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 This thesis seeks to formulate a Reformation solution to the disputed question 
in theology concerning the fate of the unevangelized by applying George Lindbeck’s 
rule theory approach through the doctrinal principles of solus Christus, sola fide, and 
fides ex auditu (salvation through Christ alone by faith alone and faith from hearing). 
The proposal develops through three stages of argumentation: 1) the 
mitigation of unresolved concerns in the literature regarding Lindbeck’s view of truth; 
2) the critical evaluation of contemporary theories on the fate of the unevangelized; 3) 
the construction of a prospective fides ex auditu solution using conceptual materials in 
early church and Reformation theology. 
After the publication of The Nature of Doctrine there are a cluster of scholars 
who take issue with Lindbeck’s epistemology as he seems to disregard the ‘usual’ 
ways of speaking about truth. Thus, the first section offers an interpretation of 
Lindbeck that relocates his view in the history of ideas and demonstrates the 
conventional nature of his epistemic approach. 
Using rule theory, the second section analyzes three evangelical and two 
Roman Catholic proposals on the question of the unevangelized and reveals ways in 
which each fall short of the noted doctrinal principles. Yet it also asserts that Gavin 
D’Costa’s use of the preparatio evangelica tradition and his incorporation of the 
doctrine of Christ’s descent into hell brings rich theological resources to the 
discussion. 
Taking D’Costa’s cue, the final part seeks to explain the preparation of an 
unevangelized person for the gospel and their possible future salvation in a way that 
makes the prospective fides ex auditu approach an intelligible option in Reformation 
theology. The section employs a systematic evaluation and creative extrapolation of 
relevant themes and concepts from early church writings and the works of Magisterial 
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 In the early days of the church the chief concern regarding the question of the 
unevangelized was about the salvation of Old Testament saints who had died before 
the coming of Christ. There was no doubt that the atonement extended to these 
individuals, but outside explicit knowledge of the person of Jesus how would they be 
saved? To answer this question, many of the early church fathers taught that the good 
news of Christ was also made known to those in hades (the place of the dead), 
whereby the righteous received the proclamation of the gospel with faith.1 And many 
of the fathers understood ‘the righteous’ to be those who had lived in accordance with 
the law of Moses, or with that which is naturally good and true in the world. 
For instance, Justin Martyr (100-165) states in his Dialogue with Trypho: 
[Those Jews] who regulated their lives by the law of Moses would in like 
manner be saved. For what in the law of Moses is naturally good, and pious, 
and righteous, and has been prescribed to be done by those who obey it. . . . 
Since those who did that which is universally, naturally, and eternally good 
are pleasing to God, they shall be saved through this Christ in the resurrection 
equally with those righteous men who were before them, namely Noah, and 
Enoch, and Jacob, and whoever else there be, along with those who have 
known this Christ.2 
 
From this perspective, Justin teaches that all those who lived in accordance with 
reason (logos) did, to a certain degree, partake of the Logos, the pre-incarnate Christ. 
                                               
1 For examples, see, Wouter Biesbrouck, “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus, Sed Extra 
Mundum Nulla Damnatio: Reappropriating Christ’s Descent into Hell for Theology of 
Religions,” Louvain Studies 37 (2013): 107–132; Jared Wicks, “Christ’s Saving 
Descent to the Dead: Early Witnesses from Ignatius of Antioch to Origen,” Pro 
Ecclesia 17, no. 3 (2008): 281–309; Hilarion Alfeyev, Christ the Conqueror of Hell: 
The Descent into Hades from an Orthodox Perspective (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 2009) 43-82. 
2 Justin Martyr, “Dialogue with Trypho,” 45, trans. Marcus Dods and George Reith, 
New Advent, accessed December 6, 2016, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/01283.htm. 
 2 
Full participation obtained only within the progressive special revelation given 
through the Jews and manifested in the incarnate Christ, but Justin also teaches that 
the Logos spread ‘seeds of the truth’ (semina veritatis) or ‘seeds of logos’ (logos 
spermatikos) among all the nations. For example, speaking of Plato, Stoics, “and the 
poets, and historians,” Justin says, “Each man spoke well in proportion to the share he 
had of the spermatic word, seeing what was related to it.”3 Yet Gerald McDermott 
notes that Justin did not see these elements of truth as being sufficient in themselves 
for salvation: “There were righteous pagans who, though uncircumcised and failing to 
keep the sabbath, were yet ‘pleasing to God.’ But they did not possess Christian 
grace, which is the presence of the person of the Logos.”4 Hence, ‘righteous pagans’ 
still needed to encounter the reality of Christ to obtain salvation. 
Another example from the early church is Clement of Alexandria (150-215), 
who claims that philosophy itself was a covenant given by God to the Greeks: 
We shall not err in alleging that all things necessary and profitable for life 
came to us from God, and that philosophy more especially was given to the 
Greeks, as a covenant peculiar to them—being, as it is, a stepping-stone to the 
philosophy which is according to Christ.5 
 
Similar to Justin’s use of the ‘seeds of truth,’ Clement views this covenant as a 
temporary act of divine preparation for the coming of Christ: “Before the advent of 
the Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness. . . . Philosophy, 
therefore, was a preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ.”6 
Jacques Dupuis explains: 
                                               
3 For example, see, Justin Martyr, “The Second Apology,” 13,  trans. Marcus Dods 
and George Reith, New Advent, accessed August 1, 2014, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0127.htm. 
4 Gerald R. McDermott, God’s Rivals: Why Has God Allowed Different Religions?: 
Insights from the Bible and the Early Church (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007), 
95; emphasis original. Citing, Justin Martyr, Second Apology 13; Dialogue with 
Trypho 34, 19, 92, 46. 
5 Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, 6.8, trans. William Wilson, New Advent, 
accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02106.htm. 
6 Ibid., 1.1. 
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As is the case for the Jewish Law itself, the function of philosophy is a 
transitional one. Having prepared people for Christ’s coming, it must finally 
make room for him. . . . Philosophy is a partial knowledge; Christ alone is the 
whole truth.7 
 
In this way, Justin and Clement form part of a long tradition that views the universal 
moral law as the medium by which all people have at least some access to God. That 
is, through elements of the good, holy, and true that are more or less present in all 
major religions and philosophies.8 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen explains: 
According to Justin and other Apologists, access to salvation, at least in some 
form—perhaps a not-yet-perfect form—was available through the Logos that 
was “sown” in all human cultures and religions. They entertained the idea that 
the seminal word or reason in which all humankind partakes gives access to 
God even for those who have never heard of Christ. But of course, the purpose 
of Christian mission is to make explicit what was implicit. So Christ 
represents the fullness and perfection of “seeds of logos.”9 
 
More recently, the Roman Catholic Church has carried this tradition forward 
by applying it to the situation of the unevangelized who have died since the coming of 
Christ. For instance, the Vatican II document Lumen Gentium summarizes the 
Catholic position, stating: 
Those also can attain to salvation who through no fault of their own do not 
know the Gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely seek God and moved 
by grace strive by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them through the 
dictates of conscience. . . . Whatever good or truth is found amongst them is 
looked upon by the Church as a preparation for the Gospel.10 
 
Prior to Vatican II the notion of ‘preparation for the gospel’ (preparatio evangelica) 
was applied only to the Old Testament Scriptures, the supernatural revelation given to 
                                               
7 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 1997), 67-68. 
8 For a comprehensive treatment of the natural law tradition, see, Norman Doe, ed., 
Christianity and Natural Law: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). 
9 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, 
Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 
2003), 57. 




and through Israel preparing the way for the coming of Christ and the establishment 
of the New Covenant.11 Yet the application of preparatio in Lumen Gentium seems to 
indicate that what was once viewed as being part of natural revelation – i.e., elements 
of the good and true; ‘seeds of the Word’ – are now being given a more elevated 
function, perhaps even a supernatural one.12 
Having said this, it is important to recognize that just as with the early church 
fathers, these elements serve only as a preparation for the gospel and are not 
themselves the gospel nor do they constitute alternative ways of salvation. Thus the 
Catholic Church is careful not to give a definitive statement on how salvation is 
granted to those after Christ: 
With respect to the way in which the salvific grace of God — which is always 
given by means of Christ in the Spirit and has a mysterious relationship to the 
Church — comes to individual non-Christians, the Second Vatican Council 
limited itself to the statement that God bestows it “in ways known to 
himself.”13 
 
Nevertheless, after Vatican II the church encouraged theologians to continue 
discussing the issue,14 and one of the first to take up this task was Karl Rahner. 
 In brief, Rahner’s theory uses the notions of ‘implicit faith’ and ‘anonymous 
Christian’ to propose that because all grace is God’s grace and all salvation comes 
from Christ then, in the case of the unevangelized, faith is implicit and grace leads a 
person’s “consciousness subjectively, even though it is not known objectively.”15 
What his answer misses, however, is the Council’s affirmation that saving grace 
                                               
11 For instance, see, Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 1997) 
428 (1964, 122). 
12 Gavin D’Costa provides a helpful examination of this issue in, Vatican II: Catholic 
Doctrines on Jews and Muslims (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 99-107. 
13 CDF (2000), “Dominus Iesus,” 21, accessed July 30, 2014, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_do
c_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html. This excerpt is commenting on and quoting “Ad 
Gentes,” 7. 
14 CDF, “Dominus Iesus”, 21. 
15 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, trans. Karl Kruger, vol. V (London: 
Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1966), 131. 
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comes only through Christ by the Spirit in relation to the church’s proclamation of the 
gospel.16 An observation also made by Protestant theologian George Lindbeck, who 
served as an official Lutheran observer during Vatican II. Concerning Rahner’s 
position, he states: 
If this [salvation], we may ask, abundantly occurs quite apart from explicit 
awareness of God, much less of Jesus, what happens to the cruciality of the 
gospel, of the fides ex auditu [faith by hearing, Rom 10:17], of decisions for or 
against Christ?17 
 
In response, Lindbeck calls for a “Reformation approach which holds that salvation is 
by explicit faith in Christ alone, sola fide ex auditu,” and he argues that the only 
conceivable way an unevangelized person can obtain this faith is during the time of 
death, “the point at which every human being is ultimately and expressly confronted 
by the gospel, i.e., by the crucified and risen Lord.”18 With Lindbeck’s proposal in 
mind, this thesis will evaluate the feasibility of offering a prospective fides ex auditu 




 The theological question regarding the fate of the unevangelized is a particular 
discussion in the field of theology of religions. Dupuis defines theology of religions 
as the study of “the various traditions in the context of the history of salvation and in 
their relationship to the mystery of Jesus Christ and the Christian Church.”19 The 
                                               
16 For examinations of this aspect of Rahner’s theory by Catholic theologians, see, J. 
A. DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 76-80, 91; Gavin D’Costa, Christianity 
and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions (Malden: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 21-23. 
17 George Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Christians,” in The 
Gospel and the Ambiguity of the Church, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1974), 104. 
18 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu,” 109, 115. Also see, Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, 25th Anniversary Edition. 
(Louisville: WJK Press, 2009), 45-49. 
19 Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 8. 
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question of the unevangelized then extends this study beyond the general 
consideration of religious structures to a specific concern for religious persons. That is 
to say, from a soteriological perspective, one seeks to understand the relationship of 
non-Christians to Christ and his church. 
To evaluate the various positions, scholars typically use the categories of 
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Regarding this standard typology, 
Kärkkäinen writes: 
Exclusivists hold that salvation is available only in Jesus Christ to the extent 
that those who have never heard the gospel are eternally lost. Exclusivists 
claim that salvation can be found only in the Christian church. In this scheme, 
non-Christian religions play no role in the history of salvation. For pluralists, 
other religions are legitimate means of salvation. Pluralism involves both a 
positive and negative element: Negatively, pluralism categorically rejects 
exclusivism (and often also inclusivism); positively, it affirms that people can 
find salvation in various religions and in many ways. . . . The mediating group, 
inclusivists, hold that while salvation is ontologically founded on the person of 
Christ, its benefits have been made universally available by the revelation of 
God.20 
 
We must note, however, that these descriptions provide only a broad sketch of the 
responses as a means for simplifying the overall discussion as not all theories fit 
neatly into just one category.21 This is also why Daniel Strange suggests: 
Rather than seeing these three positions as being tightly defined, it is perhaps 
more helpful to see them as three points of reference on a wide spectrum. Such 
an approach takes into account many positions that appear to fall in between 
the three defined points.22 
 
                                               
20 Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions, 24-25; emphasis 
original. 
21 It is for this reason that many are dissatisfied with the standard typology and have 
attempted to provide new categories. For a comprehensive treatment of these efforts, 
see, Christopher W. Morgan and Robert A. Peterson, eds., Faith Comes by Hearing: 
A Response to Inclusivism (Downers Grove: IVP Academic; 2008), 18-25. Also, 
Gavin D’Costa gives a compelling argument that inclusivism and pluralism are 
actually different versions of exclusivism. See, The Meeting of Religions and the 
Trinity, Faith Meets Faith (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2000), 22-23. 
22 Daniel Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised: An Analysis 
of Inclusivism in Recent Evangelical Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002), 15. 
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To this extent, although exclusivism represents the traditional point of reference (also 
called restrictivism,23 particularism,24 and ecclesiocentrism25), Kärkkäinen says that 
inclusivism “currently has the largest group of followers and it cuts across 
confessional and denominational boundaries; many theologians—from Eastern 
Orthodoxy to Roman Catholic to mainline Protestantism to evangelicalism—see it as 
the most viable option.”26 Nevertheless, while Kärkkäinen’s observation may 
characterize the ecumenical context, the evangelical situation presents a rather 
different picture as many theologians strongly contest the inclusivist position. 
Dennis Okholm and Timothy Phillips claim that because of inclusivism’s 
challenge to traditional assumptions about other religions, “the debate within the 
evangelical academy regarding salvation and the unevangelized is intense and fierce, 
dominating all other discussions.”27 Or as Robert Peterson states in more measured 
terms, “It is becoming increasingly evident that one issue upon which there is 
considerable disagreement among evangelicals is the question of the fate of those who 
have never been exposed to the gospel of Jesus Christ.”28 And the apparent source of 
this polemic is connected to the ‘wider hope’ views espoused by evangelical 
theologians Clark Pinnock and John Sanders.29 
                                               
23 See, Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a 
World of Religions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 14-15; John Sanders, No Other 
Name: An Investigation Into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1992), 37. 
24 See, Harold A. Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to 
Christian Faith & Mission (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 48-51; Dennis 
L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips, eds., Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic 
World, Counterpoints (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 16-17. 
25 See, Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 185-186; 
Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World 
Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 32-33, 36-38. 
26 Kärkkäinen, Introduction to the Theology of Religions, 25. 
27 Okholm and Phillips, Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, 12. 
28 Morgan and Peterson, Faith Comes by Hearing, 11. 
29 See, Clark Pinnock, “The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions,” in 
Christian Faith & Practice in the Modern World: Theology from an Evangelical 
Point of View, ed. Mark A. Noll and David F. Wells (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 
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Using a notion that Pinnock calls ‘the faith principle,’ he and Sanders argue 
that salvation in Christ is universally accessibly when ‘faith’ is understood as a 
person’s response to the revelation available to them, even if this knowledge does not 
include the gospel.30 For example, Pinnock states, “In my judgement, the faith 
principle is the basis of universal accessibility. According to the Bible, people are 
saved by faith, not by the content of their theology.”31 Sanders explains: 
Briefly, inclusivists affirm the particularity and finality of salvation only in 
Christ but deny that knowledge of his work is necessary for salvation. That is 
to say, they hold that the work of Jesus is ontologically necessary for salvation 
. . . but not epistemologically necessary.32 
 
As regards scriptural support, one important verse for their view is Hebrews 11:6: 
“And without faith it is impossible to please him, for whoever would draw near to 
God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him.” Pinnock 
argues: 
Referring as the author does to Abel, Enoch, and Noah, Hebrews indicates that 
people are saved by faith, not primarily by knowledge. The Jews of Jesus’ day 
knew more conceptually about God than their forefather Abraham, who knew 
relatively little. . . . What God was looking for in Abram was faith, not a 
certain quotient of knowledge. . . . The fact that the information possessed by 
the unevangelized is slight does not disqualify them from entering into a right 
relationship with God through faith.33 
 
                                               
152-168; Clark Pinnock, “Toward an Evangelical Theology of Religions,” Journal of 
the Evangelical Theological Society, no. 33 (1990): 359-368; Pinnock, A Wideness in 
God’s Mercy; Clark Pinnock, “An Inclusivist View,” in Four Views on Salvation in a 
Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1996), 95-123; John Sanders, No Other Name; John Sanders, 
“Inclusivism,” in What About Those Who Have Never Heard?: Three Views on the 
Destiny of the Unevangelized (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 21-55. 
Gerald McDermott and Harold Netland note that while Pinnock and Sanders 
provoked much debate, they were not the first to introduce the ‘wider hope’ view to 
evangelicalism. See, A Trinitarian Theology of Religions: An Evangelical Proposal 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Kindle location 701-704, n.108. 
30 See, Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 17-47, 157-168; Sanders, No Other 
Name, 131-149, 215-267. 
31 Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 158. 
32 Sanders, No Other Name, 215. 
33 Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 159-160. 
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He also asserts that “the holy pagans of the biblical story” give evidence to the faith 
principle: 
Like Job and Abimelech, there are those who, due to an inner voice, come to a 
fork in the road and turn to God in faith. . . . No one can deny the fact that the 
Bible presents these holy pagans as saved by faith, even though they knew 
neither Israelite nor Christian revelation.34 
 
From this perspective, although Pinnock and Sanders deny the possibility of universal 
salvation and stop short of claiming that other religions function as alternative salvific 
structures, their delineation of faith leads them to argue that Scripture supports the 
possibility of salvation through general revelation.35 For instance, Sanders says that 
while some theologians claim that Paul’s reference to general revelation in Romans 1-
3 means that “all deserve eternal condemnation,” he thinks Paul has a very different 
purpose in mind: 
It seems to me that it would be preferable to view Paul as addressing groups of 
people, both Jews and Gentiles, in the first three chapters of Romans, and as 
arguing that all have rejected God but that God continues in his love toward 
all peoples by sending his Son to make atonement for them. By this reading, 
the type of revelation each group has received is irrelevant to Paul’s message 
of grace.36 
 
In short, faith is the means of salvation and Christ is the sole cause, but Christ is not 
the sole object of faith.37 
The critical responses by evangelical scholars tend to revolve around one 
major issue – the biblical hermeneutics for working out the faith principle. For 
instance, concerning the use of Old Testament figures to support the faith principle, 
D. A. Carson states: 
Inclusivists who draw a parallel between modern non-Christians who have 
never heard of Christ and such Old Testament believers overlook the fact that 
these believers on the Old Testament side were responding in faith to special 
                                               
34 Ibid. Pinnock develops his scriptural support for the faith principle in six ways; see, 
159-168. 
35 See, Ibid., 115-147, 155-156; Sanders, No Other Name, 81-128, 233-236, 241-249. 
36 Sanders, No Other Name, 69. 
37 See, Ibid., 265. 
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revelation, and were not simply exercising some sort of general “faith” in an 
undefined “God.”38 
 
Similarly, in regard to Pinnock’s use of Hebrews 11:6, Ronald Nash states: 
I do not think that this is all there is to saving faith. Surely this faith in the 
existence of God must be directed to the true God, not some idol or pagan 
substitute. The New Testament clearly states that humans who would seek 
God must approach him through the one and only mediator, Jesus Christ (1 
Tim. 2:15).39 
 
Another example comes from Sanders’ chapter on inclusivism in What About Those 
Who Have Never Heard?, where he refers to God’s interaction with Pharaoh through 
Aaron and Moses, and argues: 
The God of Israel sought, through the plagues, to get Pharaoh to “know” him 
(Ex 7:5, 17; 8:10). The Hebrew word for “know” here carries with it the idea 
of relational and redemptive knowledge. Yahweh, the God of Israel, wanted 
Pharaoh and the Egyptian people to experience his truth and life-giving 
grace.40 
 
In response, Nash decries “Sanders’s badly flawed handling of the Exodus material,” 
and writes: 
Sanders’s procedure in all this is an example of a word-study fallacy known as 
“word-loading.” This occurs when someone takes a meaning a word has in 
one context and seeks to import that same meaning into a quite different 
setting. . . . In our passages in Exodus, the Hebrew word kî (that) follows the 
verb “to know” in the three instances Sanders cites (Ex 7:5, 17; 8:10). This 
construction indicates not a personal knowledge but an objective knowledge 
of fact. The verses in question do not mean that God was seeking to bring 
Pharaoh into a personal relationship with him, but that after God’s displays of 
power, Pharaoh will finally know that Yahweh is the true Sovereign and 
Lord.41 
 
                                               
38 D. A. Carson, The Gagging of God (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), 298. 
39 Ronald H. Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 124. 
40 Sanders, “Inclusivism,” Kindle location 230-233. 
41 Ronald H. Nash, “Response to Sanders,” in What About Those Who Have Never 
Heard?: Three Views on the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Downers Grove: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1995), Kindle location 651, 656-659. For examples of others who take 
issue with Pinnock’s and Sander’s use of Scripture, see; Strange, The Possibility of 
Salvation among the Unevangelised, 108-117; Okholm and Phillips, Four Views on 
Salvation in a Pluralistic World, 133-140; Stephen J. Wellum, “Saving Faith: Implicit 
or Explicit?,” in Faith Comes by Hearing: A Response to Inclusivism, ed. Christopher 
W. Morgan and Robert A. Peterson (Downers Grove: Apollos, 2008), 161-183; 
Robert A. Peterson, “Inclusivism and Exclusivism on Key Biblical Texts,” in Ibid., 
184-200.  
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To this extent, Millard Erickson seems to sum up the general evangelical reaction to 
inclusivism when he states, “Theologies of ‘wider hope,’ ‘universal accessible 
salvation,’ and ‘salvation through general revelation,’ while engaging, are not 
biblically acceptable.”42 Hence, while it may be true that inclusivist positions hold 
sway in the ecumenical context, this is not the case in the evangelical setting. 
Having said this, even though the common response has been to try and 
discredit the scriptural defense of inclusivism and to reassert the principle of explicit 
faith, it is perhaps interesting that these responses do not also include attempts to give 
a biblical defense for the impossibility of salvation for the unevangelized. That is to 
say, evangelical theologians seem to realize that one can no more prove from 
Scripture that none of the unevangelized will be saved any more than one can prove 
that some will be saved. To try and do so would only result in the same kind of 
‘flawed handling’ of Scripture for which they charge Pinnock and Sanders. So even if 
many evangelicals do not fully follow inclusivist positions, they have nonetheless 
moved closer to this point on the spectrum. As McDermott and Harold Netland state: 
Many evangelicals . . . find themselves somewhere between restrictivism and 
inclusivism, convinced that each goes beyond what the biblical data affirm. 
Those in this group admit that in principle God might save some who have 
never explicitly heard the gospel, but they add that we simply do not know 
whether this occurs or, if so, how many might be saved in this manner.43 
 
It appears, then, that in regard to the question of the unevangelized many evangelicals 
choose to remain agnostic on the issue.44 “When asked if there will be people in 
heaven who never had a chance to hear the gospel during their lifetime,” says Nash, 
                                               
42 Millard J. Erickson, “The State of the Unevangelized and Its Missionary 
Implications,” in Missiology: An Introduction, ed. John Mark Terry, 2nd ed. 
(Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2015), Kindle location 2965. 
43 McDermott and Netland, A Trinitarian Theology of Religions, Kindle location 
3305-3308. 
44 Pinnock calls this position “reverent agnosticism”; see, A Wideness in God’s 
Mercy, 150. Strange delineates agnostic views further in, The Possibility of Salvation 
among the Unevangelised, 305-331. 
 12 
“the first thing a wise exclusivist will say is that he does not know.”45 Yet for others, 
this response is not merely the ‘first thing’ one should say but rather the only thing 
that one should say. For instance, Robert McQuilkin argues: 
We may not be able to prove from Scripture with absolute certainty that no 
soul since Pentecost has ever been saved by extraordinary means without the 
knowledge of Christ. But neither can we prove from Scripture that a single 
soul has been so saved. . . . It may or may not be morally right for me to think 
there may be another way and to hope there is some other escape. But for me 
to propose it to other believers, to discuss it as a possibility, is certainly 
dangerous, if not immoral.46 
 
Nevertheless, immoral or not, there are some who are willing to express a measure of 
hope and even venture a tentative explanation for how and why the salvation of an 
unevangelized person might be possible. For example, in response to the question of 
whether it might not be true that God has saved some individuals who did not know 
Christ, J. I. Packer states: 
The answer surely is: yes, it might be true, as it seems to have been true for 
some non-Israelites in Old Testament times: think of Melchizedek, Job, 
Naaman, Cyrus, Nebuchadnezzar, the sailors in Jonah’s boat, and the 
Ninevites to whom he preached, for starters. In heaven, any such penitents will 
learn that they were saved by Christ’s death and their hearts were renewed by 
the Holy Spirit, and they will worship God accordingly. Christians since the 
second century have voiced the hope that there are such people, and we may 
properly voice the same hope today. But — and this is the point to consider — 
we have no warrant from Scripture to expect that God will act thus in any 
single case where the Gospel is not yet known. To cherish this hope, therefore, 
is not to diminish in the slightest our urgent and never-ending missionary 
obligation.47 
 
Yet whereas Packer establishes his tentative hope for the unevangelized on the 
salvation of ‘non-Israelites in Old Testament times,’ McDermott and Netland base 
their hopeful agnostic position on God’s grace through general revelation: 
In our judgment, the wisest response to the issue is to acknowledge the 
possibility that some who never hear the gospel might nonetheless, through 
                                               
45 Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior?, 164. 
46 J. Robertson McQuilkin, The Great Omission: A Biblical Basis for World 
Evangelism (Waynesboro: Gabriel Pub., 2002), 50-51. 
47 J. I. Packer, “Evangelicals and the Way of Salvation,” in Evangelical Affirmations 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1981), 123. 
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God’s grace, respond to what they know of God through general revelation 
and turn to him in faith for forgiveness.48 
 
For the most part, few evangelicals dare to venture much beyond this kind of agnostic 
answer. However, outside the Western context we find that evangelicals from other 
parts of the world remain unsatisfied with the lack of a robust theology of the 
unevangelized. 
In 1992, more than eighty evangelical theologians from twenty-eight countries 
(mostly non-Western) met in Manila, Philippines to address the subject of “the unique 
Christ” and other religions.49 In regard to the question of the unevangelized, they 
report: 
Old Testament saints, who did not know the name Jesus, nevertheless found 
salvation. Is it possible that others also might find salvation through the blood 
of Jesus Christ although they do not consciously know the name of Jesus? We 
did not achieve a consensus on how to answer this question. More study is 
needed.50 
 
The declaration that ‘more study is needed’ indicates a gap in evangelical theology. 
Indeed, there is a discrepancy in the attempts to criticize the inclusivist use of Old 
Testament figures and general revelation while using the same approach to support 
agnostic positions. Thus, this thesis seeks to contribute to the on-going development 




 Although the particular context of the problem is evangelical theology, my 
chief interlocutor (George Lindbeck) comes from outside this framework. The hope is 
that this approach will open up new avenues in the discussion so that the conversation 
can move beyond ambiguous references to Old Testament figures and natural 
                                               
48 McDermott and Netland, A Trinitarian Theology of Religions, Kindle location 
3368. 
49 Bong Rin Ro, The Unique Christ in Our Pluralistic World, vol. 5 (Seoul: WEF 
Theological Commission, 1993). 
50 Ibid., 10; emphasis added. 
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revelation, or to vague notions of non-Christian faith and repentance. The evangelical 
community need fresh doctrinal and theological expressions on the issue for 
ministering faithfully in the contemporary environment. As Lindbeck asserts: 
Religious traditions are not transformed, abandoned, or replaced because of an 
upwelling of new or different ways of feeling about the self, world, or God, 
but because a religious interpretive scheme (embodied, as it always is, in 
religious practice and belief) develops anomalies in its application in new 
contexts.51 
 
In this way, we might suggest that the interpretive scheme of the traditional 
exclusivist way of understanding the relation of the church to non-Christians and 
other religions is developing anomalies, and yet the evangelical community are 
growing unsatisfied with the contemporary developments. We can say for sure that 
the systematic introduction of the inclusivist category into the evangelical tradition 
has opened up something of a theological and missiological breach that cannot be 
mended through simple appeal to Scripture alone. How then are we to assess and 
contribute to the formulation of new theological interpretations on the matter? 
Lindbeck insists that this process should begin by viewing doctrines as rules 
which guide discussion rather than as fixed propositional statements that remain 
immune to changing contexts.52 In other words, if doctrines are meant to regulate 
theology then the question is not which theory is true (i.e., the one and only 
objectively right answer), but which theory is best. And “which theory is 
theologically best depends on how well it organizes the data of Scripture and tradition 
with a view to their use in Christian worship and life.”53 Hence, the emphasis of this 
approach is on the organization of the data as guided by the relevant doctrinal rules. 
                                               
51 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 25. 
52 We will discuss this aspect of Lindbeck’s theory in more detail in chapters 2-3. 
53 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 92. 
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To this purpose, Lindbeck provides a taxonomy of doctrines.54 First, he 
distinguishes between “practical doctrines” and “doctrines that concern belief.”55 For 
example, the command to love God and neighbor regulates Christian action 
(practical) while the teaching on the Trinity regulates Christian belief. Second, he 
states that doctrines can be either ‘conditionally essential’ or ‘unconditionally 
essential.’ In this case, both the command to love God and others and the Trinitarian 
confession represent unconditionally essential rules, as there is no context in which 
these rules will not apply. An example of a conditionally essential rule, then, is “the 
prohibition against Christian participation in war.”56 For while this rule has been held 
by certain Christians in certain places at certain times, “under the circumstances 
prevailing during most of Christian history, pacifism has not generally been regarded 
as obligatory.”57 Lindbeck goes on to subdivide conditionally essential doctrines 
twice more – permanent or temporary, reversible and irreversible – but our 
application of his approach concerns the nature of unconditionally essential doctrines, 
which he says are always permanent and irreversible.58 The reason this description is 
important for our purposes here is because within the systematic historical framework 
that evangelicals interpret the data of Scripture and tradition (i.e., Reformation 
theology), the sola fide ex auditu exists as an unconditionally essential doctrine. 
This does not mean that nothing new can be said about non-Christians and 
other religions, or that all must agree on a single solution. Rather, it simply allows the 
rules instantiated by this doctrine – i.e.; solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu – 
to serve as communal guidelines for assessing and formulating theories. Or as 
Lindbeck states, this approach “provides a nonreductive framework for discussion 
                                               
54 See, Ibid., 70-75. 





among those who genuinely disagree.”59 Nevertheless, before I employ rule theory to 
the question of the unevangelized I must first seek to rehabilitate Lindbeck’s approach 
from the lingering epistemic confusion left in the wake of his book The Nature of 
Doctrine. To this purpose, I survey a number of scholars who are concerned with 
Lindbeck’s conception of truth and identify the common points of contention among 
his critics. This exercise focuses on salient reviews from scholars such as Alister 
McGrath, Geoffrey Wainwright, Stephen Williams, Paul DeHart, D. Z. Phillips, Chad 
Pecknold, and John Milbank. While observing the shared concerns about Lindbeck’s 
view of truth, the survey also acts as a critique of these common objections in an 
attempt to mitigate the concerns. 
Assuming then that I have succeeded in providing a satisfying answer to the 
epistemic issue, I then attempt to test Lindbeck’s rule theory in two ways. First, I use 
it to evaluate three evangelical proposals representing the three general positions in 
evangelicalism (exclusivism, agnosticism, and inclusivism), along with two Roman 
Catholic proposals which seek to maintain the sola fide ex auditu principle. Other 
than Lindbeck, the primary interlocutors for this step are evangelical theologians 
Daniel Strange, Terrance Tiessen, and John Stott, along with Roman Catholic 
theologians Joseph DiNoia and Gavin D’Costa. 
Regarding the exclusivist position, I chose Strange for two reasons; one 
academic and one personal.60 The academic reason is simply that, as Christopher 
Morgan states, Strange’s monograph, The Possibility of Salvation Among the 
                                               
59 Ibid., 77. 
60 Other representatives of the exclusivist position are, Carl F. H. Henry, Giving a 
Reason for Our Hope (Boston: Wilde, 1949); God, Revelation, and Authority, vol. 6 
(Waco: Word Books, 1983), 360-369; “Is It Fair?,” in Through No Fault of Their 
Own? The Fate of Those Who Have Never Heard, ed. William Crockett and James 
Sigountos (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1991), 245-256; and R. C. Sproul, Reason to 
Believe (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982). 
 17 
Unevangelised, “is arguably the best work by an exclusivist.”61 Thus he is an 
appropriate candidate for our evaluation of this position. The personal reason is that 
his doctoral supervisor, Gavin D’Costa (under whose direction he produced his 
remarkable work) is also my doctoral supervisor, which means that my assessment 
represents something of a continuing conversation. Concerning the inclusivist 
position I chose not to evaluate Pinnock and Sanders, as they root their inclusivist 
views in an open theist view of divine knowledge.62 As Pinnock explains, open theism 
“adds one important feature to free will theism, namely, the inference that, if certain 
aspects of the future are unsettled owing to human freedom, it will not be possible for 
God (or anyone) to know the future definitely and exhaustively.”63 Stated bluntly, this 
view of God does not represent an orthodox evangelical understanding of divine 
foreknowledge; which is, according to the Evangelical Theological Society’s response 
to Pinnock and Sanders, that “the Bible clearly teaches that God has complete, 
accurate, and infallible knowledge of all events past, present, and future, including all 
future decisions and actions of free moral agents.”64 Therefore Tiessen provides a 
                                               
61 Morgan and Peterson, Faith Comes by Hearing, 21. Other works by strange that I 
will reference are, “General Revelation: Sufficient or Insufficient?,” in Faith Comes 
by Hearing: A Response to Inclusivism, ed. Christopher W. Morgan and Robert A. 
Peterson (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2008); For Their Rock Is Not as Our 
Rock: An Evangelical Theology of Religions (Nottingham: Apollos, 2014). 
62 See, Clark H. Pinnock, ed., The Grace of God and the Will of Man (Minneapolis: 
Bethany House, 1989); Clark Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s 
Openness, Didsbury lectures 2000 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001); Clark H. 
Pinnock, “Systematic Theology,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to 
the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 1994), 101-125; Clark Pinnock, “Constrained by Love: Divine 
Self-Restraint According to Open Theism,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 34, no. 
2 (Summer 2007): 149–160; and John Sanders, “Historical Considerations,” in The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. 
Clark H. Pinnock (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 59-100; John Sanders, 
“An Introduction to Open Theism,” Reformed Review 60, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 34-50. 
63 Pinnock, “Constrained by Love,” 149. 
64 See, Jason A. Nicholls, “Openness and Inerrancy: Can They Be Compatible?,” 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45, no. 4 (December 2002): 629-649; 
and Bruce Ware, “Defining Evangelicalism’s Boundaries Theologically: Is Open 
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more suitable contrast as he seeks to defend an inclusivist position from an 
understanding of divine foreknowledge that is rooted in the Calvinist tradition; a view 
he calls “soft determinism,” whereby “God works in the minds and hearts of human 
beings in a way that ensures the outcome but that does not destroy the human act of 
volition.”65 
As for the agnostic position, I chose to evaluate John Stott because he is a 
well-known and highly respected figure within evangelicalism. Perhaps the same 
could be said for J. I. Packer, but Stott has more to say on the question of the 
unevangelized than does Packer and therefore provides more material with which to 
assess this position.66 Finally, the reason I chose to evaluate Roman Catholic 
theologians DiNoia and D’Costa, is that they are the only scholars to date who offer a 
prospective fides ex auditu option that is also genealogically connected to Lindbeck in 
the history of ideas. 
The last part of the thesis consists of the development of a Reformation 
prospective fides ex auditu option, and the primary sources for this effort are 
Magisterial Reformers Martin Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, and John Calvin. To be sure, 
many more theologians could have informed this Reformation approach (including 
some of the radical reformers),67 but the purpose here is not to provide a general 
representation of Reformation theology on the issue but rather to offer a proposal that 
is based on a close reading of these leading fathers of Reformation faith.68 
                                               
Theism Evangelical?,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 
193-212.  
65 Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?, 20. 
66 Another candidate is Christopher Wright, The Uniqueness of Jesus (Grand Rapids: 
Monarch, 2001), 40-51. 
67 For a list of other influential Reformation figures, see, Timothy George, Theology 
of the Reformers (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2013), 18. 
68 Timothy George refers to Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin as “the leaders of the 
Protestant movement”; Ibid., 12. 
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Finally, I must note that for certain sections of this thesis I depend upon 
English translations of sources which were originally written in Chinese and in Latin. 
Although I do not read these languages, the English versions of these works are 
prolific and therefore provide adequate support for the particular arguments. 
 
The Delineation of Key Terms 
 
 Many terms will acquire their specific meanings over the course of this 
research, but it will aid our discussion if I provide initial definitions for a few key 
terms. 
 Unevangelized – Strange delineates four possible groups of people to which 
this term might refer: 
1. Those since the time of Christ, who have lived and died without 
receiving the gospel ex auditu. . . .  
2. Those who lived prior to the coming of Christ and so before the 
formulation known as ‘the gospel.’ . . .  
3. Those who are in hearing range of the gospel and are able to hear 
the gospel in the ‘biological’ sense of the word ‘hearing’ but are unable to 
understand the words that are being spoken. . . .  
4. Those who have not been presented with a full and adequate 
presentation of the Gospel and have received only a perverted or incomplete 
gospel.69 
 
For our purposes here, the focus is chiefly on categories 1 and 4, although at times it 
will expand to include category 2. Thus, ‘unevangelized’ in this thesis refers either to 
those who have never heard the gospel message during their lifetime, or who have 
only a partial or corrupted version of the gospel and no genuine opportunity to 
respond with faith before death. 
 Faith – In particular, this thesis is concerned with the notion of saving faith. 
Protestant scholastic theology holds that saving faith is contingent upon the special 
revelation of God through Christ and involves intellectual apprehension of the gospel 
                                               
69 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation among the Unevangelised, 33-34. 
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(knowledge and assent) and the movement of the will (trust). As Reformed theologian 
Richard Muller explains, the “three components” of saving faith are: 
(1) notitia, knowledge, the actual content of the gospel and the promises of 
God; (2) assensus, assent, by which the intellect acknowledges the truth of 
notitia, apart from any personal trust or saving appropriation of that 
knowledge; (3) fiducia, trust, or apprehensio fiducialis, faithful apprehension, 
which appropriates savingly, by an act of the will, the true knowledge of the 
promises of God in Christ.70 
 
To the extent that our goal is a ‘Reformation’ proposal, perhaps this definition would 
suffice for a rule theory approach. But to the extent that we seek to develop this 
proposal using Lindbeck’s theoretical framework, we need to expand upon this 
definition. 
 For Lindbeck, a genuine declaration of the Lordship of Christ obtains “only as 
it is used in the activities of adoration, proclamation, obedience, promise-hearing, and 
promise-keeping which shape individuals and communities into conformity to the 
mind of Christ.”71 In other words, a willful act based on intellectual apprehension of 
the gospel is only part of what constitutes a faith response. True faith also requires 
one to acculturate the life of the church, to become familiar with and competent in the 
Christian way of being in the world: “It is only by acquiring some familiarity with the 
determinate settings in which religious utterances acquire propositional force that one 
can grasp their meaning well enough genuinely to reject (or accept) them.”72 In 
consequence, ‘proclaiming the gospel’ or ‘hearing the gospel’ involves the acquisition 
of a Christian habitus, and therefore saving faith demands more than just the 
transmission and willful acceptance of intellectual knowledge about Christ. 
                                               
70 Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn 
Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2006), 
115-116. 
71 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 54. We will discuss this aspect of Lindbeck’s 
approach in more detail in chapters 1 and 2. 
72 Ibid. 
 21 
 Evangelical – Whether used as a proper noun or adjective, singular or plural, 
the purpose of this term and its derivatives in the present work is to convey that which 
is of maximum importance within the tradition. For instance, Roger Olson explains, 
“Evangelicalism is simply synonymous with authentic Christianity as it is founded on 
and remains faithful to the ‘evangel’—the good news of Jesus Christ.”73 Or as 
Michael Bird asserts, “The most central thing in evangelical theology is the 
evangel.”74 Thus the effort to uphold the fides ex auditu principle in the present work 
is not merely an academic exercise, but is a prayer-filled attempt to meet genuine 
missiological and pastoral concerns of evangelical faith. ‘Faith’ occurs only in the 
context of the explicit proclamation and hearing of the gospel of Christ. 
 
The Summary of Chapters 
 
 Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is divided into three parts. Part 
1 consists of chapters 2-3 and is an evaluation of Lindbeck’s theory of doctrine and 
truth. To this purpose, Chapter 2 considers reviews from several scholars who are 
concerned with Lindbeck’s conception of truth and identifies and critiques some of 
the common points of contention in the literature. This chapter will also seek to locate 
Lindbeck’s epistemology in the history of ideas by comparing it with the views of 
Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While appreciatively 
surveying the various ways Lindbeck coincides with these thinkers, I will argue that 
none of them can account fully for his configuration of truth and doctrine, thereby 
setting the stage for Chapter 3. 
                                               
73 Roger E. Olson, Pocket History of Evangelical Theology (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2007), 8; emphasis original. 
74 Michael F. Bird, Evangelical Theology: A Biblical and Systematic Introduction 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), Kindle location 351. For other treatments of the 
meaning of ‘evangelical,’ see, John Stackhouse, ed., Evangelical Futures: A 
Conversation of Theological Method ([S.l.]: Regent College Pub.), 40-58; McDermott 
and Netland, A Trinitarian Theology of Religions, Kindle location 100-780. 
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 Having argued that major aspects of Western thought cannot fully account for 
Lindbeck’s particular epistemology, Chapter 3 changes the focus of the investigation 
by considering the possibility that more subtle and pervasive influences on his 
thought come from East Asian philosophy. Noting that Lindbeck lived the first 
seventeen years of his life in East Asia, I seek to test the hypothesis through a 
comparison of his theory with elements of Confucianism and with Chinese 
philosophy in general. It is, then, with this alternative reading of Lindbeck in hand 
that I proceed to Part 2 of the thesis. 
 Part 2 (chapters 4-5) is the first step in the application of rule theory to the 
theological question regarding the fate of the unevangelized. Chapter 4 first 
establishes the regulative principles defined by the solus Christus, sola fide, and fides 
ex auditu, and then utilizes this doctrinal rubric to critically evaluate the theories of 
evangelical theologians Daniel Strange (exclusivist), Terrance Tiessen (inclusivist), 
and John Stott (agnostic). The examination demonstrates that while all three affirm 
the necessary doctrinal rules of discussion, they each organize these principles 
differently. Moreover, each falls short in their attempt to uphold the fides ex auditu. 
 Chapter 5 considers Lindbeck’s assertion that the only conceivable way to 
affirm the possibility of salvation for the unevangelized and maintain the fides ex 
auditu at the same time, is through a prospective approach. That is, by proposing that 
all will be confronted by the gospel in death. I once again employ the doctrinal rubric 
to assess the prospective theories of Lindbeck and of Roman Catholic theologians 
Joseph DiNoia and Gavin D’Costa. I note two gaps in Lindbeck’s approach – the lack 
of explanation for how an unevangelized person is prepared in advance for an after-
death-encounter with the gospel, and the lack of a conceptual theological space and 
time for explaining how an unevangelized person obtains saving faith in death. Then, 
drawing from DiNoia’s and D’Costa’s proposals, I suggest that these issues might be 
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overcome through a Reformation application of the preparatio evangelica tradition 
and the doctrine of Christ’s descent into hell. 
 Chapters 6-7 make up the third and final part of the thesis and constitute the 
main contribution to the discussion. Chapter 6 first seeks to establish historical 
theological support for a ‘Reformation’ approach to the question of the 
unevangelized, and then provides a systematic argument for understanding 
‘preparation for the gospel’ as a gracious action by the Holy Spirit through the natural 
law rather than as enduring things within conscience and culture. I develop this theory 
through a creative extrapolation of Martin Luther’s understanding of the function and 
purpose of the law and its relation to saving grace. 
 Chapter 7 regards the need for a conceptual space and time in which an 
unevangelized person might come to faith after death, and with D’Costa I suggest that 
this need can be met in the descensus doctrine. Drawing from early church treatments 
of the descent and from the writings of Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin on the subject, I 
propose the possibility of an objective space and time that is conducive to the 
salvation of unevangelized individuals who are subjectively in the same state as those 
who benefited from Christ’s descent into hades. I then conclude with a summation of 
reasons for why the prospective fides ex auditu solution presented in this thesis is 








































 After twenty-five years participating in ecumenical discussion between 
Roman Catholics and Lutherans, George Lindbeck wrote his seminal book The 
Nature of Doctrine to suggest an alternative approach for understanding Christian 
doctrine.1 Though a slim volume it is nonetheless dense with potential implications. 
Some say his theory is reductionist,2 which often coincides with accusations of 
fideism,3 or that he recommends a retreat from society,4 or that he offers a relativistic 
postmodern ideology.5 Others take issue with his variant use of certain nontheological 
thinkers such as Clifford Geertz6 and Ludwig Wittgenstein,7 or of his appropriation of 
theologians like Karl Barth8 and Thomas Aquinas.9 Yet it could be that these and 
other concerns derive mostly from inchoate attempts to locate Lindbeck’s 
configuration of truth in the history of ideas. 
 Bruce Marshall observes that a common concern among critics is that 
                                               
1 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
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Lindbeck “is soft on truth . . . failing to account for the universality and objectivity of 
truth, in particular the truth of Christian doctrine.”10 This worry is understandable 
considering the way Lindbeck employs common truth terms in rather uncommon 
ways, and it is for this reason that Marshall insists that many of these criticisms stem 
more from his “terminological infelicity” than from “substantive disagreement.”11 
 In light of these issues, Part 1 of this thesis seeks to open up new pathways in 
the conversation by changing the epistemological context for locating Lindbeck’s 
theory in the history of ideas. To this purpose, the systematic argument in this chapter 
begins with a concise explanation of Lindbeck’s notion of truth, followed by an 
evaluation of several common points of contention among scholars who are 
concerned with his epistemology. Observing these criticisms will demonstrate the 
difficulty in trying to hold Lindbeck to the ‘usual’ standards of epistemic speech, and 
thus provide a clearer picture of the distinct characteristics of his theory. 
In light of this analysis, the next section compares Lindbeck’s view of truth to 
the works of Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While 
appreciatively surveying the various ways Lindbeck coincides with each of these 
thinkers, I attempt to demonstrate that none of them can fully account for his 
configuration of truth and doctrine. The final section, then, considers a long-neglected 
feature of Lindbeck’s work that might finally help locate his notion of truth and offer 
a stronger interpretive lens for understanding his ‘rule theory’ of doctrine. 
Having said this, the point of this work is not to try and revive postliberalism 
from recent attempts to bury it,12 but rather to make Lindbeck’s rule theory of 
doctrine operational for theological application. For as Marshall observes, “The rule 
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theory of doctrine has sometimes contributed to worries about Lindbeck’s view of 
truth, but so far as I know it has never been relied upon explicitly to further a 
particular ecumenical proposal.”13 The goal here, then, is to offer a fresh account of 
Lindbeck’s epistemic method so that we might apply his theory of doctrine to the 
disputed question in theology regarding the fate of the unevangelized. 
 
A Cursory Overview of Lindbeck’s Approach 
 
 Based on his many years of involvement in ecumenical discussion, Lindbeck 
argues that it is often doctrinal differences that stand in the way of Christian 
ecumenism. Yet he believes this issue is due primarily to participants’ misconception 
of the true nature of doctrine, which then leads to a general misunderstanding of the 
intrinsic practice for determining faithful and unfaithful doctrinal changes.14 Thus, to 
resolve this ecumenical problematic he argues that it is necessary to identify the 
particular function and purpose of religious doctrine through a “pretheological” 
approach.15 
 To establish this alternative method Lindbeck delineates the prevailing 
theological views on doctrine into three general categories. The first category consists 
of views that focus on the “cognitive aspects of religion,” and he says these theories 
maintain that religious truth claims about objective reality function like scientific 
propositions.16 The problem with this view, argues Lindbeck, is that within this 
paradigm it is impossible for one to account for the variable nature of doctrine 
because those who think of doctrine in this way believe that “if a doctrine is once true, 
it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false.”17 Hence, he concludes that 
                                               
13 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, xxiii. 
14 See, Ibid., xxxiii-xxxviii. 
15 Ibid., xxx, xxxvi, 11. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Ibid. 
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theories in the cognitive-propositional category cannot fully account for the historical 
development and changing doctrinal positions in the Christian tradition.18 
 He labels the second category “experiential-expressive” theologies, as these 
views posit a common universal core to all the various religions and their particular 
expressions and experiences.19 Yet he claims that these approaches are unhelpful for 
understanding doctrine, because “insofar as doctrines function as nondiscursive 
symbols, they are polyvalent in import and therefore subject to changes of meaning or 
even to a total loss of meaningfulness.”20 For instance, if the affirmation of the 
resurrection is not held by Christians as “an enduring communal norm of belief and 
practice” but as one type of a universal experience that can be expressed in other 
ways, then such a view cannot explain its doctrinal constancy within historical 
Christianity.21 
 Finally, Lindbeck refers to the third category as a “two-dimensional outlook,” 
because these kinds of approaches attempt to reposition both cognitive and 
experiential approaches to form a mediating view for explaining the variable and 
invariable matters of faith.22 As such, he argues that these theories are better able to 
reach the ecumenical goal of “doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation,” and it is 
then for this reason that he attempts to apply this kind of ‘two-dimensional outlook’ to 
the formulation of his own theory.23 To this purpose, he contends that the way to 
account for the invariable and variable nature of doctrine is to locate its meaning and 
function within the “organic character of the faith,”24 and he proposes the application 
                                               
18 Ibid., 64. 
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20 Ibid., 3. 
21 Ibid., 66. 
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Ibid., 2-4. 
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of a “‘regulative’ or ‘rule’ theory” methodology within a “‘cultural-linguistic’ 
approach.”25 
 
The Nature of Truth and Doctrine 
  
 Regarding truth and doctrine, Lindbeck correlates his cultural-linguistic theory 
with a sense of “true” he calls “categorial truth.”26 Whereas cognitive-propositional 
views expect a specific religious statement to correspond directly to ontological 
reality, a categorial view sees this statement existing as just one piece within an entire 
interconnected system.27 This notion means that a religious statement can only 
correspond to a system, and only a system as a whole is capable of corresponding to 
independent reality.28 For instance, Lindbeck breaks down this understanding of truth 
further by explaining two ways in which religious truth obtains. First is the 
“intrasystematic truth” of a statement, referring to its internal coherence as regards the 
situational context of a religious system.29 For Lindbeck, this kind of truth goes 
beyond mere propositional statements to include performative features as well: 
Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the total 
relevant context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-
linguistic terms, is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of 
life.30 
 
Second is “ontological truth,” which may obtain when a performative statement is 
intrasystematically true within a religion that has the categories necessary for 
correspondence with the most important thing in the universe.31 Lindbeck reasons that 
for “epistemological realists,” a statement which is intrasystematically true need not 
be ontologically true, but for one to be ontologically true it must also be 
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intrasystematically true.32 Yet whereas cognitive-propositional theories view a 
propositional truth claim as having direct correspondence with ontological truth, the 
cultural-linguistic perspective recognizes “that a religious system is more like a 
natural language than a formally organized set of explicit statements, and that the 
right use of this language . . . cannot be detached from a particular way of 
behaving.”33 In other words, only as a cognitive-propositional statement is put into 
action within the appropriate contexts of a coherent system does it then obtain 
intrasystematic truth with the possibility of also being ontologically true. So how do 
doctrines fit into this interpretation? 
 Lindbeck views doctrines as “communally authoritative rules of discourse, 
attitude, and action.”34 The “Christian example” of this cultural-linguistic definition 
is: “Church doctrines are communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and 
practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in 
question.”35 In this way, Lindbeck equates ‘doctrines’ with ‘rules’ and so limits the 
nature of doctrine to the level of cognitive-propositional truth claims. But having 
already discarded “‘classical’ propositional views of doctrine,” he seeks to distinguish 
his approach by asserting that the propositional content of a doctrinal statement deals 
only with issues of religious language and, in themselves, not with ultimate reality.36 
In other words, on their own doctrines do not correspond to ontological truth and only 
serve as guidelines for Christian belief and action. Thus, doctrines are “second-order 
rather than first-order propositions and affirm nothing about extra-linguistic or extra-
human reality.”37 
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Lindbeck’s Critics and the Search for Consonance 
 
 As regards Lindbeck’s discussion of cognitive approaches, the objection that 
he is too soft on truth usually stems from his assertion that doctrines are second-order 
propositions ‘and affirm nothing about extra-linguistic or extra-human reality.’ Most 
critics concede that the objective value of cognitive-propositional statements is 
limited, but to the extent that it is there at all they maintain that the truth claim itself is 
still about God. Nevertheless, it is possible that many of these arguments are based on 
a misunderstanding of the full extent of what Lindbeck means by ‘proposition’ and 
‘correspondence.’ 
 For instance, some critics argue that Lindbeck’s development of the cognitive-
propositional category lacks intellectual rigor and does not present an honest appraisal 
of its proponents. Geoffrey Wainwright contends that “Lindbeck’s descriptions of the 
cognitive-propositionalist position are too simple for it even in its classical or 
traditional forms, let alone in its sophisticated post-critical versions.”38 Likewise, 
Alister McGrath claims that Lindbeck’s treatment of the cognitive-propositional 
position “fails to take account of the evident ability of proponents of this approach to 
reformulate, amplify or supplement a doctrine with changing historical 
circumstances.”39 Nevertheless, while these objections assume that Lindbeck is 
attempting to refute the cognitive-propositional approach altogether, consideration of 
his full discussion on the subject might also lead one to assume that he is attempting 
to reform the traditional understanding of the role of cognition in regard to doctrine 
and correspondence to ultimate reality. 
 For example, contrary to McGrath’s assertion above, Lindbeck does indeed 
acknowledge and affirm the efforts of more recent cognitive-propositional 
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approaches, saying, “Some modern forms of propositionalism . . . allow for the 
possibility that doctrines have both unchanging and changing aspects.”40 He further 
points out that like these modern propositional theories, the rule theory also 
differentiates between “what a doctrine affirms ontologically and the diverse 
conceptualities or formulations in which the affirmation can be expressed.”41 Thus 
Lindbeck not only accounts for the ability of certain modern cognitive-propositional 
approaches to deal with doctrinal variations, he also agrees with their distinction 
between these variations and what a doctrine affirms ontologically – he simply 
disagrees with the way in which these theories explain ontological correspondence.42 
As Stephen Williams points out, “There is at least a consistent intention [by 
Lindbeck] to distinguish between propositionalism as a theory of doctrine (of which 
many critical things can be said) and a claim that Christian doctrine involves first-
order propositions.”43 
 Nonetheless, other critics argue that any discussion of propositional truth must 
maintain a cognitive understanding of correspondence. For instance, Jay Richards’ 
insists that “most who speak of coherence theories of truth or of the necessity of 
coherence for correspondence usually mean a coherence between relevant beliefs, 
statements, or propositions.”44 In other words, because Lindbeck does not mean what 
‘most’ people ‘usually mean’ by coherence Richards finds his view of truth to be 
“perplexing” and “baffling.”45 In a similar way, McGrath complains that “Lindbeck 
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seems to hold that there is no need to believe that they [doctrines] have anything to do 
with God, or even with reality in general.”46 And Paul DeHart states, “For Lindbeck 
the categorial scheme of Christianity is more an adjunct to pragmatic performance, 
and he does not offer a ‘strong’ doctrine of revelation to anchor the particular 
conceptual scheme in God’s reality.”47 Yet as stated earlier, maybe the reason he 
‘seems to hold’ the view that there is no need to assert God’s existence is not due to 
sloppy epistemology, but to the unusual way in which he delineates ‘proposition.’ 
 
‘Proposition’ in the First Instance 
 
 When Lindbeck considers doctrines qua doctrines, what he means by 
proposition in this first instance is simply that the immediate object of doctrinal 
speech is religious language, not extra-linguistic reality.48 This is why McGrath 
argues that Lindbeck reduces theology to nothing more than “talk about talk about 
God.”49 While this statement may be true to a certain extent, it will be shown later 
how collapsing Lindbeck’s theory of doctrine in this way misrepresents the full scope 
of what he eventually means by proposition. Lindbeck’s point here is that in the 
search for truth cognitive-propositional aspects are inevitable and necessary, but they 
are just one part of the whole process.50 Yet regarding this initial construal, D. Z. 
Phillips and John Milbank have similar concerns. 
 Phillips says that Lindbeck is “prepared to jettison talk of an independent 
reality” when he separates propositions from ontological truth and inserts the notion 
of intrasystematic truth between them.51 He assumes that because Lindbeck sees 
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doctrines as second-order propositions, this then means that he is also “attacking the 
notion that theological statements have to do with an objective reality or with truth 
claims.”52 Therefore Phillips argues that Lindbeck utilizes a notion of independent 
reality that “is entirely unmediated” when he refers to it as the “Most Important” and 
the “Ultimately Real.”53 Yet while Phillips may be right to assert that there is no 
“logical space which transcends the language-games and forms of life in which 
concepts have their life,”54 a closer reading shows that Lindbeck uses these terms 
heuristically in his discussion of Christianity and other religions.55 Lindbeck’s point is 
not that religious statements have nothing to do with ultimate reality, but that “a 
religious utterance, . . . acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence 
only insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that 
correspondence.”56 Thus he is not saying that cognitive statements do not correspond 
to ultimate reality, but that they only correspond to ultimate reality when part of a 
specific interconnected religious system. We should also note that if Lindbeck is 
indeed proposing an unmediated notion of ultimate reality to which all religions 
correspond, then he would fall into the experiential-expressive trap rather than the 
cognitivist one as Phillips suggests. 
 Nevertheless, Milbank agrees with Phillips and claims that “more importance 
must be given to propositions, and so to ontology, than Lindbeck appears to allow.”57 
He asserts that Lindbeck must recognize that the “absolute” is only defined internally 
by Christian practice, and argues that such definitions occur through a setting which is 
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“always already imagined, albeit in a ‘mythical’ form.”58 What we find, however, is 
that on a descriptive level Lindbeck declares that religions are understood “as idioms 
for dealing with whatever is most important,” which is mediated “in their stories, 
myths, and doctrines.”59 Hence the ‘absolute’ in this context is not understood as 
something that is outside the religious tradition but, “on the contrary, different 
religions seem in many cases to produce fundamentally divergent depth experiences 
of what it is to be human.”60 So contrary to Phillips’ and Milbank’s assertions, 
Lindbeck does indeed affirm that it is the internal practice of a religion that defines 
notions of ultimate reality, and as it applies to Christianity, “it is the religion 
instantiated in Scripture which defines being, truth, goodness, and beauty.”61 Again, 
Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic approach in no way reflects the common-core-
experience notion of the experiential-expressive theories. 
 Yet here, contradicting his first criticism, Milbank further contends that for 
Lindbeck meaning is “defined in advance.”62 This second criticism again relies on 
Phillips’ idea that “if anything ‘refers’ for Lindbeck, it is the entire Christian 
performance,” and he says that Lindbeck seeks to define performance in advance “by 
the exemplary narratives of Jesus,” and thus “develop a kind of ‘metanarrative 
realism’” that “becomes dangerously ahistorical.”63 This argument is similar to 
McGrath’s assertion that “Lindbeck appears to treat the Christian language as 
something ‘given’, adopting an a-historical approach,”64 and it is this concern, 
perhaps more than any other, that has the most warrant when it comes to the internal 
logic of Lindbeck’s theory. 
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 Lindbeck argues that historical-critical methods of biblical interpretation miss 
the canonical message by ignoring that Scripture, with all its literary diversity, is 
telling one overarching story.65 In place of these extratextual methods he contends 
that Scripture should be read and interpreted through an “intratextual” canonical 
framework.66 Essentially, this means recovering the pattern of interpretation that 
focuses on Jesus as the key figure for tying together the whole scriptural story.67 In 
agreement with his fellow Yale scholars Hans Frei and Brevard Childs, Lindbeck 
argues that the factually true dimension of Scripture is not principally in its historical 
accuracy, but in its “history-like” or “realistic narrative” rendering of divine and 
human interaction.68 DeHart argues that this approach provides no ground for 
claiming that Christianity is the only categorially true religion,69 and Williams 
ponders, “Would it be meaningful to ask whether there is a being who exists (as he 
appears to do in the narrative) independently of other beings, who communicated with 
Israel, was disposed to save, not condemn, the world through Jesus Christ?”70 
 It is probably safe to say that Lindbeck’s answer to Williams’ question is 
‘yes,’ but not for the same reason these critics argue it should be. According to 
Lindbeck, when considering the Christian religion the “investigator” may take it as a 
given that the community believe in “the Jesus Christ of the biblical narratives as the 
way to the one God of whom the Bible speaks.”71 There is no need for one to seek 
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some kind of universal proof outside the practice of this communally authoritative 
writ, confession, and practice. In consequence, “the rendering of God’s character is 
not in every instance logically dependent on the facticity of the story.”72 His point 
here appears to be similar to the one he makes about cognitive aspects of truth; that is, 
historical concerns are a part of biblical hermeneutics, but the whole process and its 
success is not based on this element alone. So while on literary or grammatico-
historical grounds one might challenge his application of a ‘history-like’ view of the 
Bible, this notion does not itself affect his notion of truth. Therefore, his theory is not 
exactly ahistorical, but neither is it historically dependent as he holds that the Bible is 
a “transhistorical metanarrative stretching from the beginning of time to its end.”73 
 Nevertheless, Milbank thinks that Lindbeck insulates the Bible in a “narrative-
become-paradigm” so that “Christians are seen as living within certain fixed 
narratives which function as schemas, which can organize endlessly different cultural 
contents.”74 Rowan Williams voices a similar concern when he says, “I am both 
interested and perturbed by the territorial cast of the imaginary used here—of a 
‘framework’ within whose boundaries things—persons?—are to be ‘inserted.’”75 The 
supposed implication here is that, from a Christian perspective, neither what the 
church nor society have to say really matters because their reality is already 
determined for them. Thus Milbank argues that because Lindbeck understands 
doctrines as nothing more than second-order activity, this also means that he views 
them as “a mere husk to be easily discarded.”76 He therefore accuses Lindbeck of 
making the metanarrative only about the story of Jesus and ignoring the “continuing 
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story of the Church.”77 Yet, once again, a closer reading shows that Lindbeck does not 
wish to exclude the context or the imagination of the reader, and is concerned only 
that the narratives “shape the imagination and perceptions of the attentive reader.”78 
In other words, he claims not that the story of Jesus is the metanarrative, but that the 
story of Jesus shapes the understanding of the metanarrative which includes the role 
of the church in the world.79 Hence, the story of Jesus does “not empty Old Testament 
or postbiblical personages and events of their own reality.”80 Furthermore, to say that 
Lindbeck sees doctrine as ‘a mere husk to be easily discarded’ muddles his full 
explication of what doctrine is and forgets his goal of “reconciliation without 
capitulation.”81 
 When taken all together, one can see that Lindbeck simply evaluates each part 
of the whole epistemic process in turn, so that depending on the reader’s proclivities it 
might ‘seem’ that he does not give enough credence to one aspect or another. 
Moreover, while it is true that he does not affirm ontological correspondence for 
cognitive-propositional statements, he is not yet finished defining what he means by 
proposition and correspondence. 
 
‘Proposition’ in the Second Instance 
 
 Lindbeck says that a religious utterance can “acquire propositional force” 
when performed in appropriate religious ways.82 On this point, his meaning of 
proposition takes on broader dimensions as the utterance demonstrates 
correspondence with the religious system through performance. Furthermore, 
coherent performance is not defined completely in advance but is lived out through 
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activities such as “prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation.”83 For Lindbeck, the 
natural activities of the Christian life – its performance – is a first-order proposition.84 
As Richards observes, while “most” people speak of coherence in terms of cognitive 
propositional statements, “Lindbeck, on the other hand, intends more by 
intrasystematic truth than this type of coherence. He makes contextual and 
performative aspects essential requirements to the ontological truth of statements.”85 
More precisely, he requires contextual and performative aspects for intrasystematic 
truth, and requires intrasystematic truth for correspondence to ontological truth. 
Critics often neglect this second function of proposition in Lindbeck’s theory, and 
although they recognize his inclusion of performance they rarely see the propositional 
connection. Yet grasping this connection is essential to understanding his theory. 
Perhaps a summation will help bring together the two instances of proposition before 
we attempt to locate Lindbeck’s epistemology in the history of ideas. 
 According to Lindbeck, a doctrine in itself is a cognitive-propositional 
statement about religious beliefs and practices, and in this way the definition of 
doctrine is fused to the meaning of ‘rules’ which delimits how the term ‘proposition’ 
here functions. In this instance, the most a doctrine might do is function symbolically 
as a first-order proposition, but alone it can never actually be a first-order proposition; 
i.e., they “affirm nothing about extra-linguistic or extra-human reality.”86 A doctrine 
in itself is a second-order proposition which, although integral to the life of the 
church, is only one aspect of the performance necessary to constitute a first-order 
proposition.87 To this end, when Lindbeck speaks further of performance it is not 
doctrine that he presses into service (i.e., the cognitive aspect), but rather he seeks to 
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broaden the understanding of proposition beyond this intellectual component. His 
intent is not to leave the cognitive element (doctrine) behind, but to highlight the 
minimal though essential role it plays within the entire process.88 So the meaning of 
proposition expands as it obtains ontological correspondence through proper 
performance. That is, religious propositions “acquire enough referential specificity to 
have first-order or ontological truth or falsity only in determinate settings, and this 
rarely happens on the pages of theological treatises or in the course of doctrinal 
discussions.”89 So it is important to understand that a proposition (not doctrine per se) 
“acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence only insofar as it is a 
performance, an act or deed, which helps create that correspondence.”90 When this 
correspondence occurs, one must not forget that a first-order proposition is not itself 
ontological truth (we will discuss how one determines correspondence in a 
moment).91 
 Milbank claims that Lindbeck must recognize that even if doctrines are 
second-order reflections on first-order use, they “nonetheless do contain an 
inescapably ‘surplus’ propositional element which contributes, in a distinct moment, 
to the overall imagination of reference.’”92 But is not this ‘surplus propositional 
element’ the very point Lindbeck seeks to make? In other words, one finds that 
instead of being a “crypto-cognitivist” he is rather more like a crypto-
propositionalist.93 Therefore, his epistemology may be less cognitive than these critics 
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like, but it is apparently more ontological than they realize. Yet there still remains the 
issue of trying to locate Lindbeck’s ‘unusual’ notion of truth in the history of ideas. 
 
Locating Lindbeck’s Epistemology 
 
 Lindbeck draws his theory of doctrine from his conception of truth so that 
locating his epistemology within the history of ideas should make it easier to 
understand his theory. Thus, this section will investigate the possibilities by beginning 
the search with some of those whom Lindbeck credits with having had a positive 
influence on his thinking. Of these, some primary nontheological thinkers are Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Peter Winch, and Clifford Geertz and two of the main theological 
thinkers are Karl Barth and Thomas Aquinas.94 Yet because Barth and Thomas are 
separated in both time and thought we will consider them separately, whereas because 
Wittgenstein, Winch, and Geertz are closely related in the linguistic and 
hermeneutical turn of the twentieth century we will look to Wittgenstein as 
representing the main assumptions about knowledge from this period.95 That said, the 
purpose of the following comparison is not to delimit the one way to interpret 
Lindbeck, but to find an interpretive framework that will provide the best 
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The Case for Karl Barth 
 “The hands may be the hands of Wittgenstein and Geertz” writes David Tracy, 
“but the voice is the voice of Karl Barth.”96 He implies that even though Lindbeck 
integrates aspects of other theories into his own, he nonetheless organizes them 
around Barth’s theological structure. To be sure, Tracy makes a valid claim because 
many scholars already assume a Barthian influence on Lindbeck’s work and on the 
postliberal project in general.97 For instance, Gary Dorrien argues that postliberal 
theology is at its best when it holds to Barthian themes,98 and Richard Crane argues 
that several postliberals, including Lindbeck, “have pointed out that the ways in 
which their understanding of the truth and referential status of Christian language 
about God are profoundly indebted to the theology of Karl Barth.”99 Thus we will 
consider this supposed Barthian influence upon Lindbeck. 
 
The Influence of Barth’s Theological Method 
 
 One reason many assume that Barth influenced Lindbeck’s theory is because 
Lindbeck himself admits that his “ad hoc and unsystematic” use of nontheological 
thinkers is in response “to Karl Barth’s recommendations for the employment of non-
scriptural concepts in theology.”100 Thus he looks to twentieth-century linguistic 
theory and cultural anthropology to argue for the priority of descriptive theories of 
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interpretation over prescriptive ones.101 Thus one could indeed argue that Lindbeck’s 
preference for descriptive methods actually begins with Barth, who claims: 
There is no independent standpoint from which we can survey and either 
approve or disapprove the ways of God. . . . We can only keep God’s actual 
ways before us. We can only try to understand both the fact and the extent that 
they are actual ways.102 
 
Barth contends that there is no way to step outside the reality of God to make 
independent judgments about God, one can only observe the ‘actual ways’ God freely 
chooses to reveal his reality. 
It appears that Lindbeck echoes this notion in his response to the experiential-
expressive idea of a prelinguistic experience of salvation, saying, “The humanly real . 
. . is not constructed from below upward or from the inner to the outer, but from the 
outer to the inner, and from above downward.”103 He maintains that a person “begins 
to become a new creature through hearing and interiorizing the language that speaks 
of Christ,” which is found only in the explicit form of Christianity.104 And these 
statements are reminiscent of Barth, who says, “Nothing could be further from our 
minds than to attribute to the human creature as such a capacity to know God and the 
one Word of God [outside the Bible and the church].”105 Nevertheless, Barth also 
asserts that even in the context of the Bible and the church, saving faith still cannot 
depend on any kind of human ability to know God.106 As Hendrik Kraemer explains, 
for Barth “the event of revelation does not have two aspects: God the agent, and man, 
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the recipient. Both the act of revelation (a parte Dei) and its reception (a parte 
hominis) are God’s.”107 With this view in mind, Crane asserts that Lindbeck also takes 
this theological position in his own work: 
One of Lindbeck’s objectives, following in the trajectory of Karl Barth’s 
theology, is to articulate a forceful critique of theological projects that 
compromise the sovereign freedom of God by interpreting faith and the 
knowledge of God as the realization of an innate human capacity.108 
 
To be sure, if Crane’s argument is correct, then it provides strong support for a 
Barthian core to Lindbeck’s notion of truth. 
 A final reason Lindbeck appears indebted to Barth’s epistemology is with his 
conditions for the interpretation of Scripture. First, Lindbeck credits Barth with 
helping to form his hermeneutic of engaging “in close reading of the entire canon in 
its typological and christological narrative unity.”109 Moreover, he supports his 
argument for an intratextual narrative approach to biblical interpretation by claiming 
that this was also the approach Barth (and the Reformers) sought to employ.110 
Second, Lindbeck says that the biblical canon is the lexical framework for 
Christianity, and that the only way to determine if a statement is true or false is to 
observe it in the “ordinary religious language when it is used to mold lives through 
prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation.”111 Likewise, for Barth: “The Church and 
Holy Scripture and preaching and the sacrament are therefore again the only possible 
criteria in any practical investigation.”112 
 So with Barth’s influence already assumed, Lindbeck’s recognition of Barth 
for his ad hoc apologetics, and his agreement with Barth that Christian knowledge of 
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God is discerned only through the Bible and the church, the initial case for locating 
Lindbeck’s epistemology with Barth looks strong. But before drawing any 
conclusions, we must consider a few more points. 
 
A Reflection on the Case for Karl Barth 
 
 Although the information presented above seems to indicate that Barth might 
be the epistemological key to understanding Lindbeck’s theory of truth, a closer look 
shows that the similarities are mostly superficial. It is true that Lindbeck claims that 
his utilization of nontheological works is due partially to “Barth’s recommendation 
for the employment of non-scriptural concepts in theology.”113 But anyone familiar 
with Barth’s theological project will immediately think this an odd statement. As 
noted above, Barth puts divine truth on a completely different plane from the human 
ability to know God. Divine grace alone accounts for knowledge of God and the only 
way to measure apprehension is by observing God’s actual ways through the 
canonical scriptures in the life of the church.114 Yet while Hunsinger thinks that 
Lindbeck’s hermeneutics of intratextual social embodiment coincides with Barth’s 
personalist notion of truth,115 Lindbeck himself asserts that Barth falls short “of the 
flexibility combined with determinateness, the plurality combined with unity, of a 
full-fledged hermeneutics of social/ecclesial embodiment.”116 So how then did 
Lindbeck get the idea that Barth encouraged the use of non-scriptural concepts in 
theology, and how does this idea fit with his claim that Barth influenced his 
intratextual approach to interpretation? 
 We find a clue in the last chapter in The Nature of Doctrine, when after he 
credits Barth for his notion of intratextual narrative interpretation of the Bible 
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Lindbeck also admits that this understanding of Barth comes “second hand” as he 
“learned to think about Barth in this way above all from conversations with Hans 
Frei.”117 This is critical information for our investigation, because Lindbeck makes a 
fine point here as to how he integrates Barth’s method into his own approach. 
According to Lindbeck, if not for Frei he likely would have had little use for Barth: 
“In the absence of something like Frei’s explanations, the discussion reads to me like 
a good job of baptizing bad epistemology.”118 Indeed, this statement alone indicates 
that Lindbeck’s application was not of Barth’s notion of truth, but of a certain 
interpretation of Barth’s method. Moreover, Lindbeck comments on Barth’s bad 
epistemology,’ stating: 
It may well be that his doctrine of revelation, especially his talk of the 
rationality and self-evidence of the event of the knowledge of God, is the most 
damaging instance of this.119 
 
Therefore, it appears that Barth’s position on how truth is conceived is not what 
influences Lindbeck’s theory, but rather it is Barth’s emphasis on the “retrieval of the 
Reformation version of the way of reading the Bible” – which Frei helped Lindbeck 
see – that is the actual Barthian influence on his theory.120 
 What Frei helped Lindbeck understand was that because Barth needed an 
epistemology for communicating this hermeneutical emphasis within his intellectual 
environment, he “cobbled together a set of notions about knowledge of revelation and 
about theology as science.”121 Thus, Lindbeck says that those turned off by Barth’s 
epistemology (as he is) often stop reading and “never discover the strange new world 
of the Bible as Barth describes it.”122 It is, then, Barth’s act of cobbling together, or ad 
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hoc use of non-scriptural concepts, that Lindbeck takes to heart and not his theory of 
truth. Furthermore, we find that Barth’s ‘recommendation’ for this kind of theological 
approach comes to Lindbeck indirectly; that is, through a particular descriptive 
reading of Barth’s theological method. 
 Lindbeck’s theory of truth requires a certain degree of human capacity to 
respond in order to justify correspondence to ontological truth. And this aspect of his 
theory diverges so far from Barth that Hunsinger says it “may actually reflect certain 
classical disagreements in the Christian tradition about how to view the relationship 
between nature and grace.”123 So the question remains, if not Barth’s then whose 
epistemology does Lindbeck seek to ‘baptize’ into the biblical intratextual world? 
 
The Case for Thomas Aquinas 
 
 Hunsinger points out that Lindbeck quotes Thomas Aquinas more often than 
he quotes Barth, and he suggests that “when it comes to stipulating the conditions for 
cognitive truth, the words are the words of Lindbeck, but the voice is much more 
nearly that of Aquinas than of Barth.”124 Lindbeck himself states, “My utilization of 
the contemporary developments has been heavily influenced by the reading and 
teaching of St. Thomas that I have done since my undergraduate days four decades 
ago.”125 Thus his familiarity with the writings of Thomas gives strength to the 
possibility that his notion of truth follows a Thomistic trajectory. 
  Marshall is one who advocates this option, claiming that Thomas “has figured 
consistently in Lindbeck’s writing and teaching throughout his career and has deeply 
shaped his own theology.”126 He also claims that this connection is most evident in 
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the conditions Lindbeck gives for what counts as justification for truth claims, and 
that while some cognitivists claim that his approach is not the usual way most people 
speak of truth, 
His account of truth is not at all novel in substance, however fresh the 
perspective from which it is articulated. Thomas Aquinas also maintains that 
utterances of Christian belief are ontologically true only if they cohere with 
specific linguistic and practical paradigms internal to the religion itself.127 
 
Marshall argues that the real issue is not what Lindbeck means by ontological truth, 
but how his conditions for justifying correspondence compare to Thomas’ criteria.128 
For instance, one might consider the two ways that Thomas argues the formal 
aspect of faith can be viewed. He says that one way to view the formal aspects of faith 
is to consider the “First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of 
articles.”129 In other words, only in God do truth and the knowledge of truth dwell as 
one. Yet the other way to understand faith is from the human point of view, and here 
“there are various distinct articles of faith.”130 In essence, there is the object of faith 
and the various delineations of faith itself. Marshall contends: 
Thomas’s account of the object of faith bears directly on questions regarding 
the justification of Christian belief. In fact it suggests a view of epistemic 
justification in the religious domain which is not inconsistent with Lindbeck’s 
appeal to the criterion of linguistic coherence within a religion.131 
 
He argues that for Thomas, part of what it means to justify a claim to having certain 
knowledge about God involves language, because part of what it means to believe in 
God depends on the acceptance of certain propositional statements about God. 
Furthermore, the conditions for determining these propositional statements are 
specific to the object of faith: “Christian faith only affirms propositions about God 
and creatures when these propositions are in accord with faith’s formal object, namely 
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the language of Scripture and the creeds understood as the self-communication of 
God.”132 One can also see this idea in Lindbeck’s conditions for formulating Christian 
beliefs, as he claims that the Bible is the “framework” or even the “lexical core” of 
Christianity,133 and that interpretations are “constrained by a single set of guidelines, 
the trinitarian and christological creeds.”134 Thus, on these points the case for a 
Thomisitc epistemology is perhaps worthy of further consideration. 
 
A Correspondence Between Correspondence Theories? 
 
 As already discussed, the interpretive process for Lindbeck is holistic and 
requires a particular apprehension gained through particular settings and applied in 
appropriate ways and contexts. Cognitive affirmation of the object of faith through 
Scripture and the creeds is good, but complete affirmation comes from right 
application discerned through practice. In short, a statement becomes capable of 
correspondence to ontological truth only as it is actively applied in relevant 
contexts.135 A consequence of this delineation is that Christians live within the only 
categorical setting which provides the language necessary for obtaining Christian 
faith. But how does this notion compare to Thomas? 
 Thomas teaches that the will moves the intellect to assent to the object of faith, 
but that in order for the will to assent the intellect must first be aware of the object of 
faith as mediated through the conditions that determine faith: “The act of any power 
or habit depends on the relationship of that power or habit to its object.”136 That is, 
Christian faith begins with intellectual awareness of the object of faith mediated 
through a particular context and completed by a movement of the will towards the 
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object of faith, both to assent to the First Truth and to live a life in accordance with 
the object of faith.137 Thomas states: 
If the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the 
will, an act of faith is ‘to believe in God.’ For the First Truth is referred to the 
will, through having the aspect of an end.138 
 
And for one whose end is the First Truth, Thomas says: 
So does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things 
concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which God 
bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith and not to those which are 
against faith.139 
 
In similar fashion, Lindbeck says that a declaration of faith acquires “enough 
referential specificity to have first-order or ontological truth or falsity only in 
determinate settings.”140 Consequently: 
Nonbelievers are not yet confronted by the question of salvation because it is 
only by acquiring some familiarity with the determinate settings in which 
religious utterances acquire propositional force that one can grasp their 
meaning well enough genuinely to reject (or accept) them.141 
 
Lindbeck maintains that true faith is unambiguous, and he declares, “According to 
this view, saving faith cannot be wholly anonymous, wholly implicit, but must be in 
some measure explicit.”142 Similarly, Thomas says, “After grace had been revealed, 
both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ.”143 
Moreover, explicit faith comes by explicit means and when these conditions are 
unavailable no claim to faith is justifiable: 
Unbelievers cannot be said ‘to believe in a God’ as we understand it in 
relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the 
conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly believe in a God.144 
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Thus, we might say that Thomas and Lindbeck agree that one is justified in claiming 
that a belief corresponds to God’s reality in so far as it coheres to certain determinate 
conditions which include, but are not limited to, cognitive aspects of faith. 
 For example, Thomas says ‘to think’ may be defined in three ways. The first is 
in the ability to understand information or to grasp the reason or logic of an idea; and 
the second is when this intellectual ability “is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, 
and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with 
the certitude of sight.”145 To this extent, knowledge is never quite certain and perfect 
understanding remains just out of reach. The third meaning of ‘to think’ is merely the 
act of cognition itself, thus Thomas says that it is the second definition which best 
expresses the meaning of “to believe,” because faith is assent even when “knowledge 
does not attain the perfection of clear sight.”146 Lindbeck agrees: “Our beliefs may 
correspond to reality, but we are justified in holding that they do so, not by directly 
seeing the correspondence, but by some other means.”147 Thus it seems that 
interpreting Lindbeck’s epistemology through Thomas’ teaching on how one justifies 
Christian truth claims may help resolve some of the misunderstandings noted in the 
previous section. But can we say that Thomas is the source of Lindbeck’s view of 
truth? 
 
A Reflection on the Case for Thomas Aquinas 
 
 Lindbeck is grateful to Marshall for employing Thomas to better explain his 
theory, and he confesses, “If I had referred more to the Thomistic ideas he [Marshall] 
elucidates when I was writing Nature of Doctrine, it would have been a better 
book.”148 Also, where Lindbeck seems to sit uncomfortably with Barth who places 
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revelation and response solely in an act of God towards people, he appears more 
comfortable with Thomas’ relational view of faith. Yet there are reasons to believe 
that even though Lindbeck finds support for various elements of his theory in 
Thomas, the full extent of his notion of truth and the nature of doctrine cannot be 
wholly supported by interpretations of Thomas. 
 
Lindbeck’s Heuristic Appropriation of Thomas 
 
 One reason that a Thomistic interpretation does not support Lindbeck’s notion 
of truth is the way in which he words his response to Marshall. He states, “By 
showing how St. Thomas can be understood in a way consistent with Nature of 
Doctrine, Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind better 
than I explained it myself.”149 Lindbeck points out that Marshall’s essay demonstrates 
how Thomas can be understood in light of his own theory, and in this way Marshall 
does a better job than he did himself of explaining the view of truth which he had in 
mind. While he recognizes that there are aspects of Thomas that help show the 
reasonableness of his own view, it seems he does not intend to base his theory on 
Thomas’ notion of truth. And this understanding is evident in his lengthiest 
application of Thomas when he refers to the distinction between the human mode of 
signifying (modus significandi) and the signified (significatum).150 
 Lindbeck highlights these concepts to argue that a mere human utterance 
cannot be its own standard of proof of correspondence to its referent. Language about 
God is neither univocal nor equivocal but analogous, and “theologians may use 
analogies to exclude erroneous interpretations, but they are only able to specify how 
these predications cannot correspond, not how they do correspond to reality.”151 He 
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gives an example saying that one can declare, “God is good,” by accepting the ways 
in which the Scriptures demonstrate God’s goodness even though the reality of God’s 
goodness “is utterly beyond comprehension.”152 He says the proposition signifies 
ways people might align their lives towards God “as if he were good in the ways 
indicated,” but that the utterance itself does not specify the comprehensive meaning or 
application.153 Lindbeck calls this view a “modest” propositionalism because it 
represents the limits of cognitive knowledge in a way that “is no longer incompatible” 
with his approach.154 
 Without venturing too far into the discussion on interpretations of Thomas, 
several observations may be made. First, Lindbeck begins by saying that while his 
theory does not exclude “some classical theists,” like Thomas, it also does not 
necessitate their approaches.155 So rather than make the point that his theory generates 
from a Thomistic epistemology, he instead seeks to show how certain concepts from 
Thomas might be appropriated into his own theory. Second, he says that one way to 
fit Thomas into the cultural-linguistic approach is through an “agnostic reading” of 
Thomas’ notion of analogical knowledge.156 This statement might not be a problem 
except that this rather narrow interpretation of Thomas is not a standard account 
among scholars,157 and as Colman O’Neill says, “Were this what St. Thomas really 
thought there would be no need for the inverted commas used by Prof. Lindbeck 
when he refers to it as agnostic.”158 
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 Third, although Thomas goes further than Barth by including relevant and 
active human participation within the conditions for efficacious faith, it is not clear if 
his conception of truth actually stretches as far as Lindbeck’s description of first-order 
propositions. For instance, Lindbeck applies the cultural-linguistic approach to the 
resurrection stories using the concepts of modus significandi and significatum, and 
says that the significatum “provides the warrant for behaving in ways recommended 
by the resurrection stories even when one grants the impossibility of specifying the 
mode in which those stories signify.”159 He then admits that the implication of this 
delineation “goes beyond anything Aquinas says.”160 Fourth, even though Lindbeck 
claims that Marshall’s essay makes him think that “Aquinas was a constant, even if 
background, presence while I wrote Nature of Doctrine,” this does little to account for 
the full measure of his unusual approach.161 Especially when Lindbeck also claims 
that his incorporation of Thomas is a part of his ad hoc apologetics as a way to 
recommend the theological viability of his own nontheological approach: “Such 
arguments in defense of its theses can, I think, be found in sources as diverse as 
Aquinas, the Reformers, and Karl Barth, but these have simply been mentioned, not 
deployed.”162 
 Finally, when attempting to locate Lindbeck’s notion of truth in either Barth or 
Thomas it is easy to forget the most important element of the investigation – 
Lindbeck is proposing a ‘pretheological’ approach to understanding religion and 
doctrine. If nothing else, this element alone precludes a Thomistic epistemological 
core to his theory. Ultimately, Lindbeck appears to learn from Thomas the same kind 
of lesson he learns from Barth – that of baptizing or absorbing the world into the 
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world of the Bible. Only where Barth used notions of knowledge and science from his 
intellectual environment, Thomas “tried to do something similar with 
Aristotelianism.”163 
 Again, Lindbeck is not seeking to develop a theory independent of 
Christianity, but to present a theory that he thinks can meet a current need of the 
church and then immerse it into the Christian life. As O’Neill points out, “Lindbeck 
does not intend to withdraw from the theological enterprise; he wishes to carry over 
into it a method already established outside it.”164 But if Lindbeck’s epistemology is 
not at first theological, then where in the history of ideas does it connect? 
 
The Case for Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
 The comparative study with Barth and Thomas showed that while Lindbeck 
references these theologians to explain his theory, he does construct his project upon 
their epistemic foundations. The question now is whether Lindbeck’s epistemic 
source is Ludwig Wittgenstein. For as Bruce Ashford says, “It has been no secret that 
the postliberal movement is influenced by Wittgenstein.”165 And because Lindbeck is 
at the forefront of this movement Michael Nicholson claims that he has “certainly set 
a trend for the subsequent theological appropriation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.”166 
To begin the evaluation, this section will look to Brad Kallenberg’s argument 
regarding the three ways in which Lindbeck coincides with Wittgenstein’s later 
writings.167 For although Kallenberg works under the common misunderstanding that 
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Lindbeck precludes “positive affirmations about God,” the points he offers are still 
worthy of consideration.168 
 
The Influence of Wittgenstein’s Later Writings 
 
 The first common point is with Lindbeck’s insistence that acquiring 
understanding of certain beliefs and practices requires involvement in the particular 
cultural-linguistic system. “In other words,” says Kallenberg, “to understand a set of 
foreign religious beliefs one must become an ‘insider’ to that form of life and those 
language-games in which these beliefs are at home.”169 The terms ‘form of life’ and 
‘language-games’ are borrowed from Wittgenstein, and Lindbeck incorporates them 
into his work, saying, “Just as a language (or ‘language-game,’ to use Wittgenstein’s 
phrase) is correlated with a form of life, . . . so it is also in the case of a religious 
tradition.”170 As Wittgenstein explains, “The word ‘language-game’ is used here to 
emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of 
life.”171 Thus a propositional statement on its own says something about the language 
itself but nothing about the independent existence of its ostensive reference. This 
argument is similar to Lindbeck’s claim that doctrines are second-order propositions 
and signify nothing outside the particular linguistic system in which they are 
uttered.172 In similar fashion, Wittgenstein says that the statement “‘X exists’ . . . is 
not a sentence which treats of X, but a sentence about our use of language, that is, 
about the use of the word ‘X.’”173 
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 The second point of agreement Kallenberg mentions is “in following 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the ‘Language vs. World’ model, Lindbeck appreciates the 
collapse of the sentence-fact distinction.”174 This point dovetails with the previous 
one because Lindbeck denies that doctrines obtain direct correspondence to reality, 
and claims instead that they are simply one part of reality which “is in large part 
socially constructed and consequently alters in the course of time.”175 Thus he argues 
that human reality forms through the dynamic relationships among people within their 
social and communal environments, which also seems to reflect Wittgenstein’s 
thinking. As Fergus Kerr notes, “Again and again Wittgenstein reminds the reader 
that all meaning, even the very gesture of pointing something out, must have 
conceptual links with the whole system of the human way of doing things 
together.”176 To this extent, Lindbeck also reminds the reader that the right use of a 
religious system’s language “cannot be detached from a particular way of behaving,” 
thus all investigation must observe words, thoughts, and actions in motion as they 
work together naturally within a form of life.177 Or as Wittgenstein says: 
Just as making a move in chess doesn’t consist only in pushing a piece from 
here to there on the board – nor yet in the thoughts and feelings that 
accompany the move: but in the circumstances that we call ‘playing a game of 
chess.’178 
 
A propositional statement alone means little because “every sign by itself seems dead. 
What gives it life? – In use it lives.”179 
 Kallenberg’s third observation is that “religious language, and specifically 
doctrines, can undergo change without becoming ‘heretical’ or ‘untrue’ to the 
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language-game.”180 This observation is important because if Lindbeck corresponds to 
Wittgenstein here, then the case for a Wittgensteinian core to his theory of truth will 
prove the most likely of the three possibilities. The progression of the comparison so 
far shows that Lindbeck’s idea that knowledge is mediated through distinct and 
specific ways might coincide with Barth, Thomas, or Wittgenstein. Yet moving out 
from here to also include the performance of certain practices or actions within 
specific contexts can only coincide with Thomas and Wittgenstein. But where 
Lindbeck strains credulity in his delineation of Thomas’ notion of analogy to explain 
the limits of language, Wittgenstein appears able to go the distance. 
 
The Rules of Socially Constructed Reality 
 
 Lindbeck muses that it would be helpful “to find an alternative approach that 
made the intertwining of variability and invariability in matters of faith easier to 
understand.”181 He then locates this alternative route within the idea that reality (from 
a human perspective) is for the most part socially constructed and changes through 
time.182 Doctrines are a part of the socially constructed reality entailing that they too 
adapt to the changing environment.183 Doctrinal change occurs because the context in 
which the community is located changes and some of the norms of beliefs and 
practices begin to fit awkwardly within a shifting form of life as “a religious 
interpretive scheme . . . develops anomalies in its application in new contexts.”184 It 
follows then that if doctrines are like rules of grammar, then they can guide the 
community in navigating the structure of Christian language to identify the anomalies 
and adapt the language to fit new situations. In this way, difficulties are not dealt with 
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by coming up with new language to meet the need, but by reassessing and 
reformulating the existing speech.185 Or as Wittgenstein says, “The problems are 
solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long 
been familiar with.”186 
 Regarding the idea of rules, Wittgenstein says one can say that a person is 
“following a rule” only when that person demonstrates the ability to act according to 
the rule.187 Formal rules are like loosely drawn boundary lines on which people agree 
for a special purpose – such as playing a game. Yet no game is completely bounded 
by formal rules – e.g. no regulation exists on how hard one may hit a tennis ball – and 
the concept itself, “game,” defies boundaries altogether; for “what still counts as a 
game, and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No.”188 
Nevertheless, particular games are identified by particular rules and mastery of these 
rules comes only through playing the game. This is why Wittgenstein argues that 
“‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a 
rule.”189 
 In this way, Lindbeck’s rule theory of doctrine rather looks Wittgensteinian 
when he claims that doctrines should be viewed as guidelines for specifying the right 
use of language, and that doctrines “provide semantic reference” for working through 
new formulations.190 This is also why some suggest that Lindbeck is attempting to 
apply Wittgenstein’s idea that theology is like grammar,191 because Wittgenstein also 
recommends attending to what is and is not appropriate to say about God by looking 
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to the grammar of theological speech for dealing with new situations.192 And 
according to Wittgenstein, the people best equipped to make these kinds of judgments 
are those who are proficient in the various language-games: “Can one learn this 
knowledge? Yes; some can learn it. Not, however, by taking a course of study in it, 
but through ‘experience.’”193 Likewise, Lindbeck states, “In short, intelligibility 
comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from good performance, not 
adherence to independently formulated criteria.”194 Thus, in light of these similarities 
maybe using a Wittgensteinian framework to interpret Lindbeck is actually the key to 
resolving many of the concerns about his theory of truth. 
 
A Reflection on the Case for Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
 The case for a Wittgensteinian core to Lindbeck’s notion of truth looks more 
promising than do the other two for at least three reasons: (1) it is a nontheological 
theory and thus the best candidate for Lindbeck’s pretheological approach; (2) there is 
a close similarity between their approaches to language and their use of the terms 
‘language-game,’ ‘rules,’ and ‘form of life’; and (3) Lindbeck himself references 
Wittgenstein’s explanation of the limits and nature of language to help communicate 
the variable nature of doctrine through rule theory. But do these reasons mean 
Wittgenstein’s epistemology is the core of Lindbeck’s notion of truth, or do they 
simply indicate that he appropriates Wittgenstein into his own theory more than he 
does the others? A closer look may show the latter to be the case. 
 
Lindbeck’s Terminological Infelicity 
 
 First, we must attend to the way Lindbeck explains his use of Wittgenstein’s 
work: 
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Wittgenstein’s influence has been strong in some theological circles. While 
this does not appear to have yet inspired consideration of the problems of 
doctrinal constancy and change and of agreement and disagreement with 
which this book is concerned, it has served as a major stimulus to my 
thinking.195 
 
Lindbeck admits that Wittgenstein helped him in his effort to explain his own theory 
of doctrine, and this influence is evident in the overlapping conceptual language in his 
presentation of rule theory. But again, the issue is in how Wittgenstein influenced 
Lindbeck because after claiming that Wittgenstein was a “major stimulus” to his 
thinking, he then qualifies this statement, saying, “Even if in ways that those more 
knowledgeable in Wittgenstein might not approve.”196 Now familiar with the ways in 
which Barth and Thomas influence Lindbeck, this sentence gives a hint that he may 
approach Wittgenstein in a similar way. Thus, our investigation must consider ways 
those ‘more knowledgeable’ of Wittgenstein might not approve of Lindbeck’s 
appropriation. 
 For instance, Lee Barrett contends that what Lindbeck means by ‘rules’ in 
regard to doctrine is not what Wittgenstein means by the term.197 Evaluating Lindbeck 
he says, “At times it seems that doctrinal rules have meaning in themselves apart from 
any particular practice.”198 Strictly speaking, Barrett is correct as Lindbeck argues that 
regulating the language of faith is not merely part of the doctrinal role, but rather it is 
“the only job that doctrines do in their role as church teachings.”199 As demonstrated 
earlier, Lindbeck equates doctrines with second-order truth claims so that when he 
claims that doctrines are rules he thereby cements the understanding of ‘rules’ within 
this definition. In other words, Lindbeck contends that rules (doctrines) are literally 
communally authoritative regulations which, to some extent, exist independently of 
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specific applications and can be adapted to fit changing conditions. As Barrett 
complains, “All of these remarks suggest that it is possible, at least conceptually, to 
separate the formal rules from their specific instantiations in practice.”200 The 
implication is that what Lindbeck means by rules is different from what Wittgenstein 
means by the term. 
 As noted above, Lindbeck might easily agree with Wittgenstein that 
“‘following a rule’ is a practice,” but for Wittgenstein the rule is not separable from 
the particular practice.201 One cannot play chess according to the rules of baseball and 
claim they are still playing a game of chess, for “chess is the game it is in virtue of all 
its rules.”202 The form and content cannot be divided. This, however, is not what 
Lindbeck means by rules because sometimes following a doctrinal rule requires 
changing the form: “One can grasp the self-identical content as distinct from the form 
only by seeing that the diverse formulations are equivalent and, usually in a second 
step, by stating the equivalency rules.”203 It is true that Wittgenstein says that various 
activities can be linked together under a general concept – e.g., ‘game’ encompasses 
the different activities called ‘games’ – but he clearly does not affirm the existence of 
anything like ‘equivalency rules.’ There are “family resemblances” to be sure, but 
there is absolutely no self-identical content that is common to all.204 So Lindbeck’s 
explanation of following a rule is quite different from Wittgenstein’s. 
 Another charge of terminological confusion leveled against Lindbeck is with 
his use of the expressions ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life.’ Concerning the 
determination of what is true and what is false, Wittgenstein says, “What is true or 
false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. 
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This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.”205 This idea may sound 
similar to Lindbeck’s understanding of second-order propositions, but there is actually 
a substantive difference. For example, Lindbeck asserts: 
If the form of life and understanding of the world shaped by an authentic use 
of the Christian stories does in fact correspond to God’s being and will, then 




If Lindbeck had properly understood the notion of a form of life, he would 
have seen that it is only within such contexts that the question of what it 
means to ask whether a statement is true or false can arise. So if we want to 
ask whether a doctrine is true or false, we have first to ask what it means to 
speak of truth or falsity in this religious context.207 
 
It was demonstrated earlier that contrary to Phillips’ assertion Lindbeck does not 
actually support an unmediated notion of reality, but Phillips is correct to point out 
here that Lindbeck does indeed hold the notion that ontological truth (God’s being 
and will) is an objective reality to which a form of life must correspond. So if 
Lindbeck is seeking to follow Wittgenstein, then Phillips is right to object because 
Wittgenstein intends something rather different by this concept. 
 The argument is that Wittgenstein never meant anything quite so grand or all-
encompassing by these phrases as does Lindbeck. Although Wittgenstein provides no 
clear definitions, Nicholson looks to Wittgenstein’s use of these terms and says, 
“Wittgenstein implies that activities such as shopping, building, fighting battles, 
calculating, and so on are forms of life,” and each form of life may consist of several 
combinations of language-games.208 “Moreover,” says Nicholson, “it is not possible, 
other than as a conceptual abstraction, to neatly extract a language game from the 
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form of life in which it is embedded.”209 This objection overlaps with the previous 
one regarding rules, and it shows that even though Lindbeck employs Wittgenstein’s 
terms he did not exactly represent his concepts. For if Wittgenstein intends “language-
game” to serve as a reminder that “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or 
of a form of life,” which looks like “giving orders, . . . reporting an event, . . . making 
up a story; and reading one, acting in a play,”210 etc., then a religion cannot itself be a 
form of life. As Kerr notes, “It is impossible to apply the expression to any 
phenomenon on the scale of ‘religion’ – which must include innumerable language-
laced activities.”211 Yet this is exactly what Lindbeck intends: “A religion thought of 
as comparable to a cultural system, as a set of language games correlated with a form 
of life, may as a whole correspond or not correspond to what a theist calls God’s 
being and will.”212 A faithful application of Wittgenstein means one cannot say that 
an entire religious system is ‘a form of life,’ but that it consists of many different 
forms of life. 
 Having said this, the purpose of this section is not to chastise Lindbeck for 
abusing, misconstruing, or misunderstanding Wittgenstein, but to show that 
Lindbeck’s notion of truth cannot be located with Wittgenstein. As Ashford says, 
“This is not to say that Lindbeck misunderstood Wittgenstein; it is simply to say that 
he adapted Wittgenstein for his own purposes.”213 As with Barth and Thomas, aspects 
of Wittgenstein can help explain aspects of Lindbeck, but his work overall still 
remains set apart from these scholars. Thus, our search to locate Lindbeck’s 
epistemology within the history of ideas must move beyond the usual arguments.
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 While the investigation into some of the more obvious influences on Lindbeck’s 
theory resulted in a dead end for locating his epistemology, this does not mean hope is lost 
but that more imagination is required. For example, Nancey Murphy and James McClendon 
highlight Lindbeck’s rejection of foundationalism and his communal approach to decision 
making and conclude that his theology “is through and through postmodern.”1 Conversely, 
Peter Ochs believes that making such assertions about Lindbeck’s theology is a mistake 
because by doing so critics “misrepresent Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-linguistic alternative’ as a 
substantive theological claim rather than as a heuristic that is merely instrumental to his 
scriptural reasoning.”2 
 Ochs is perhaps on to something with the first part of his statement, but then weakens 
his point when he makes ‘scriptural reasoning’ the theological focus of the cultural-linguistic 
approach. Scriptural Reasoning is the interreligious practice of reading scriptural texts of 
other faiths – usually of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – in order to better understand 
differences as well as gain fresh insights into one’s own tradition.3 While our research so far 
has revealed that Lindbeck’s theory is indeed a heuristic, it also shows that his approach is 
instrumental to his biblical hermeneutic and not to his scriptural reasoning. To be sure, the 
practice of scriptural reasoning is not excluded by his approach but neither does it depend 
upon it: “The cultural-linguistic approach can allow a strong case for interreligious dialogue, 
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but not for any single type of such dialogue.”4 The point is, intertextuality is Lindbeck’s 
substantive theological claim and the cultural-linguistic theory (inclusive of rule theory) is his 
epistemic method for making this claim. But because the cultural-linguistic approach is 
chiefly a pragmatic tool, Ochs believes that Lindbeck is best understood through the lens of 
American pragmatist Charles Peirce.5 
 In considering these two suggestions regarding postmodernism and pragmatism, a few 
observations are in order. First, Lindbeck himself is ambivalent towards postmodernism, 
referring to it as a “parasitic negation” of modernity.6 And although he says that his 
theological approach could be called “postmodern” (among others), “postliberal” best 
describes what he has in mind.7 The clue here is that Lindbeck’s epistemology is something 
like postmodernism, but not exactly. Second, Lindbeck asserts that “if theologians happen to 
need an epistemology, . . . and when only a bad one is available, they have the responsibility 
to baptize it as thoroughly as possible.”8 Thus Ochs is not wrong to insist that Lindbeck’s 
approach is pragmatic, but Peirce – similar to Barth, Thomas, and Wittgenstein – might only 
serve Lindbeck’s approach rather than provide a sufficient comprehensive interpretive 
framework. Especially when we consider the “anti-metaphysical bias . . . grounded in Ochs’ 
use of Peirce.”9 For the discussion has demonstrated that Lindbeck does not deny the 
independent metaphysical existence of the world, but rather, as Jeffrey Hensley notes, 
“Lindbeck’s point is that if theology is understood intratextually, then the biblical narratives 
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shape the way Christians view the extrascriptural world.”10 So the two clues with which the 
investigation will continue are that Lindbeck’s theory is like postmodernism and like 
pragmatism, yet does not wholly fit within either epistemic category. 
 
A New Question 
 
 Short of implying that Lindbeck conjures his notion of truth from thin air, a way must 
be found to account for its existence. Therefore, rather than asking, ‘How did these thinkers 
influence his theory?’, we might ask instead, ‘What influenced Lindbeck to pursue these 
particular scholars in the first place?’ One thing to consider when asking this question is that 
the various ‘ideas’ in the history of ideas do not belong solely to Western thinkers. Ideas 
belong to human thinkers and human philosophies branch out from many different times, 
places, and cultures. With this in mind, one detail which is noted sometimes by way of 
introduction, but has seemingly yet to be seriously considered, is that Lindbeck lived the first 
seventeen years of his life in East Asia.11 
 In a 2006 interview he recalls that during these formative years he immersed himself 
in Chinese thought and culture through conversations with local friends and through reading 
“all the relevant literature I could lay my hands on.”12 Lindbeck claims that these influences, 
along with his family’s close friendship with a local pastor and his wife, helped implant East 
Asian ways of thinking in his mind. He recounts that this couple were “warmly Christian and 
yet, in their manners, Confucian to the core.”13 He then confesses, “I am inclined to think that 
without these China-implanted modes of thought, I would not have been attracted to the 
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thinkers from whose ideas I have cobbled together the outlook for which I seem to be chiefly 
known.”14 
 Most of Lindbeck’s research deals with “Jews, Roman Catholics and non-Lutheran 
Protestants,”15 but concerning his experience with Chinese people and culture, he says, 
“Their tacit influence on my thinking, however, lies deepest and it is only gradually that I 
have become aware of how pervasive it has been.”16 Could this be why Lindbeck cannot be 
made to fit the ‘usual’ patterns of speaking about truth? Could the context for effectively 
evaluating his work actually be a feature which never explicitly appears anywhere in it? 
 
What is Like Postmodernism and Like Pragmatism but is Not Either? 
 
 In a comparative study between the Chinese conception of Dao (meaning something 
like ‘way,’ ‘road,’ ‘path,’ or ‘teaching’) and the Western conception of ‘Truth,’ Keqian Xu 
sees a fusion on the horizon as Western postmodern ideas move ever closer to ancient 
Chinese philosophic concepts.17 In other words, while there are still important differences, 
there are some ways in which postmodern ideas of truth are like Chinese notions of 
“appropriate activity.”18 Thus, if Lindbeck’s theory is built upon Chinese epistemological 
categories, Xu’s observation may help explain why his epistemology is like postmodernism. 
 As regards the second notion, that Lindbeck’s theory is like pragmatism, Chad 
Hansen says of ancient Chinese philosophy: “Given the structure of doctrines in the 
philosophical texts of the period, a pragmatic interpretation of classical Chinese is a more 
explanatorily coherent theory than a semantic (truth-based) alternative”19 That is to say, 
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where Western philosophy is concerned with the placement of words and the grammatical 
structure of sentences for determining truth, Chinese philosophy is not. Hansen argues that 
the main emphasis of Chinese writings is the concern for shaping life around what is best for 
society, thus they focus more on pragmatic issues than on metaphysical concerns.20 This is 
also why translating certain Chinese characters (such as Dao) simply as ‘truth,’ is liable to 
cause Western thinkers to misunderstand these Chinese philosophical notions. For as 
Chenyang Li states, truth viewed from this perspective means that “a person merely rich in 
factual knowledge and semantic truth is nevertheless ignorant.”21 
 From this brief survey, the two clues regarding postmodernism and pragmatism 
indicate that Lindbeck might adhere to East Asian modes of thought for developing his 
approach. If so, this will go a long way in explaining why many Western scholars have found 
it difficult to comprehend the full scope of his theory and may also provide a more 
comprehensive framework for understanding Lindbeck’s notion of truth. 
 
Introducing a New Context to the Discussion 
 
 To test the possibility that East Asian modes of thought substantially influence 
Lindbeck’s theory, the following section will look at three social concepts found in 
Confucianism to see how they compare to Lindbeck.22 The intent of this comparison is not to 
claim that Lindbeck’s epistemology is specifically Confucian, but to suggest that the 
epistemic orientation of Chinese philosophy in general might provide a better background for 
understanding the overall epistemic nature of his theory. The survey of Confucianism, then, 
serves as a way to introduce this unique background to the discussion. Thus, issues 
sometimes associated with Confucianism – such as that it oppresses women23 or is 
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incompatible with democracy,24 – are not immediately relevant to the proposal being made 
here. For the purpose of this comparison is not to argue for a particular tradition or practice, 
but to identify a particular epistemological framework. 
 Because this section will introduce a whole new context to the discussion, it will help 
to keep three things in mind. First, remember Lindbeck’s notion that a Christian truth claim 
corresponds to the ultimate reality of God’s being and will “only as it is used in the activities 
of adoration, proclamation, obedience, promise-hearing, and promise-keeping which shape 
individuals and communities into conformity to the mind of Christ.”25 Second, keep in mind 
that even as he places great importance on the performance of these activities, the primary 
intent of his theory of doctrine is to explain “how new doctrines can develop in the course of 
time, and how old ones can be forgotten or become peripheral . . . [also,] how old doctrines 
can be reinterpreted to fit new circumstances.”26 Third, the discussion so far shows that 
Lindbeck believes that correspondence to ultimate reality is possible through what he calls 
categorial truth, but it is not yet clear how one determines this correspondence. 
 
The Principles of Ren, Li, and Yi 
 
 One important Confucian concept is the guiding social ideal called ren (also written 
jen).27 This concept is something like “humaneness” or “benevolence,” and it “expresses the 
Confucian ideal of cultivating humanity, developing human faculties, sublimating one’s 
personality and upholding human rights.”28 It is a kind of transcendent yet immanent quality 
that one must cultivate, and although many refer to ren conventionally as a principle, virtue, 
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ideal, or even a doctrine, it is nothing less than the essence of social harmony.29 A major 
component for achieving this Confucian goal is through the principle of li – ritual and 
propriety. As Karyn Lai explains, “From the practical point of view, it is through observing 
and practising li-behaviours that one learns about ren.”30 Here we might recall Lindbeck’s 
notion of performance and correspondence, for one cannot observe these requirements in 
isolation because li are entirely relational and are the only way to realize ren: “Each 
individual’s project of self-cultivation,” says Yew Leong Wong, “is conducted within the 
social context: it is through establishing oneself as a member of the society that one cultivates 
oneself.”31 
 Looking further at ren and li, Shun Kwong-Loi notes that there is some debate among 
scholars concerning Confucius’ conception of how the two principles relate. He labels one 
interpretation “definitionalist,” because adherents claim that strict observance of existing li 
rules is the only way to achieve ren.32 Within this understanding no change or revision can be 
made to li practices, and exact performance of these rules is “the sole criterion for 
distinguishing between the possession and lack of jen.”33 The other view he calls the 
“instrumentalist” interpretation.34 This reading of Confucius claims that “each of the two is 
distinct from and intelligible independently of the other. . . . However, as a matter of fact, the 
two are related by causal relations which make one a means to the other.”35 In other words, 
the definitionalist says that the only way to identify the presence of ren is through exact 
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adherence to li practices, whereas the instrumentalist says that li practices have more to do 
with an attitude or disposition than with particular practices. A delineation that appears to be 
similar to Lindbeck’s explanation of cognitive-propositional and experiential-expressive 
views. 
 Shun goes on to propose an alternative reading that recognizes the role li play in 
shaping the ren ideal, and also “allows for the possibility of departing from or revising an 
existing rule of li if there is good reason for doing so.”36 A suggestion that once again seems 
similar to Lindbeck’s desire to propose a theory which acknowledges the changing and 
unchanging nature of doctrine. Nevertheless, for Confucianism, Shun gives an example of 
what this approach might look like by referencing a teaching of Confucius: 
Ritual calls for caps of hemp, though nowadays silk is used, because it is more 
economical. I go along with others in this. 
 Ritual calls for one to bow at the foot of the stairs [before the emperor]. 
Nowadays people bow at the top of the stairs, but this is presumptuous. Although it 
means differing from others, I perform the bow at the foot of the stairs.37 
 
In this statement, Confucius affirms the importance of existing li practices for achieving ren 
but allows for the possibility that alterations of these practices might be made when the 
context changes. As Wong says, “The essentially functional character of li suggests that li 
practices are evaluated in terms of their efficacy in realising the Confucian objectives.”38 
Thus ren, in some sense, transcends li so that a community can evaluate and possibly revise 
existing practices in order to maintain the ability of li to express (correspond to) ren. In this 
case, the first part of the Confucian quote shows that people had the desire to follow the rule 
regarding ceremonial caps, but for economic reasons it became necessary to wear silk caps 
instead of the prescribed hemp. In this way, says Shun, one “can justify departure from a li 
rule only when the efficacy of the li rule in serving its purpose remains unaffected.”39 In the 
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second part, Confucius states that there is no reason, except for arrogance, to alter the rule of 
bowing to a ruler before ascending the steps to the upper hall. In the first instance he follows 
the consensus for the revision of li, in this second instance he does not because the reason for 
the change is ‘presumptuous.’ As Lindbeck might say, majority agreement is sufficient but 
not necessary for determining the consensus fidelium.40 In any case, here we find a 
description of practices and beliefs that is comparable to Lindbeck’s explanation of doctrinal 
change and constancy. 
 Yeo Khiok-khng recognizes that because the written character, “li,” is usually 
translated into English as “ritual” or “rite,” Christians, “especially Western Protestants,” are 
prone to think of it in a negative light.41 But within a Confucian understanding, “the 
connotations often associated with the terms, such as ‘wooden,’ ‘fixed,’ ‘uncompromising,’ 
‘mechanical,’ ‘imposing,’ with the overtones of ‘lifeless,’ ‘formality,’ or ‘going through the 
motions’—are all off the mark when it comes to the meaning of li.”42 Li are performed 
because, when properly applied, they are constitutive of ren, which is social harmony. One 
cannot achieve ren through mere cognitive knowledge of existing li practices, but if with 
genuine regard one performs li then these acts become the medium for achieving ren.43 
 Another crucial ingredient for achieving ren is a specific disposition called yi (as we 
discuss this principle, keep in mind Lindbeck’s explanation for how to discern 
correspondence). Lai says that the concept of yi has to do with “‘appropriateness’ or ‘right,’ . 
. . that is, there is emphasis on doing the ‘right’ thing in a particular context, rather than 
merely following a rule or norm.”44 Moreover, a person who is experienced in li is able to 
determine what is proper in particular circumstances, as well as in the broader activity of 
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42 Ibid. 
43 Wong, “Li and Change.” 
44 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 31. 
 74 
making revisions and alterations to existing practices. As Shun states, “It seems that yi has to 
do with the appropriateness or rightness of one’s behavior, which is not just a matter of 
following li,” rather yi requires a careful yet adaptable relation between ren and li.45 Shun 
demonstrates this point with two corresponding observations: 
(1) That observance of li is a means to cultivating and expressing jen; (2) that revision 
of or departure from an actually existing li rule can be justified by economic or some 
other consideration, as long as this does not affect its efficacy in performing the 
function described in (1); and (3) that the general observance of li is, at least in part, 
constitutive of jen; (4) a generally conservative attitude toward the existing li 
practices.46 
 
To be sure, this delineation is as close to a systematic method for evaluating ‘truth’ that one 
will find in Confucianism, and Shun sums up this idea, saying: 
Since the concept itself is made available to members of the community by the 
existing linguistic practice, any revision has to proceed against the background of a 
general acceptance of the existing practice, thereby ruling out the possibility of a 
more comprehensive revision. This accounts for a generally conservative attitude 
toward the linguistic practice actually in existence.47 
 
To this extent, perhaps we can identify some substantial correlations between Lindbeck’s 
view of truth and these Confucian principles. I recognize that this brief survey oversimplifies 
these principles, but the hope is that the discussion has nonetheless provided us with enough 
information to serve our purpose here. Thus, the following comparative study is not meant to 
be a comprehensive or definitive evaluation of Lindbeck’s work in light of Confucian ideals, 
but rather to serve as a tentative test for what might prove to be a fruitful way forward in the 
discussion. 
 
A Comparison of Lindbeck with Confucianism 
 
 Along with the point stated above about the tentative nature of this proposal, I must 
also note that I do not read Chinese texts and so must rely on English translations and 
commentaries for the delineation of Confucianism and Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, the 
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English scholarly resources on the subject are prolific and it is because of this material that I 
am able to put forward this original contribution in the study of Lindbeck. 
That said, one might develop a comparative study of Lindbeck’s work with readings 
of Confucianism in a number of ways, because if the hypothesis is that his theory is rooted in 
East Asian thought then, theoretically, one might start anywhere in his work and find 
significant connections. Thus, with no particular guidance for where to begin and yet needing 
to begin somewhere, this section will springboard from the brief analogy Lindbeck uses to 
illustrate his theory of truth by first comparing his view with aspects of Confucian thought in 
particular and then with Chinese philosophy in general. 
 
The Lordship of Christ and the Crusader 
 
 Recall Lindbeck’s differentiation between intrasystematically true and ontologically 
true statements.48 An intrasystematically true statement need not be ontologically true, but an 
ontologically true statement must be intrasystematically true.49 With this explanation he 
provides the following illustration: 
The crusader’s battle cry “Christus est Dominus,” for example, is false when used to 
authorize cleaving the skull of the infidel (even though the same words in other 
contexts may be a true utterance). When thus employed, it contradicts the Christian 
understanding of Lordship as embodying, for example, suffering servanthood.50 
 
This illustration causes some critics to understand Lindbeck to mean that a person can negate 
the truth of a statement by acting in a way that is false to its proper utterance. For example, 
William Placher asserts: 
Even assuming that one could argue back from the virtue of the tellers to the truth of 
their tale, any such argument on behalf of Christian narratives either would fall victim 
to a strong form of relativism, . . . or else would have to claim that the Christian 
community makes people demonstrably more virtuous than other communities do.51 
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Likewise, Jay Richards argues that Lindbeck’s notion of truth makes “it difficult for someone 
to be a hypocrite (at least for long).”52 For if the idea is that someone can actually falsify a 
claim through improper use, then improper application cannot be considered hypocritical: 
“Having violated this claim, one could then deny its truth, since one’s actions make it 
false.”53 
Nevertheless, Peter Thuesen argues that more important than these concerns, is the 
fact “that Christians do not always agree on what counts as coherent—practically or 
linguistically.”54 In other words, if truth obtains only through the appropriate application of a 
statement, then whose understanding of ‘appropriate’ is to be authoritative? Addressing these 
concerns in concert with the Confucian ideas discussed above might bring some clarity to this 




 The first way that Lindbeck parallels Confucian philosophy is in how correspondence 
to an ‘ideal’ or ‘truth’ obtains. H. G. Creel notes that Confucius taught his disciples that “it is 
not enough to be sincere merely in thought and in speech. True sincerity calls for action.”55 
One must be sincere in one’s thinking and doing, which means expressing one’s thinking and 
doing in the appropriate ways.56 His point is that Confucius’ main concern was that members 
seek to be true, not to prove the actions of li somehow verify the independent truths of ren. 
The truth of the presence of ren, and the truth of the ability of li to achieve ren, is realized 
through the process of living them out. As Ralph Covell explains, in Chinese thought “truth 
cannot be proved logically, only grasped experientially. . . . The emphasis is on the whole, 
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not the parts; on the fullness of reality more than on reason.”57 This might be somewhat of an 
overstatement, as ‘logic’ and ‘reason’ are certainly involved, but it is indeed the case that 
these elements are situated as one part of a multifaceted process. In other words, the truth of a 
propositional statement is not proved merely by its logical correspondence to other cognitive 
statements, it must also be genuinely lived out and allowed to engage the fullness of reality. 
For “the value of learning,” Li Fu Chen explains, “lies in its application and not in the 
quantity of ‘knowledge’ acquired.”58 As regards Lindbeck’s illustration, the statement “Christ 
is Lord” may certainly be cognitively true (i.e., logically consistent with other cognitive 
statements of the community), but this fact alone amounts to very little in the discussion of 
ultimate meaning.59 
 Some of Lindbeck’s critics assume that if they can locate the one thing that holds 
together his theory of truth, they will be able to prove its logical falsity. Placher believes this 
weak point is Lindbeck’s emphasis on virtue,60 while Richards thinks the “perplexing” 
component is his dependence on performance.61 Yet a passage from the Analects shows that 
if East Asian modes of thought influences Lindbeck’s theory, then identifying the one thing 
that holds it together may not be so simple. 
The Master said, You might have sufficient knowledge to gain a position, but if you 
do not have the humaneness [ren] needed to hold on to it, then although you gain it, 
you will surely lose it. You might have sufficient knowledge to gain a position and 
the humaneness needed to hold on to it, but if you do not administer it with dignity 
[virtue], the common people will not respect you. You might have sufficient 
knowledge to gain a position, the humaneness needed to hold it, and may administer it 
with dignity, but if your actions do not accord with ritual [li], the results will be less 
than good.62 
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This passage demonstrates that responsibility for reaching Confucian objectives does not 
belong with any one criterion. It is not just virtue any more than it is just performance or just 
knowledge. The conditions for attaining ren occur only when each principle functions 
appropriately, and only by working together as a whole is the ideal reached.63 If one must 
speak in terms of correspondence, then correspondence is realized in a community that 
appreciates effective practices (li) for cultivating ren, and whose members live them out 
appropriately (yi).64 
 Lindbeck also insists that a propositional statement alone, no matter how ‘logical,’ is 
insufficient for attaining the full meaning and intent or ‘truth’ of a statement. For example, 
referring to Paul and Luther he says: 
What they were concerned to assert is that the only way to assert the truth is to do 
something about it, i.e., to commit oneself to a way of life, and this concern, it would 
seem, is wholly congruent with the suggestion that it is only through the performatory 
use of religious utterances that they acquire propositional force.65 
 
Nevertheless, acquiring propositional force does not automatically make the utterance true.66 
The crusader’s performatory use of a religious utterance definitely achieved propositional 
force, but it was a false proposition (i.e., wrongly applied). Thus Lindbeck argues that the 
particular performance by the crusader is false (inappropriate) and unable to achieve 
coherence with the true meaning of ‘Christ is Lord.’ An assertion that is reminiscent of the 
Confucian teaching on the rectification of names. 
 Chenyang Li explains that the rectification of names is one of the most important 
doctrines of Confucius, and it is concerned “not so much with proper names as with names as 
general terms, that is, kind names and descriptions.”67 For example, a king is not a king 
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merely because of his title, but because he embodies the socio-ethical expectations of how a 
king ought to behave. As Chung-Ying Cheng explains: 
This doctrine does not just require definitional consistency, but implies a recognition 
of principles; that is, recognition of standards of action that can be used to judge what 
is true, good, and right, on the one hand, and what is false, bad, and wrong, on the 
other. . . . But because moral knowledge of right and wrong in a normal situation 
carries a command for doing right, to rectify names, therefore, is related to the 
program for carrying out the command for doing the appropriate thing in accordance 
with the proper situation. This is a reason why rectifying names has practical 
significance for human conduct and is not merely a matter of the correct use of 
language.68 
 
Again, judging what is true or false is not determined only by moral knowledge, but is 
determined as this knowledge is carried out “for doing the appropriate thing in accordance 
with the proper situation.”69 
 Comparatively, Lindbeck is not simply concerned with whether or not the crusader’s 
declaration is semantically true, but with whether or not the performative utterance correlates 
with the Christian understanding of the Lordship of Christ.70 He seems to imply that because 
the crusader wears the name ‘Christian,’ his actions ought to accord with what it means to 
function as a disciple of Christ; “embodying, for example, suffering servanthood.”71 
Chenyang Li says, “For Confucius, names . . . imply a person’s proper role in a nexus of 
social relationships and also imply social responsibilities.”72 Lindbeck similarly argues that a 
Christian understanding of Lordship is mediated by “a total pattern of speaking, thinking, 
feeling, and acting,”73 and when a person lives and thinks in these communally accepted 
ways, it is assumed they possess the capacity to truly declare that Christ is Lord.74 This 
capacity does not make the declaration true, but truth and meaning are completed or realized 
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through the proper relation of knowledge, practice, and virtue.75 So being Christian – having 
the name ‘Christian’ – also implies being Christianly – behaving like a Christian. 
 It is also for this reason that Lindbeck judges the crusader’s expression of the 
Christian name to be false, bad, and wrong; although if rectified, “the same words in other 
contexts may be a true utterance” because “utterances are intrasystematically true when they 
cohere with the total relevant context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in 
cultural-linguistic terms, is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of life.”76 
In short, internal correspondence among propositional statements is not enough to achieve 
correspondence to ultimate reality. One must incorporate the appropriate activities with a 
genuine regard towards their adequacy and proper performance for efficacy. With this 
understanding in mind, the second way Lindbeck’s theory coincides with East Asian ways of 




 Lindbeck seeks to show that an innate balance exists between faithful observance of 
communal practices – which are the medium for achieving Christian objectives – and 
faithfully maintaining their efficacy for achieving these objectives in the midst of change.77 
Stated simply, he does not attempt to convince readers to adopt a specific philosophy for 
determining faithful doctrinal reformulations, and even less does he seek to provide a 
systematic method for doing so.78 What he attempts to get readers to recognize is that despite 
the absence of an abiding conscious intent or method for determining such things, Christian 
doctrine nevertheless behaves within a pattern “of constancy and change, unity and 
diversity.”79 This describes the doctrinal setting and empirical environment for evaluating 
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and developing adequate theories about the nature of doctrine.80 A theory, in other words, 
should not propose how Christians might go about ascertaining faithful reformulations, but 
should seek to describe how specific doctrines have functioned in the history of the church. 
The root of Lindbeck’s approach is to observe first and reflect second.81 
Thuesen asserts that even if one can agree that the crusader’s actions were false, the 
same cannot be said for deciding what constitutes a true statement because “Christians do not 
always agree on what counts as coherent—practically or linguistically.”82 He provides a 
“practical” example of a pastor who “quotes the biblical proposition ‘God is love’ (1 John 
4:8),” and then interprets it in a way that contradicts another pastor who quotes the same 
proposition.83 Thuesen challenges: “Which pastor, to use Lindbeck’s terminology, is making 
an intrasystematically true proposition?”84 One important point of clarification in response is 
to remember that for Lindbeck, the proposition “God is love” from 1 John 4:8, as bare text, is 
not yet a ‘biblical’ proposition. This propositional statement is imbedded within the entire 
canonical ecclesial world in which it acquires meaning and significance. So only from this 
perspective can one then ask which utterance, or more specifically which preaching, is an 
intrasystematically true proposition. “The significant things,” Lindbeck declares, “are the 
distinctive patterns of story, belief, ritual, and behavior that give ‘love’ and ‘God’ their 
specific and sometimes contradictory meanings.”85 With this in mind, turning back to 
Thuesen’s questions, who is qualified to decide which preaching is the true one? 
 In the Analects, one who is well suited to make such judgments is called a junzi, an 
exemplary person. This is one who possesses creative propriety: “The Master said, The 
gentleman [junzi] makes rightness the substance [yi], practices it through ritual [li], displays it 
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with humility, brings it to completion with trustworthiness.”86 Yet, while this person is 
practiced in li, determining the appropriate interpretation among the possibilities is not a 
simple matter of choosing the one closest to existing interpretations.87 As Thuesen pointed 
out, the difficulties with this approach make resolution nearly impossible. But neither is a 
junzi concerned primarily with determining which is the ‘true’ one – at least not in any kind 
of a linguistic-scientific way. For the junzi seeks harmony rather than agreement.88 Wong 
describes this person, saying: 
Such a person would be well-versed in the specific li practices that govern her roles 
and the situations she is in. The properly motivated member of the society observes 
the cues available to determine dispositions and attitudes of her counterparts in the 
same situation, and thereby determine the best course of action in such situations.89 
 
Thus, good and proper judgment does not occur through mere knowledge of cognitive 
propositions which function as pre-established formulations for dealing with any and all 
situations. Rather, the properly motivated person, the junzi, is one who has acquired a high 
level of indigeneity within the community. They apprehend social cues by being attentive to 
people’s words and facial expressions, and they can sense appropriate action.90 They are at 
home in their environment, responding naturally to each situation with little conscious 
thought for what is ‘right.’ 
Though the junzi seeks harmony, this does not mean that there is no disagreement. A 
Confucian understanding of harmony “means that the junzi may disagree with others, and yet 
he would still treat others with respect and regard for the obtaining of the greater good. He 
may therefore thrive on this disagreement by making his disagreement a source of fruitful 
and creative relationship.”91 A junzi could be any person from any social level, but essentially 
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“the junzi, as the exemplary person, is one who through disciplined practice sets in motion a 
sympathetic vibration for others to follow. That path will be the way of yi, appropriateness, 
rightness, or morality.”92 
 So how does this teaching compare to Lindbeck? In regard to judging which view is 
best, he states, “Those who are able to judge in these matters, . . . are those who have 
effectively interiorized a religion. . . . They know by connaturality, as Aquinas might say, 
whether specific usages are in conformity to the spirit, the interior rule of faith.”93 
Ascertaining a faithful practice or formulation is less about cognitive reflection and more 
about interiorized religion. Lindbeck claims that “everyone knows this intuitively,” but 
having to admit less intellectual control causes “the fear of relativistic anomie.”94 Yet 
“competent practitioners” will be members of the mainstream community, and “while they 
may have no formal theological training, 
they are likely to be saturated with the language of Scripture and/or liturgy. One 
might, perhaps, call them flexibly devout: they have so interiorized the grammar of 
their religion that they are reliable judges, not directly of the doctrinal formulations 
(for these may be too technical for them to understand), but of the acceptability or 
unacceptability of the consequences of these formulations in ordinary religious life 
and language.95 
 
A major component of Lindbeck’s explanation is the consideration of consequences. In 
seeking harmony the question of true or false has more to do with what is best for achieving 
Christian objectives. Lindbeck insists that this way of looking at things, “instead of 
undermining the authority of doctrines, may be better adapted to enhancing their regulative 
efficacy than are modernized and relativizing propositional interpretations.”96 
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 This idea is similar to Shun’s second observation about the relation between ren and 
li: “That revision of or departure from an actually existing li rule can be justified by 
economic or some other consideration, as long as this does not affect its efficacy in 
performing the function described in (1) [i.e., cultivating and expressing ren].”97 As this 
understanding relates to Christianity, Lindbeck says that the competent person will ably 
discern that “whatever coheres with the Gospel recitals of Jesus’ Spirit-guided enactment of 
his identity as God’s Messiah is a possible interpretation, a possible scriptural word from 
God, and whatever does not cohere is to be rejected.”98 This idea is surely less decisive than 
cognitive-propositional approaches, but it leaves room for doctrinal reformulation in an ever 
changing environment rather than trying to delimit the only ‘right’ or ‘true’ expression for all 
time.99 This is important because “when other criteria are not decisive, the interpretation 
which seems most likely in these particular circumstances to serve the upbuilding of the 
community of faith in its God-willed witness to the world is the one to be preferred.”100 
 Lindbeck’s view of the situation may not look like the usual way most Christians 
speak about doctrine, but maybe this depends on one’s location in the discussion. From 
another perspective doctrine is one part of the whole in which self-cultivation occurs through 
harmonious participation. As Wong says, this need not mean that doctrines will either fall 
into meaninglessness or rigidity, because 
it is an adequate understanding of what the Confucian objectives entail and the 
structure of the situations one find[s] oneself in that inform one’s evaluation of 
existing li practices. However, changes in li practices take place against a 
conservative attitude towards inherited social conventions, and it is this conservative 
attitude that provide[s] stability and continuity despite the changes.101 
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Thus, if one were seeking an alternative approach for explaining the variable and invariable 
matters of Christian beliefs and practices, then consideration of a Confucian understanding of 
the subject would certainly bring new and unusual dimensions to the discussion. 
 
The Distinctive Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy and Lindbeck’s 
Epistemological Approach 
 
 Lindbeck states, “If theologians happen to need an epistemology . . . they have the 
responsibility to baptize it as thoroughly as possible.”102 The assumption here is that 
Lindbeck himself happened to need an epistemology and the cultural-linguistic theory is the 
baptized form. Yet, as noted earlier, the proposal for locating his unique epistemic approach 
cannot simply depend on one particular philosophical theory. Otherwise the comparison with 
Confucianism merely shifts the problem of identifying Lindbeck’s ad hoc approach from a 
Western context to an East Asian one. In other words, if his theory reflects certain elements 
of Confucianism, then it likely reflects aspects of philosophical Daoism or Chan Buddhism as 
well. So the primary purpose of the comparison with Confucianism has been to provide an 
example of the kind of form that an East Asian epistemological approach takes. And it is this 
particular form which helps us better appreciate the thing itself; that is, the epistemological 
nature of East Asian philosophy. Thus let us consider Lindbeck in relation to East Asian 
philosophy in general. 
 Beginning with an ancient Chinese text called the Yijing (The Book of Changes), Lai 
identifies several themes which she says “are manifest more broadly across the range of 
Chinese philosophical doctrines, and they are constitutive of the distinctive characteristics of 
Chinese philosophy.”103 Among these themes are at least three ways Lindbeck’s approach 
correlates with the general nature of East Asian philosophy. 
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 A notable feature of Lindbeck’s approach is that he begins the process by assuming 
that change is inevitable. His thesis does not seek to answer whether or not doctrinal change 
does or should occur, rather he simply assumes the reality and thus seeks to describe the 
nature of doctrine.104 For example, in his modification “of common ways of thinking about 
religions,” he asserts, “Religious change or innovation must be understood, not as proceeding 
from new experiences, but as resulting from the interactions of a cultural-linguistic system 
with changing situations.”105 Comparatively, Lai says, “The Yijing embodies an attitude that 
is expectant of change and that seeks ways to prepare for it and deal with it.”106 Regarding 
Chinese philosophy in general, she explains: 
The early thinkers were acutely aware of constant changes in society. . . . In the 
debates among the different doctrinal groups, there was some consensus that the 
norms and ideals for the rectification of society had to adapt to the different needs 
brought about by new situations.107 
 
Because Lindbeck sees the notion of change as having a priori status, he also insists that 
investigative theories – such as theories on how doctrinal change occurs – ought to be 
descriptive.108 That is, a theory should first seek to observe the situation within the entire 
relevant context before the investigator reflects on the issue. This notion leads Lindbeck to 
claim that “theology is understood as the scholarly activity of second-order reflection on the 
data of religion”109; hence, the cognitive dimension of knowledge for Lindbeck is not as 
much about “what to assert” as about “how to think.”110 
Similarly, the priority of observation is an important feature of Chinese philosophy: 
The Yijing emphasises observation as a critical element in reflective thinking, and 
perhaps procedurally prior to it. The predictions and prescriptions in the text are 
founded on observation of connections, movements and transformations in the world. 
From these observations, one perceives patterns, regularities and correlations.111 
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Because constant movement implies the inevitability of change, one should both expect new 
situations and be aware of the ways in which people dealt with change in the past. For 
“knowing in the Chinese tradition,” Lai explains, “is ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing 
that.’”112 The reason awareness and practice of traditional principles are important is not so 
that people can hold rigidly to the old ways, but so they can hold faithfully to the original 
meanings in the midst of an ever-changing world. So “what is relevant in particular 
circumstances is at times open to interpretation.”113 Or as Lindbeck says, “Everything is in 
flux. . . . The meaning of rites and utterances depends on contexts. To replicate the old forms 
in new situations frequently betrays the original meaning, the original spirit.”114 
 Finally, while our comparison could go on to draw other significant correlations – 
such as social embodiment, holistic perspectives, and correlative thinking – there is 
nevertheless one unique feature which might ultimately serve as the keystone for connecting 
the epistemological arch between Lindbeck and Chinese philosophy. So far, the comparison 
shows that (1) the inevitability of change serves as a given assumption for both approaches, 
and (2) the reality of change means that interpretation remains open so that doctrines can 
adapt and help formulate appropriate action in new situations. The essential ingredient, then, 
is (3) the employment of a well-rounded hermeneutic. That is, the interpretive method is not 
only “keen to rely on the ideas of antiquity,” it also “ruminates on and interprets the insights 
of various thinkers, and applies them to situations at hand.”115 Considering the difficulties 
Lindbeck’s ad hoc approach has caused many Western scholars, an extended explanation 
from Lai on this point is crucial: 
This method of drawing insightful views from any number of different doctrines and 
integrating them into a viable theory continues to be a central feature of Chinese 
philosophy down to the present. The syncretic approach is markedly different from 
analysis, which involves understanding the assumptions that lie behind particular 
                                               
112 Ibid., 227. 
113 Ibid., 14. 
114 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 65. 
115 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 14. 
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theories, and the justification of basic concepts and ideas. While analysis seeks to 
distinguish and isolate basic components of an argument, the syncretic approach 
integrates ideas from doctrines that are discrete and perhaps even oppositional.116 
 
As we have seen, not only does Lindbeck use common truth terms in uncommon ways, he 
also intertwines various concepts from theories usually assumed to be incompatible. 
Indeed, Lindbeck’s syncretic approach causes Kenneth Surin to assume that 
“Lindbeck wants to reconcile his ‘categorial’ account of religious truth with an ingenious 
hybrid truth-theory which combines the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of 
truth.”117 Thus he recognizes Lindbeck’s unsystematic use of individual ideas and divergent 
theories to express his own theory. But perhaps Surin, like others, misidentifies the particular 
role that epistemology plays in Lindbeck’s theory. For it could be that Lindbeck’s syncretic 
approach is not only an attempt to justify some ‘ingenious’ theory of truth, but that the actual 
approach itself, his very act of cobbling together various truth-theories, is itself his baptized 
epistemology. In this way, I would suggest that his ad hoc approach for explaining the 
cultural-linguistic position is not merely an attempt to reconcile his truth theory, but that it is 




 Lindbeck recognizes that the persuasiveness of the cultural-linguistic approach “does 
not depend on moving step by step in a demonstrative sequence, but on the illuminating 
power of the whole. It may be that if light dawns, it will be over the whole landscape 
simultaneously.”118 But the difficulty lies in trying to bring together the seemingly disparate 
pieces of his epistemological setting to provide a comprehensive view of the cultural-
linguistic landscape. Thus ‘the whole’ is often the very thing which causes the most 
confusion. Nonetheless, I have suggested that perhaps the main reason Lindbeck’s theory of 
                                               
116 Ibid., 16; emphasis added. 
117 Kenneth Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith’: An Examination of Lindbeck’s 
Chapter Three,” Modern Theology 4, no. 2 (January 1988): 192. 
118 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, xxxvi. 
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truth seems unusual is not because of some originality on his part, but because the organic 
nature of his epistemological setting is foreign to his critics’ eyes. 
 The first chapter set the stage by showing the difficulty in trying to hold Lindbeck to 
the usual standards of epistemic speech. Therefore, I sought to locate his epistemology in the 
history of ideas by evaluating the works of Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. While the survey revealed significant correlations, I proposed that none of 
these representative thinkers could ultimately account for his configuration of truth and 
doctrine. Chapter 2, then, offers an original contribution to the discussion by calling attention 
to the fact that Lindbeck lived the first seventeen years of his life in East Asia, and I have 
tentatively suggested that an East Asian epistemic affords a more suitable hermeneutical 
framework for understanding his theory. 
Admittedly, the explicit evidence connecting Lindbeck to East Asian thought is 
mostly conceptual, but perhaps the proposal is worthy of consideration nonetheless. For as 
Hansen puts it: “An interpretation is a theoretical model for a corpus whose aim is to make 
the corpus intelligible. The question is which interpretation is best—most plausible, most 
explanatorily powerful and elegant.”119 Thus if readers are convinced that the interpretation 
of Lindbeck presented here is best, then it will likely happen through perceiving an implicit 
quality in Lindbeck’s work that resonates with East Asian modes of thought more than with 
Western ones. Again, the goal is not to delimit the one way to interpret Lindbeck, but to find 
an interpretive framework that provides the most comprehensive explanation of the overall 
character of his theory. To this extent, where a search of Western thought failed to locate 
Lindbeck’s epistemic method, East Asian thought appears to offer a more promising 
environment for bearing fruit. 
If then interpreters of Lindbeck will reorient their approach accordingly, perhaps rule 
theory can finally be relied upon for working through a particular theological dilemma – such 
                                               
119 Hansen, “Chinese Language,” 493. 
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as the question regarding the fate of the unevangelized. Indeed, Part 2 of this thesis marks the 
beginning of our efforts to apply a rule theory approach to the contemporary discussion of the 
unevangelized. In theory, if doctrines are treated as rules for theological discussion, then this 
approach should help us remain faithful to particular doctrinal directives while also 
reformulating doctrinal expressions for working through this disputed question in theology. 
For the point in saying that doctrines are like rules is not to say that their purpose is to specify 
all that can be said about something, “but rather to indicate the formal possibilities and 
thereby to enhance the chances of meaningful discussion and debate.”120 
 Having said this, and before proceeding, it is important to know that the East Asian 
philosophical element of our study will play a less obvious role in the coming chapters. In 
other words, I seek to approach the problem of the unevangelized from a Lindbeckian 
perspective and not necessarily from a Confucian one. The purpose of Part 1 has been to clear 
the intellectual rubble away from Lindbeck’s epistemic method so that we might now employ 
his theory of doctrine to the theological issue at hand. However, this does not mean the East 
Asian aspect will disappear altogether, for to the extent that Lindbeck’s theory is influenced 
by East Asian philosophy, and to the extent that we have sought to interpret him through 
Confucian ideals, this particular interpretive lens will continue to inform our efforts. 
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ASSESSING EVANGELICAL THEORIES 





 Informed by a Trinitarian and Christological reading of the biblical canon, the 
Christian church forms both a confessing and confessional community. Essential to 
communal identity is the New Testament teaching that Jesus fulfills everything 
written about the Messiah in the Hebrew Scriptures, and that he is the only way of 
salvation for all people (Acts 4:12). In virtue of this scriptural teaching, Christians 
affirm that a person attains salvation through the act of believing and confessing the 
Lordship of Christ when they hear the preaching of the gospel with faith (Rom 10:9-
17). Yet the question remains, what about the salvation of those to whom the gospel is 
never proclaimed; those who are never evangelized and so are never led to the ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ of faith in Christ? Though answers to this question have been and will 
continue to be diverse, we might find that the doctrinal rules instantiated by the solus 
Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu principles provide an effective means for 
examining the various theological proposals. 
 In brief, from a Protestant perspective the solus Christus principle stipulates 
that “the Offering of Christ once made is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and 
satisfaction, for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual; and there is 
none other satisfaction for sin, but that alone.”1 The sola fide principle specifies that 
while salvation is through Christ alone, “this cannot be received except through 
faith.”2 And essential to saving faith is the fides ex auditu principle which signifies 
                                               
1 The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, XXXI “Of the one Oblation of Christ finished 
upon the Cross.” 
2 Paul Timothy McCain, W. H. T Dau, and F Bente, eds., Concordia: The Lutheran 
Confessions (St. Louis: Concordia Pub. House, 2006), 91. 
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that “by his Word, God rendered faith unambiguous forever”3 and outside the 
preaching of the gospel “neither you nor I could ever know anything about Christ, or 
believe on Him, and have Him for our Lord.”4 In any case, essential to a rule theory 
approach is the notion that doctrines regulate what can and cannot be said in Christian 
theological discourse, and thus guide (without specifying exclusively) doctrinal 
reformulations.5 
 With this in mind, the present chapter will assess the theories of evangelical 
theologians Daniel Strange, Terrance Tiessen, and John Stott using the doctrinal 
typology of solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu. This exercise will serve as a 
case study for how rule theory effects theological discussion, and also afford an 
abbreviated survey of the common evangelical positions on the issue of the 
unevangelized. 
 
The Subversive Fulfillment Approach of Daniel Strange 
 
 Working from a Reformed/Calvinist position, Daniel Strange begins the 
development of his theology of religions in contrast to inclusivist positions in 
evangelical theology.6 In his initial work he asserts that because the question of the 
unevangelized is a soteriological matter, theories must not neglect relevant doctrinal 
issues “including the nature and extent of saving faith, the nature of revelation and the 
                                               
3 Jean Calvin, Calvin’s Institutes, ed. Donald K. McKim (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2001), 9 (1.6.2). 
4 McCain, Dau, and Bente, Concordia, 403. 
5 See, Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 5, 78-82. 
6 “Inclusivism” is the standard label in the theology of religions for positions which 
affirm that salvation is found only in Jesus yet are open to the idea of implicit faith 
and, traditionally, the possibility that other religions contain salvific elements. See, 
Paul F. Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names: Christian Mission and Global 
Responsibility (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1996), 4-12; Christopher J. H. Wright, The 
Uniqueness of Jesus (London: Monarch, 2001), 37-85; or Veli-Matti. Kärkkäinen, An 
Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary 
Perspectives (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 24-25. 
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doctrines of grace.”7 Thus, theologians who hold inclusivist positions “might well 
revise their stance if it were proved that to hold to a certain belief on the 
unevangelised compromised, for example, the solus Christus.”8 In this case, Strange 
has in mind the inclusivist model of Clark Pinnock.9 
As regards the question of the unevangelized, Pinnock argues that those who 
respond to the Spirit’s offer of grace through general revelation and conscience can in 
this way receive Christ’s salvation.10 Yet Strange argues that if the Spirit is working 
among the unevangelized to help them “implicitly” receive salvific grace, “the 
question remains how the salvation of the unevangelised believer is related directly to 
the work of Christ and not merely to the work of the Spirit in creation.”11 He 
concludes that Pinnock’s view is untenable as an evangelical position, because it 
neither holds to the core precepts of the evangelical tradition nor represents an 
orthodox understanding of the Trinity.12 So how might one determine a legitimate 
evangelical position? Strange goes on to develop what Timothy George calls an 
“extra bonus” by providing “the most definitive typology to date of evangelical 
responses to the fate of the unevangelized.”13 
Drawing from systematic theology, Strange makes the doctrine of atonement 
the cornerstone of his typology and, in the first instance, divides theories between 
                                               
7 Daniel Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised: An Analysis 
of Inclusivism in Recent Evangelical Theology, Paternoster Theological Monographs 
(Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 26.  
8 Ibid., 22. 
9 See, Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a 
World of Religions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992). 
10 See, Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 149-180. 
11 Ibid., 221. 
12 Ibid., 263-265. 
13 Timothy George, review of The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 
by Daniel Strange, Themelios 31 (2006): 110. 
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particular and universal views of God’s salvific will.14 Based on these two groups, he 
then identifies six distinct particular atonement positions and three universal 
atonement positions.15 As for his own stance on the issue, he claims the problem is 
not with the unevangelized per se, but with the question itself: 
The problem with the question of the unevangelised is that it is wrongly 
construed as being about “those who have never heard through no fault of 
their own,” or those who are “invincibly ignorant.” However the biblical 
worldview tells us that no-one is spiritually guiltless and that while there are 
degrees of light and of responsibility, everyone has spurned the light they 
have, whether this be the light of general revelation or special revelation.16 
 
He further claims that because “the ‘Reformed’ evangelical paradigm” precludes 
universal atonement, “there is no ‘problem’ of the unevangelised.”17 Yet if there are 
those who have only received general revelation, what then is this ‘light’ and 
‘responsibility’ outside of special revelation? 
 
The Purpose of General Revelation 
 
In a chapter contribution entitled “General Revelation: Sufficient or 
Insufficient?,” Strange upholds the existence of general revelation but denies the 
possibility that salvation might obtain through this mode alone.18 Furthermore, 
“general revelation is insufficient to save but sufficient to condemn and ‘render 
without excuse.’”19 As regards salvation, general revelation needs special revelation 
before it can be understood and appropriated rightly, and the ordinary means of 
special revelation is through hearing the proclamation of the gospel.20 Nevertheless, 
                                               
14 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 36-38, 304-306. 
The belief in universal atonement, that Christ died for all, is different from the belief 
in universalism, that all will be saved. 
15 Ibid., 307-331. 
16 Ibid., 282; emphasis original. 
17 Ibid., 266. 
18 Daniel Strange, “General Revelation: Sufficient or Insufficient?,” in Faith Comes 
by Hearing: A Response to Inclusivism, ed. Christopher W. Morgan and Robert A. 
Peterson (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2008), 40-77. 
19 Ibid., 42. 
20 Ibid., 54, 67. 
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although general and special revelation are distinct Strange also argues that they are 
not meant to be separated. Referring to Psalm 19 he states: 
Here we witness a wonderful unity to God’s revelation in creation and Torah, 
but a unity in which there is not only a definite qualitative difference between 
the two modes of revelation, but also an inseparability and “order,” which 
presupposes that it is only in context of special revelation and salvation that 
God’s general revelation of himself in creation can be truly understood.21 
 
Thus, for Strange, because special revelation is necessary for salvation and because 
there are people in the world who only receive general revelation, perhaps these 
people are “those who have fallen outside of God’s preceptive (but not decretive) 
will?”22 In other words, the very fact that special revelation never reaches certain 
groups of people is tangible evidence that the purpose of general revelation is not 
God’s salvation, but his judgment of sin. “There is a corporate responsibility here,” 
says Strange, “the most universal ‘unity’ being our guilt in Adam.”23 At this point, 
however, he recognizes the argument is somewhat askew as he attempts to maintain 
an inseparable relation between the two modes of revelation, while also claiming God 
deliberately withholds special revelation from certain people thereby causing a 
separation. Strange nuances his argument by appealing to the tradition of prisca 
theologia (ancient theology)24 and the writings of twentieth century Reformed 
missiologist J. H. Bavinck25 to argue for a third understanding of revelation which 
constitutes a kind of admixture of general and special revelation.26 
                                               
21 Ibid., 56; emphasis added. 
22 Ibid., 71. 
23 Ibid., 72. 
24 Strange depends primarily on Gerald McDermott’s study of Jonathan Edwards’s 
use of prisca theologia. See, McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: 
Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
25 See J. H. Bavinck, “General Revelation and the Non-Christian Religions,” Free 
University Quarterly 4 (1955): 43-55; idem, The J. H. Bavinck Reader, ed. John Bolt, 
James D. Bratt, and P. J. Visser (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 95-109. 
26 Strange, “General Revelation,” 72-77. 
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The prisca theologia is the notion that the pure knowledge of God has been 
passed down through the ages and traces of this ‘original’ revelation exist within 
some or all human knowledge. Yet Strange states, “Because of human suppression 
and substitution, and without the regenerating work of God, this once true knowledge 
of God becomes atrophied through a divine providential law of entropy and rather 
than becoming a means to salvation, it becomes a further basis for judgment.”27 While 
he is unable to develop his proposal fully at this point, he provides a more robust 
account in his book For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock.28 Here Strange seeks to apply 
an historiographical approach for understanding the origin of religions, foregrounded 
by the “seemingly retired” anthropological theory called “original monotheism.”29 
 
A “Single-Source” Theory for Explaining Revelation 
 
In For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, Strange attempts to locate the 
“historical origin of the phenomena of ‘religions’” within a biblical world 
chronology.30 To this purpose, he establishes his theological anthropology upon a 
literal “historical” interpretation of Genesis – in opposition to “purely ‘theological’ 
and ‘literary’ interpretations”31 – giving particular attention to the stories of creation, 
Noah, and the tower of Babel in chapters 1-11.32 Though he is in this case more 
concerned with the question of other religions than with the question of the 
unevangelized,33 Strange nonetheless expands his notion of original revelation and its 
purpose for those who never hear the preaching of the gospel. He argues that just as 
                                               
27 Ibid., 74. 
28 Daniel Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock: An Evangelical Theology of 
Religions (Nottingham: InterVarsity Press, 2014); published in the USA under the 
title Their Rock Is Not Like Our Rock: A Theology of Religions (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2015). This thesis refers to the UK edition. 
29 Ibid., 98. 
30 Ibid., 98; emphasis original. 
31 Ibid., 101. 
32 Ibid., 53-94, 100-103, 121-154. 
33 Ibid., 34-35. 
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the physical existence of all human beings traces back to a single couple, divine 
revelation and human knowledge also flow out from this singular period in time. He 
states: 
Given a monogenetic understanding of human origins, what is being posited 
here is a “single-source” theory of revelation and knowledge, when the whole 
of humanity was in proximity of redemptive-historical events and which 
therefore defies a simplistic categorization as either natural “general” 
revelation or supernatural “special revelation.” As well as the more usual, 
“media” and “means” of “general revelation,” a number of Reformed scholars 
include specific and “supernatural” knowledge preserved as “tradition” and 
“memory.” I wish to label this revelation as “remnantal.”34 
 
Strange turns again to the prisca theologia and also incorporates the anthropological 
concept of “original monotheism”35 to argue that the source of prisca theologia 
originates with Adam and Eve.36 Furthermore, his single-source theory of revelation 
does not consist only of a pre-fall awareness of the existence of one God who created 
all things, but includes the imago Dei as a kind of transcendent first principle (people 
are made to worship) and a postlapsarian proclamation of Christ in Genesis 3:15 – 
i.e., the protoevangelium (first gospel).37 Within this framework he supports the idea 
that there is no one who has only ever received general revelation (from nature and 
conscience alone), because all people retain a remnant of the prisca theologia and are 
also influenced by it at times through contact in history. Nonetheless, this 
‘knowledge’ is rendered inadequate for salvation because of constant human and 
demonic suppression and distortion.38 
                                               
34 Ibid., 104. Strange cites Peter Harrison in reference to the “single-source” theory of 
revelation, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131. 
35 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 98. Original monotheism is a theory 
that synchronizes world history with the chronology of biblical history to claim that 
the first religion of all human beings was the monotheistic faith of the Bible. For a 
contemporary assessment, see Winfried Corduan, In the Beginning God: A Fresh 
Look at the Case for Original Monotheism (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2013). 
36 See, Ibid., 53-120. 
37 Ibid., 53-94. 
38 Ibid., 95-120, 232-236. 
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So according to Strange, general revelation is not only the transcendent reality 
of the imago Dei and the physical presence of creation, but also includes an admixture 
of corrupted elements of special revelation (the gospel) which flow through human 
knowledge and tradition with an occasional influx of the prisca theologia during 
moments of historical proximity.39 Hence, an unevangelized person “simultaneously 
on the one hand knows the living God of the Bible (i.e. knows in ‘personal 
relationship’, not just ‘knows about’), leaving her responsible and ‘without excuse’, 
and yet on the other hand does not know God.”40 Salvation occurs, then, only as one 
receives special revelation “because with it comes the regenerating work of the Spirit 
in special grace.”41 From this perspective, Strange concludes that the gospel subverts 
the content of other religions and also fulfills the metaphysical human need to 
worship God.42 
 
A Critical Review of Strange’s Theory 
 
As noted earlier, Strange attempts to make his case from a Reformed 
theological perspective, and specifically from “within the tradition represented by the 
Magisterial Reformers especially John Calvin and his followers.”43 Thus we might 
anticipate his claim that general revelation alone does not save but is enough to 
“condemn and ‘render without excuse.’”44 But whereas theologians usually base this 
assertion on an understanding that general revelation consists of little more than 
God’s communication of himself through the natural order,45 Strange distinguishes his 
                                               
39 Ibid., 103-104. 
40 Ibid., 93. 
41 Ibid., 222. 
42 Ibid., 268-273. 
43 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 8. 
44 Strange, “General Revelation,” 41; cf. idem, The Possibility of Salvation Among the 
Unevangelised, 282; For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 93, 324. 
45 For example, see The Canons of Dordt, “The First Main Points of Doctrine,” 
Article 4, and “The Third and Fourth Main Points of Doctrine,” Article 15. 
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approach by claiming that all general revelation contains remnants of special 
revelation.46 By connecting the Reformed appropriation of the prisca theologia to the 
protoevangelium in Genesis 3:15, he provides a framework to support his claim that 
God does not condemn the unevangelized for merely rejecting him through natural 
revelation, but for suppressing elements of the gospel as well. 
With this in mind, because Strange makes Genesis 3:15 the epistemic axiom 
of his understanding of revelation, we will focus on this particular point and seek to 
evaluate his theory scripturally, historically, and theologically from within his own 
stated terms of confessional faith.47 Yet our doctrinal typology for this assessment is 
that salvation is through Christ alone by faith alone and that faith comes from hearing 
(solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu). 
 
Strange’s Appropriation of the Protoevangelium 
 
Strange references Genesis 1-3 and highlights the protoevangelium (3:15) to 
argue that ‘pure knowledge’ of God and his plan of redemption in Christ was given at 
the time of Adam and Eve. Furthermore, from that point in time divine revelation has 
flowed through human history in two “diametrically opposed” streams.48 One stream 
contains the prisca theologia where common grace and special grace (saving grace) 
remain intact, and the other stream contains only remnants of the prisca theologia and 
common grace, which, through “a divine providential law of entropy,”49 is devoid of 
                                               
46 In For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, Strange develops a multifacited and 
multidisciplined theology of religions which deserves a fuller treatment than this 
article will provide. The following assessment will only consider his notion of 
revelation and salvation concerning the question of the unevangelised. 
47 Strange lists these confessional terms in The Possibility of Salvation Among the 
Unevangelised, 8-9; Gavin D’Costa, Paul F Knitter, and Daniel Strange, Only One 
Way? Three Christian Responses to the Uniqueness of Christ in a Pluralistic World 
(London: SCM, 2011), 92-93; and For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 41-42. 
48 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 82. 
49 Strange, “General Revelation,” 74. 
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the Spirit’s regenerative work.50 He asserts, “In the sovereign providence of God, he 
has preserved and sustained redemptive knowledge of himself within some streams of 
humanity and not within others.”51 
First, scripturally speaking, we might question whether Genesis 3:15 is 
technically the first proclamation of the gospel whereby God announces his messianic 
intent in such a way that distinguishes this moment as the gospel’s epistemic source. 
For a canonical reading of Scripture shows that when Paul regards the source of 
human sin, death, and condemnation he points to Adam (Rom 5:12-21),52 but when he 
regards the first proclamation of the gospel and the basic elements for understanding 
faith in Christ, he points to Abraham (Rom 4:1-25; Gal 3:7-9, 15-29). 
This is not to say that God waited until the covenant with Abraham to initiate 
his redemptive work, or that Strange has no theological basis for interpreting Genesis 
3:15 as the protoevangelium.53 Rather, the point is that the promise given through 
Abraham is the hermeneutical lens for working out this interpretation. So although he 
seeks to explain Genesis 3:15 as the time “when the whole of humanity was in 
proximity of redemptive-historical events,”54 Strange nonetheless must rely 
exegetically upon Genesis 12 to support this argument. For the liminal moment from 
which we discern God’s redemptive intent is historically and textually correlated to its 
substantiation in Abraham. To be sure, Strange asserts that “Abraham and his 
                                               
50 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 89-90. 
51 Strange, “General Revelation,” 71. 
52 It is interesting, and perhaps relevant, to note that Paul was the first biblical author 
to make this connection. 
53 It is common parlance in Reformed theology to speak of the messianic intent of 
Genesis 3:15. For example, see, Michael S. Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic 
Theology for Pilgrims On the Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 152n3, 972; 
Thomas R. Schreiner, The King in His Beauty: A Biblical Theology of the Old and 
New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 19-20; and James M. 
Hamilton, God’s Glory in Salvation Through Judgment: A Biblical Theology 
(Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 82-91. 
54 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 104. 
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descendants are a part of this ‘seed’ theology (cf. Gen 3:15),”55 but it is perhaps more 
accurate to speak of Abraham and his descendants as the progenitor of this seed 
theology. For an intratextual reading of Scripture places the epistemic source of the 
protoevangelium within the historical period beginning with Genesis 12, when, as 
Paul declares, the gospel was preached “beforehand to Abraham” (Gal 3:8). This is 
why Christopher Wright asserts that “from the great promise of God to Abraham in 
Genesis 12:1-3 we know this God to be totally, covenantally and eternally committed 
to the mission of blessing the nations through the agency of the people of 
Abraham.”56 Thus, strictly speaking, the epistemological source of the gospel is 
Genesis 12:3. 
Nevertheless, as indicated above, there remains a viable way to achieve an 
intratextual interpretation of Genesis 3:15 as the protoevangelium. However, it 
depends on a syntactical issue which Strange does not address sufficiently, and which 
may weaken his theory in the process. As John Collins notes, when considering the 
meaning of the woman’s offspring in verse 15, “the first thing to decide is whether the 
text speaks of a specific offspring or of her offspring in general.”57 He explains that 
the Hebrew word itself does not connote either a singular or plural meaning, and 
scholars disagree as to which translation is correct. And while there may be good 
reasons for holding a singular interpretation,58 Strange provides no background 
discussion for why he chooses this reading over a plural one, nor does he explain the 
                                               
55 Ibid., 187. 
56 Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand 
Narrative (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2006), 63. 
57 C. John Collins, Genesis 1–4: A Linguistic, Literary, And Theological Commentary 
(Phillipsburg: P&R, 2006), 156. 
58 Ibid., 178-179; Jack Collins, “A Syntactical Note (Genesis 3:15): Is the Woman’s 
Seed Singular or Plural?,” TynB 48 (1997): 139-148; R. A. Martin, “The Earliest 
Messianic Interpretation of Genesis 3:15,” Journal of Biblical Literature 84, 
(December 1965): 425-427; Jason Derouchie, “The Blessing-Commission, the 
Promised Offspring, and the Toledot Structure of Genesis,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 56 (2013): 219-247. 
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ways in which this choice effects the scriptural method for defining the 
protoevangelium.59 For example, Collins states, “If we see Genesis 3:15 as referring 
to a specific offspring, we can speak this way of ‘unfolding,’ and we do not have to 
appeal to a sensus plenior.”60 
In other words, even if this verse is meant to be messianic, it is still the case 
that neither the reader nor those who were in physical proximity to this event can be 
expected to discern this meaning apart from the occurrence and apprehension of the 
“unfolding” revelatory events which all together inform this explanation of 
offspring.61 While Strange recognizes a “gradual progression in the specificity of 
revelation as redemptive history progresses,” he nonetheless collapses God’s 
“authentic and genuine knowledge of himself and his salvation in his chosen people” 
into the textual and historical moment of Genesis 3:15.62 But if this particular text in 
Scripture demands further illumination before readers can grasp its redemptive 
content then, scripturally speaking, there is no reason to assume this particular 
moment in history comprises the epistemic origin of the gospel apart from further 
revelation in time. As John Sailhamer points out, “There remains in this verse a 
puzzling yet important ambiguity: Who is the ‘seed’ of the woman? It seems obvious 
that the purpose of verse 15 has not been to answer that question, but rather to raise it. 
The remainder of the book is, in fact, the author’s answer.”63 
                                               
59 He mentions this issue in The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 
168-169 and in For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 81, but only briefly with no 
discussion of the particular debate. 
60 Collins, Genesis 1–4: A Linguistic, Literary, 158. The sensus plenior refers to a 
“fuller” or “deeper” sense of the meaning of a text which goes beyond authorial 
intent. 
61 Ibid., 158-159; Collins notes Romans 16:20 and Revelation 12:17 as possibly 
alluding to Genesis 3:15, but also explains how this reading is by no means definitive. 
62 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 222-223. 
63 John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological 
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 108. 
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There is therefore no definitive intratextual support for claiming that those 
who lived in historical proximity to God’s verbal response to human sin in Genesis 3 
would have understood these words as an offer of messianic redemption to which they 
must respond in faith. Hence, one can discern the messianic intent of this verse, if 
any, historically and textually only after Abraham. 
Second, historically speaking, explicit evidence for interpreting Genesis 3:15 
as the protoevangelium does not appear until Irenaeus in the second century AD 
(Haer. 40.3).64 He makes this connection by asserting that the hermeneutical means 
for discerning Christ in the Old Testament is the incarnation of Christ himself. 
Irenaeus explains that “the treasure hid in the Scriptures is Christ, since He was 
pointed out by means and types and parables,” and yet it is only after their fulfillment 
in “the advent of Christ” that Christians are able to perceive this treasure (Haer. 
4.26.1). Concerning Irenaeus’ hermeneutic, John Behr explains: 
With regard to Christ being disseminated in Scripture, and, in reverse, being 
foreseen by the patriarchs and the prophets, it is particularly important to note 
that the mechanism turns upon the Cross: it is by the Cross that the types and 
prophecies are brought to light, given their proper exegesis. . . . This manner 
of reading the Scripture was revealed only after the Passion.65 
 
Irenaeus teaches that Christ unlocked his self-communication in Scripture for the 
apostles, and we receive this hermeneutic through the apostolic proclamation of 
Christ. He claims that it is impossible to see the protoevangelium in Genesis 3:15 
prior to the life, death, and resurrection of Christ (Haer. 4.26.1). Thus, scripturally 
and historically speaking, Abraham is the epistemic source for discerning the person 
of Christ (Gal 3:7-9), and Christ is the epistemic source for discerning all that is 
written of him in the corpus of Scripture (Luke 24:27, 32, 44). Walter Moberly 
                                               
64 Justin Martyr may also allude to this verse in Dial. 102. The earliest “messianic” 
interpretation of Genesis 3:15 may be the Septuagint, according to Collins, “A 
Syntactical Note,” 139-148. 
65 John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The formation of Christian Theology 1 (Crestwood: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 132. 
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concludes, “Israel’s scriptures not only prepare the way for Christ, … there is also a 
retrospective movement from Jesus back to Israel’s scriptures whereby they are 
recognized to be what they would not otherwise be recognized to be.”66 Therefore if 
one can perceive the gospel in Genesis 3:15 only after Christ, and indeed this 
potential interpretation did not obtain until the second century AD, then once again 
there is little reason to assume the original hearers comprehended and responded to a 
messianic purpose with just these words alone. 
Third, considering Strange’s commitment to a ‘classical’ Reformed theology, 
it is perhaps significant, theologically speaking, that John Calvin chooses the plural 
translation of ‘offspring’ in Genesis 3:15, and thus appeals to the sensus plenior for a 
Christological reading. He makes this connection in several steps. First, he interprets 
the plain meaning of the text to be “that there should always be the hostile strife 
between the human race and serpents” and that humanity will remain “superior” to 
serpents.67 Then, in a second step, he makes a “transition” to an anagogical 
interpretation whereby God “assails Satan under the name of the serpent,” so that 
people may first “learn to beware of Satan as of the most deadly enemy; then, that 
they may contend against him with the assured confidence of victory.”68 Thus, as 
regards the meaning of the verse itself, Calvin interprets “the seed to mean the 
posterity of the woman generally.”69 Yet because it is true that many people do indeed 
fall under the power of Satan, he connects this verse to Christ in a final step through a 
Pauline explanation of Abraham, saying, “So Paul, from the seed of Abraham, leads 
us to Christ.”70 In the end, Calvin understands the seeds of the woman to signify the 
                                               
66 R. W. L. Moberly, The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 70. 
67 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Book of Genesis, trans. John King, repr. ed. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 1:167-168. 
68 Ibid., 169. 
69 Ibid., 170. 
70 Ibid., 171. 
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church, which will gain victory over Satan through the seed of Abraham; who is 
Christ the Head.71 So we find that Calvin also identifies the protoevangelium 
beginning with Abraham and discerned only after Christ. 
While Strange need not agree with Calvin’s interpretation of Genesis 3:15, he 
would do well to work through Calvin’s position as he seeks to develop his own 
Reformed view. For if both Paul and Calvin place the protoevangelium with Abraham 
through a post-advent reading of Scripture, then this fact alone must have substantial 
implications for his single-source theory of revelation. 
 
A Doctrinal Assessment 
 
Strange makes a good point when he highlights Psalm 19 to assert that this 
passage “is a microcosm of the symbiotic relationship between general and special 
revelation,” and that “God’s purpose in general revelation has never been for it to 
function independently of his ‘worded’ special revelation.”72 Yet in light of the 
doctrinal setting effected by the solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu 
principles, there is a critical weakness in the way he develops this point. 
Strange devotes a large part of his evaluation of Pinnock towards building a 
case that epistemological awareness of the ontological work of Christ is necessary for 
saving faith.73 And through this process he upholds the solus Christus concluding that 
even an implicit response to the work of the Spirit in the world does not account for 
how this response occurs in Christ. For “surely if one is to ‘die with Christ’ and ‘rise 
with Christ,’ one must know what he has done, let alone know the fact that he 
exists?”74 But in his later writings, in an effort to connect this Christological epistemic 
element in his own theory, he inadvertently resolves this particular issue for Pinnock 
                                               
71 Ibid. 
72 Strange, “General Revelation,” 66. 
73 Ibid., 139-290. 
74 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 221. 
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as well. Strange argues for the existence of “embryonic revelatory knowledge of the 
gospel from Genesis 3:15 onwards,” a knowledge which in itself had sufficient 
epistemic reference for saving faith.75 He also claims that humanity possesses a 
remnant of this knowledge “preserved as ‘tradition’ and ‘memory’” that they 
“epistemologically suppress.”76 Yet with this argument Strange’s support for the 
notion of implicit ‘false faith’ also indirectly supports Pinnock’s theory of implicit 
saving faith. Although Strange claims “that in positing this ‘remnantal’ revelation I 
am not saying it has any ‘salvific’ potential,” his introduction of the concept 
nonetheless opens the door wide for speculation on its salvific possibilities.77  
For instance, if general and special revelation cannot operate apart from each 
other, and if general revelation includes a remnant of special revelation for which 
people are guilty through their implicit suppression, then it is just as possible they can 
be forgiven through their implicit acceptance of this ubiquitous knowledge. The 
problem for Strange is that in claiming there is a vestige of special revelation among 
the unevangelized, the logical structure of his argument requires that he allow for the 
Spirit’s work of special grace as well; otherwise there remains an internal dissonance 
in his theory.78 Strange holds that one cannot separate the ontological work of special 
grace from the epistemological presence of special revelation.79 Thus, irrespective of 
its condition – whether in “embryonic” or “remnantal” form – the presence of this 
revelation includes the regenerative work of the Spirit.80 So the only way he can 
balance his theory is to either allow the possibility that the unevangelized can have 
                                               
75 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not As Our Rock, 82-87, 194. 
76 Ibid., 103-104. 
77 Ibid., 108. 
78 Gavin D’Costa also recognizes this issue in Strange’s theory of religions. See, 
D’Costa, “Gavin D’Costa Responds to Paul Knitter and Daniel Strange,” in D’Costa, 
Knitter, and Strange, Only One Way?, 149-150. 
79 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 221-22; idem, The Possibility of 
Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 139-290. 
80 Ibid., 222. 
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implicit faith in the same way they have implicit false faith – i.e., through the flow of 
universal knowledge about God and Christ rooted historically in the protoevangelium 
of Genesis 3:15 – or explain how the unevangelized can have explicit false faith in the 
same way the evangelized can have explicit saving faith – i.e., fides ex auditu – thus 
making his notion of remnantal revelation irrelevant. Yet considering his particular 
Reformed theological framework, the first option cannot support an evangelical 
understanding of solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu (the crux of his 
criticism of Pinnock), leaving only the second option, which would require 
substantive changes to his theory. 
To this purpose, Strange may want to set aside the scientific notion of a 
monogenetic view of human origins, the anthropological theory of original 
monotheism, and the deistic version of prisca theologia to make better use of his 
stated doctrinal and confessional material.81 For if the scriptural, historical, and 
theological resources indicate that the protoevangelium was introduced with Abraham 
so that everyone was not, has not been, and still are not in proximity to redemptive-
historical events, then how might one explain false faith without separating the 
ontological and epistemological elements of faith? For this he may find creedal 
support from the Baptist confessions listed in his theological material, which state, 
“Nothing prevents the salvation of the greatest sinner except his own voluntary 
refusal to accept Jesus Christ as teacher, Saviour and Lord.”82 Thus he might 
speculate on how unevangelized people who die before hearing the gospel will 
receive the opportunity to accept or refuse Christ explicitly. Or, if the Reformed 
doctrines of total depravity and particular atonement imply that there is no “problem” 
                                               
81 Ibid., 108-110; see also Steven Studebaker, Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian 
Trinitarianism in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Gorgias Studies in 
Philosophy and Theology (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2008), 222-223. 
82 1925 Baptist Faith and Message, 6, emphasis added; also see, The New Hampshire 
Confession of Faith, 6. 
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of the unevangelized,83 then perhaps he could approach this subject indirectly by 
addressing related questions within Reformed theology perceived to be genuine 
problems. As George points out in his review of Strange, “There are a cluster of 
issues even Reformed theologians need to think through more clearly than has yet 
been done. What about the salvation of those who die in infancy, or those who remain 
mentally incompetent?”84 
For instance, the Westminster Confession states: 
Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated, and saved by Christ, through 
the Spirit, who works when, and where, and how he pleases: so also are all 
other elect persons who are incapable of being outwardly called by the 
ministry of the Word (10.3). 
 
Thus, to affirm this confession he might seek to explain how this particular group of 
unevangelized people will eventually receive the outward calling of the word for 
saving faith – that is, the “fully orbed character of notitia, fiducia and assensus” 
ministered ex auditu.85 And by dealing with this issue he may also discover ways to 
approach the broader theological question of the unevangelized. 
As his theory stands, however, his assertion that all humanity was in proximity 
to the gospel of faith and salvation in Genesis 3:15, and his subsequent notion of 
remnantal revelation whereby all people have epistemic guilt through implicit false 
faith, compromises the doctrinal relation between the sola fide and fides ex auditu 
principles. That is to say, if faith obtains only through explicit hearing of the word of 
Christ, then the necessary epistemic conditions for belief are the same conditions 
necessary for unbelief. Which means that just as the notion of remnantal revelation 
cannot support the possibility of saving faith among the unevangelized, neither can it 
support the possibility of false faith. Yet if Strange will allow his scriptural and 
                                               
83 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 266. 
84 George, “Review of The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised,” 110. 
85 ‘Knowledge,’ ‘assent,’ and ‘trust’ in Christ; see, Strange, For Their Rock Is Not As 
Our Rock, 222n22; also, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 30. 
 110 
confessional material to have primary influence over the speculative nature of his 
theory, then perhaps he will be in a better position to offer a creative articulation of 
revelation for addressing the issue of the unevangelized.86 
 
Terrance Tiessen’s Universal Revelation Accessibilist Approach 
 
 Terrance Tiessen formulates his theory of the unevangelized from a Reformed 
theological position, but rather than conform to the “gospel exclusivism” of Calvin he 
emphasizes the “accessibilism” of Ulrich Zwingli who maintains that divine election 
alone determines salvation.87 From this perspective, Tiessen argues that all the various 
scriptural texts which exclusivists use to claim that people must hear the gospel for 
saving faith do not actually apply to the question of the unevangelized: 
When the gospel exclusivist principle is applied throughout history, it has the 
strange effect of portraying God’s saving program as narrowing each time he 
reveals himself more explicitly. Thus the covenant made with Abraham, 
which spoke of God’s plan to bless all nations, would have suddenly excluded 
from God’s saving work any who were ignorant of the covenantal revelation 
that had just been made.88 
 
To resolve this issue, he proposes that while God holds every person accountable for 
their response to divine revelation, his judgment is contingent upon the amount of 
revelation each person has received.89 He reasons that any form of revelation is itself 
God’s self-revelation to the world, thus the salvific distinction lies not between 
general and special revelation, but between revelation and the Holy Spirit’s work of 
illumination.90 In other words: 
                                               
86 Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock, 35. 
87 Terrance Tiessen, “The Salvation of the Unevangelized in the Light of God’s 
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Trinity Journal 28, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 291. 
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Without the Spirit’s illumination, no form of revelation results in a person’s 
salvation. On the other hand, this also opens up for us the distinct possibility 
that general revelation plus illumination may lead to salvation just as is true 
when special revelation is illuminated.91 
 
Nevertheless, Tiessen thinks it unlikely that anyone receives general revelation alone, 
and says that a “realistic assessment” must consider the possibility of remnants and 
inflow of special revelation as well.92 
Instead of suggesting that this remnantal revelation exists for the sole purpose 
of solidifying God’s judgment, he suggests that the Holy Spirit reveals these special 
truths to every individual at some point in their life, and that they then respond either 
with belief or unbelief. So in the case of the unevangelized, the Spirit’s illumination 
serves “as a form of special revelation”93 whereby each person’s “response to that 
revelation is part of their fundamental orientation of faith or unbelief in God.”94 And 
this ‘orientation’ is not merely an act of turning towards faith or unbelief, but rather is 
an act which initiates the epistemic reality of faith or unbelief in the life of the 
individual. Hence, when a person receives this special illumination of the Spirit, a 
positive response is what “the Bible calls ‘faith.’”95 Tiessen claims that this kind of 
faith is a biblical faith because it “is explicitly faith, but it is implicitly faith in 
Christ.”96 He argues: 
It is probably best not to withhold the designation “saved” from those who 
have been reconciled to God through a graciously enabled faith response to 
God’s self-revelation, even though that revelation may have been less 
complete than the gospel concerning Jesus.97 
 
                                               
91 Ibid., 157. 
92 Ibid. Also see, Terrance Tiessen, “Can the Unevangelized Be Saved?,” Didaskalia 
5, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 87-88; Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?, 150-157. 
93 Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?, 157; emphasis original. 
94 Ibid., 23. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., 214; emphasis original. 
97 Ibid., 226. 
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Hence, all those who receive lesser forms of revelation and yet respond in faith will 
meet Christ at death and “respond to him in a manner consistent with the response 
they had been giving to God and his revelation during their lifetime.”98 
 For Tiessen, God’s unconditional election means that all those whom God has 
chosen for salvation may or may not exist within the epistemic reach of the gospel, 
but God gives sufficient faith to each of them through degrees of revelation suitable to 
their individual circumstances. He concludes: 
God’s continuing self-revelation is not limited to the universally accessible 
means that we call “general revelation.” Nor is revelation limited to the 
universally normative covenant revelation that is now confined to Scripture. 
God makes himself known to individuals in very particular ways, and every 
one of these divine encounters calls for a response of faith and obedience.99 
 
Stated simply, God provides universally sufficient grace through the Spirit’s 
illumination of the respective ‘universally normative’ modes of revelation, or of 
revelation that is ‘particular’ to certain individuals. Thus, everyone who rejects this 
universal offer of grace comes under God’s righteous judgment while those who 
obtain efficacious faith receive salvation.100 
 
A Critical Review of Tiessen’s Theory 
 
 Tiessen’s proposal for resolving the issue of the unevangelized presents a 
unique evangelical approach for at least two reasons. First, he attempts to develop an 
understanding of universal saving grace that puts everyone in an epistemic position of 
belief or unbelief through the work of the Holy Spirit in the world.101 Second, he is 
willing to consider the possibility of an at-death encounter with Christ for those who 
die before hearing the gospel.102 
                                               
98 Ibid., 25. 
99 Ibid., 122. 
100 Ibid., 239-240. 
101 See, Ibid., 487-497. 
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As regards his theological approach, he states, “I put forward a ‘five point’ 
Calvinist soteriological proposal, but I concur with Zwingli rather than with Calvin, 
that God’s elective grace is not restricted to the boundaries of the covenant people, in 
either Testamental period.”103 Thus, in light of his distinctive theological method, and 
because he affirms the classic Protestant doctrine of salvation by grace through faith, 
we will evaluate his notion of saving faith according to the regulative principles of a 
Reformed evangelical position in the Zwinglian tradition. 
 
Tiessen’s Explanation of Saving Faith 
 
 Tiessen defines faith as a Spirit-enabled response to any type of divine 
revelation, even in regard to revelation that lacks the content of the gospel.104 So 
while he admits that no one receives the full benefits of salvation until they have 
knowledge of Christ, he argues that God can still save someone through faith outside 
hearing the gospel.105 For instance, he says that a person who has no knowledge of the 
Abrahamic covenant may nonetheless have the “faith of Abraham” because “in 
Romans 4:11-16, it is clear that the quality of Abraham’s faith, not its knowledge 
content, was the key in his justification.”106 Thus, like Abraham, personal salvation 
for an unevangelized person can obtain through faith in God’s “context-appropriate 
manifestation” outside gospel proclamation.107 Yet how does Tiessen’s notion of faith 
relate to the fides ex auditu principle from Romans 10:17? He says that Paul’s 
message in Romans 10 is that Israel is guilty “because they have heard the gospel but 
have not believed it,” with the implication that the passage does not pertain to the 
                                               
103 Tiessen, “Who Can Be Saved?,” 291. Nonetheless, Tiessen attributes his 
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unevangelized who have not heard.108 Nevertheless, he still insists that “the basic 
principle of salvation by faith, which comes by hearing the ‘word,’ applies to all 
forms of revelation.”109 
 In response to this assertion, we need only recall our discussion of the 
protoevangelium in the previous section to challenge Tiessen’s claim that Abraham 
was saved even though he “had never heard the gospel about Jesus.”110 For despite 
Tiessen’s exegetical approach, a canonical reading shows that rather than being the 
“paradigmatic” example of all “those from whom God has elicited a faith response to 
lesser revelation,”111 Abraham is instead the father of all those who hear and receive 
the preaching of the gospel with faith (Gal 3:2-14). A reading that Zwingli also 
affirms when he states, “Just as Abraham embraced Jesus his blessed seed, and 
through him was saved, so also today we are saved through him.”112 The point here is 
not that Abraham knew the identity of Jesus, but that he knew the special messianic 
promise of God. So when Zwingli says that ‘Abraham embraced Jesus’ he is not 
claiming that Abraham knew the person of Christ, but that he and all the other Old 
Testament believers “leaned upon the mercy of God through the promise of Christ 
just as much as we do now that He has appeared.”113 
To be sure, Tiessen appears to acknowledge this distinction. In order to 
preserve the solus Christus, he asserts that even though the faith of Abraham (and of 
all the Old Testament believers) was not based on knowledge of the person of Jesus, it 
was nonetheless “implicitly a faith in Christ.”114 Yet he also claims that “this may also 
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be the case for some of the unevangelized, whether they are responding to God’s 
revelation in creation or to some other faint trace of special revelation.”115 The 
problem is, the Old Testament believers were not responding only to natural 
revelation or to some ‘faint trace’ of special revelation, but rather they received an 
explicit and sufficient word from God. As Stephen Wellum asserts: 
When we begin to ask about the nature of Abraham’s saving faith, Genesis 
15:6 becomes the key text—‘Abram believed the LORD, and he credited it to 
him as righteousness.’ . . . Did he have Jesus Christ as the object of his faith? 
The best answer to that question is yes and no. No, in that he did not know it 
was Jesus who was the seed of the woman; but yes, in that his faith was in the 
promise of God, centered in the promised seed, which eventually, as the plan 
of God unfolds, leads us directly to Christ.116 
 
In other words, their faith was explicitly faith in the special word of promise, the word 
of Christ. 
 Tiessen argues that a Jew who knows nothing “of the new covenant 
community, the church of Jesus Christ” may nevertheless be saved through “an old 
covenant faith.”117 And if one is ignorant even of the Abrahamic covenant, then “the 
minimum is clearly defined in Hebrews 11:6, the belief that God exists and that he 
rewards those who seek him.”118 Yet he appears to move too quickly when he equates 
the epistemological situation of a Jew with the situation of the unevangelized. As 
Adam Sparks suggests: 
His proposal [Tiessen’s] is broadly right, but should be understood as 
supporting my position that saving faith has not changed. A believing Jew 
living at the time of Christ would have faith in the Messiah (anticipated). If 
such a Jew died before hearing of the advent of the Messiah, then there is no 
reason to suggest they would be denied saving faith now that greater 
information (which they have not received) about the Messiah is available. In 
theory then, it is possible to be saved “by Old covenant anticipation” after the 
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Christ-event, if that anticipation is according to special covenantal 
revelation.119 
 
The point is that the unevangelized do not have an ‘Old covenant anticipation,’ and 
yet it is this messianic content that is essential for obtaining saving faith. For instance, 
in Romans 10 Paul continues his discussion of Israel and contrasts the righteousness 
based on the law through works with the righteousness based on faith through Christ 
(10:5-6). Then in verses 6-8 he extends his argument by connecting “the word of faith 
which we are preaching” with the “word” proclaimed beforehand by Moses (Deut 
30:14). Observing this connection, Calvin points out that Paul does not regard the 
word of Moses as something different from the message of Christ, because the “word 
of faith” which Paul preaches is the same word that Moses proclaimed in advance 
(i.e., the word of Christ).120 Thus “the words, ‘which we preach,’ are added,” Calvin 
explains, so “that no one might have the suspicion that Paul differed from Moses; for 
he testifies, that in the ministration of the gospel there was complete consent between 
him and Moses.”121 
Again, the point is not that Moses knew the personal identity of Christ, but 
that he looked forward to the coming Savior who Paul now preaches as having come. 
For instance, commenting on the Romans 10 passage, D. A. Carson states: 
Once again it is important to stress the content of faith spelled out in these 
verses. Paul says that the person who confesses with the mouth “Jesus is 
Lord” and believes in the heart that God raised him from the dead will be 
saved. . . . We are a long way from an abstract “faith principle” that does not 
have Jesus as its content.122 
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To this extent, Tiessen’s notion of a gospel-less faith finds little scriptural support. As 
Ronald Nash argues: 
The New Testament reports that the Old Testament saints looked forward to a 
mediator who would die (John 5:46; 8:56; 1 Peter 1:10 – 12) and how the 
gospel was preached to Abraham (Gal. 3:6). . . . How can Old Testament 
believers who had a significant relationship to special revelation and whose 
faith was tied to symbols and practices that looked forward to Christ provide 
warrant for treating unevangelized moderns as believers?123 
 
In other words, the saving nature of faith is contingent upon a particular context 
involving God’s special self-revelation to a specific people. Gabriel Fackre explains: 
A long tradition in Christianity affirms the personal salvation of those with 
“Abrahamic” faith, based on Paul’s deep discussion in Romans 4. Here, 
therefore, is a recognition of justification by faith before the knowledge of 
Christ. But this faith has to do with a response to the saving actions of God 
among a chosen people where the word of mercy is uniquely given and heard. 
This is faith within the stream of salvation history, not a generalized “faith 
principle.”124 
 
Nevertheless, Tiessen seeks to define faith within the context of general revelation, 
stating, “The faith response to God’s revelation of his eternal power and divine nature 
through his work of creation would . . . include a worship of the Creator God and a 
spirit of thankfulness for what he has made and provided for us.”125 Yet this 
delineation of faith exposes a logical contradiction in his theory, which is perhaps 
characteristic of other inclusivist theories as well. 
The inclusivist description of the faith principle in the context of general 
revelation often entails at least some knowledge of God. And the requisite knowledge 
is usually theistic in general, monotheistic in particular, and stresses a specific 
cosmological worldview (e.g., ‘a spirit of thankfulness’ to the creator God). For 
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instance, commenting on John Sanders’ explanation of the faith principle, Fackre 
writes: 
This [the faith principle] contradicts the trust-without-knowledge refrain and 
also limits salvation to religions that teach belief in a personal God, thereby 
excluding the hundreds of millions who espouse nontheistic Buddhism, 
Confucianism and so on. How is this consistent, and how is it 
“inclusivism”?126 
 
One example of this point is a central Buddhist doctrine concerning the cause of 
suffering. Bhikkhu Buddhadasa explains: 
God as creator is known in Buddhism under the term ‘avijja’. This means the 
lack of knowledge, or ignorance. Ignorance is the power of nature which is the 
cause of all existing things and as such the cause of suffering.127 
 
Referencing this doctrine, another Buddhist teacher tells adherents “that we should 
annihilate and conquer this God at all costs. . . . Kill him, kill him! Why should we do 
so? Because God has created to suffer, created an evil world, which proves that he is 
stupid.”128 If this is indeed the theistic lens through which Buddhists interpret ‘the 
power of nature,’ then at the very least Tiessen has failed to present a coherent 
accessibilist position.129 Especially in light of the fact that he also argues that the 
ethical dimensions of faith for an unevangelized person requires that “whatever 
information, religious or moral, a person accepts as ultimately authoritative truth 
(whether this is understood to be from a personal God or not) must be believed and 
obeyed.”130 Hence, saving faith for an unevangelized Buddhist would mean rejecting 
the Creator God as the ignorant cause of suffering and, at the same time, worshiping 
him as the Creator with “a spirit of thankfulness for what he has made and provided 
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for us.”131 The contradiction here is absurd. Thus, from within his confessional 
framework we find that Tiessen’s scriptural and theological support for the notion of a 
saving faith outside special revelation is antithetical to the fides ex auditu principle. 
 Considering the historical material for his confessional outline, Tiessen claims 
to follow Zwingli in regard to his teaching on divine election and the unevangelized. 
Tiessen writes: 
God’s elective grace is not restricted to the boundaries of the covenant people, 
in either Testamental period. The Spirit’s regenerative work sometimes 
accompanies less explicit forms of divine revelation than the good news 
concerning Jesus.132 
 
To this purpose, Tiessen references a quote from a letter Zwingli sent to King Francis 
I of France entitled, An Exposition of the Faith.133 In this letter he declares Socrates, 
Aristides, and Numa (to name a few) as being among “the communion and fellowship 
of all the saints and sages and believers and the steadfast and the brave and the good 
who have ever lived since the world began.”134 But rather than use this excerpt to 
further outline Zwingli’s position in support of his own project, it soon becomes clear 
that Tiessen has no intention of following Zwingli on the matter. 
 For example, before Zwingli wrote his letter to King Francis I, he met with 
Martin Luther at the Marburg Colloquy (1529) to discuss their differences of opinion 
on the nature of the Eucharist – Luther asserting the real presence of Christ’s body 
and blood, Zwingli arguing for a symbolic understanding of the bread and wine.135 
They were unable to resolve their disagreement on this particular issue, but they did 
agree that faith comes through Christ alone and that God gives faith through the Holy 
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Spirit “when we hear the gospel or the word of Christ.”136 So when Zwingli later 
named nine “heathen” as citizens of heaven, W. P. Stephens says that Luther saw this 
“as evidence that Zwingli was not sincere in the Marburg Colloquy.”137 Indeed, 
Luther seems to have the Marburg agreement in mind when he writes: 
Tell me, any one of you who wants to be a Christian, what need is there of 
baptism, the sacrament, Christ, the Gospel, or the prophets and Holy Scripture, 
if such godless heathen, Socrates, Aristides, yes, the cruel Numa, who was the 
first to instigate every kind of idolatry at Rome by the devil’s revelation, . . . 
are saved and sanctified along with the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles in 
heaven, even though they knew nothing about God, Scripture, the Gospel, 
Christ, baptism, the sacrament, or the Christian faith? What can such an 
author, preacher, and teacher believe about the Christian faith except that it is 
no better than any other faith and that everyone can be saved by his own faith, 
even an idolater and an Epicurean like Numa and Scipio?138 
 
Stephens explains that for Luther, because “Zwingli’s heathen” have no knowledge of 
Christ, “such faith as they have must be other than Christian, with the implication that 
they can be saved by their own faith.”139 An implication that Simon Chan applies to 
Tiessen’s theory as well, asking, “But would such a view of salvation not make 
knowledge of Christ extraneous?”140 Nevertheless, a closer examination shows that 
Tiessen is more vulnerable than Zwingli to the charge that this view nullifies the 
uniqueness of Christ. 
 Tiessen claims that “salvation has always been by grace through faith” but that 
faith has not always been by hearing the gospel of Christ.141 He asserts that saving 
faith does not always depend on whether or not a person hears the gospel during their 
lifetime, and “the kind of faith God requires varies depending on the revelation with 
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which he has blessed an individual.”142 Therefore “being saved and becoming a 
Christian are not the same thing.”143 But the concern here is that the ‘faith’ of 
Tiessen’s unevangelized ‘believers’ comes from extra-biblical revelation resulting in 
a faith that must be something other than Christian. Zwingli, however, does not fall 
into this particular trap as easily as Tiessen nor as cleanly as Luther supposes. 
 For Zwingli, salvation has always been by grace through God’s election alone, 
and this election is “free and not at all bound, and above baptism and circumcision; 
nay, above faith and preaching.”144 There is only one essential component for 
salvation, and that is God’s free purpose in marking out certain individuals for 
redemption through Christ. He explains: 
We see that the first thing is God’s deliberation or purpose or election, second 
his predestination or marking out, third his calling, fourth justification [by 
faith]. Since then all these are of God, and faith hardly holds the fourth place, 
how is it that we say that salvation comes of faith?145 
 
His answer is that faith is a sign of election for those who hear the gospel so that they 
may know that God has chosen them for eternal salvation; for “faith is the sign of the 
election by which we obtain real blessedness.”146 Thus, because God’s choice is “not 
at all bound” to such signs, faith is a sign only for those who hear the gospel.147 Oliver 
Crisp calls this view of election “justification in eternity,” and explains, “According 
to the doctrine of justification in eternity, the person who is eternally elect in Christ is 
also eternally justified. Possession of faith makes no material difference to one’s elect 
status, because it is an effect, not a cause, of justification.”148 From this perspective, 
writes Crisp, faith is “the means by which the elect individual comes to understand 
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that she is already a member of the elect, and already justified by God in Christ.”149 In 
short, the proclamation of the gospel is necessary for faith but preaching and faith 
need not precede salvation as salvation depends wholly upon God’s free election. 
Suffice it to say that unlike Tiessen, Zwingli’s approach allows him to affirm 
the possibility of salvation among the unevangelized without having to deny the fides 
ex auditu principle for saving faith. As Gottfried Locher explains, faith’s “decisive 
character is safeguarded in that one can only speak of faith as being necessary for 
salvation in the strict sense, when there is preaching of the gospel.”150 Of course, the 
fact that Zwingli denied the sola fide for salvation rather than the fides ex auditu for 
faith could hardly have assuaged Luther’s anger. Tiessen, however, posits the 
existence of faith where there has been no preaching. The point is, Tiessen appears to 
be trying to follow the modern inclusivist line of Pinnock and Sanders rather than the 
historical theological position of Zwingli on the issue of the unevangelized. Thus, the 
onus is on Tiessen to explain how a non-Christian response to extra-biblical 
revelation and lived out through a faithful adherence to and practice of non-Christian 
‘authoritative truth’ constitutes saving faith in Christ. 
 
A Doctrinal Assessment 
 
 In the end, we find that from a scriptural, theological, and historical 
perspective Tiessen’s separation of the sola fide from the fides ex auditu causes him 
to fall short of his intended goal. Nevertheless, Tiessen’s project is not without merit 
and its main strength is his insistence on the necessity of faith for salvation and the 
necessity of the Holy Spirit’s work of illumination for faith. To this extent, I suggest 
that if Tiessen will follow his scriptural and confessional material more closely, then 
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he may still be able to affect the kind of doctrinal precision needed for proposing an 
accessibilist position. 
 For example, he is keen to categorize his position as “monergistic” and 
develop his proposal within a Reformed theological framework following Zwingli.151 
For this reason he might begin by adopting Zwingli’s soteriology, which is summed 
up nicely in his statement that “the elect were chosen before they were conceived; 
they are at once then sons of God, even if they die before they believe or are called to 
faith.”152 Granted, this statement appears to belie Tiessen’s stance that salvation is 
through faith alone. But there are indications that following Zwingli’s theological 
trajectory will lead Tiessen to some creative yet doctrinally appropriate ways to 
maintain his position. 
For instance, Zwingli maintains that just as circumcision was a sign of election 
for children born into the nation of Israel, baptism is now a sign of election for 
children born to Christian parents.153 He states that because Israel and the church are 
one people and thus under the one covenantal promise, Christian parents whose child 
dies can be certain their child was saved.154 For according to Zwingli, Scripture 
teaches: 
Original sin cannot damn the children of Christians, because although sin 
would, to be sure, damn according to the law, it cannot damn on account of 
the remedy provided by Christ, especially it cannot damn those who are 
included in the covenant which was concluded with Abraham.155 
 
Thomas Noble explains Zwingli’s view of sin, stating: 
Zwingli distinguishes then between original guilt (the reatus) and original sin 
(the vitium), and the latter, the vitium is not really sin at all: it is a defect. He 
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defines sin as voluntary. An act of sin, for Zwingli, is a voluntary 
transgression of a known law.156 
 
Hence, as Philip Schaff states, Zwingli “fully admits the distinction between original 
or hereditary sin and actual transgression, but he describes the former as a moral 
disease, or natural defect, rather than punishable sin and guilt.”157 In this way, Zwingli 
declares: 
There are none of whose election we are more sure than of those children who 
are taken away young, while still without the law. . . . For dying is just as 
much a sign of election in them as faith is in grown people.158 
 
Although his view of covenant means that he is less certain about the children of non-
Christians who die, Zwingli nonetheless states that one who holds the opinion that 
original sin cannot condemn even these children “will have more basis and authority 
for his view in the Scriptures than those who deny this.”159 Timothy George explains, 
“For Zwingli baptism with the Spirit rather than water baptism was the means by 
which individuals were drawn into the orbit of divine salvation. The Spirit was not 
bound to external signs.”160 
Having said this, despite Zwingli’s argument that God’s predestination is 
above baptism, faith, and preaching, we have seen that he nonetheless recognizes a 
necessary order to salvation.161 And even though he considers faith a ‘secondary 
thing’ within this salvific process, he also admits that the certainty of election means 
that faith must be added at some point in this process. As Crisp explains, although 
God “eternally ordains” the justification of the elect, “the mechanism by means of 
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which this eternal act of election is actualized obtains in and through the work of 
Christ in time,” and in time this work “is applied to the individual by faith.”162 For 
Zwingli, this view means that because the salvation of elect infants and adults is 
certain, “faith is in that order the last thing beyond glorification.”163 Thus, like 
Tiessen, Zwingli argues that the standard of explicit faith does not apply to those 
“who by reason of age are not able to hear, nor those to whom the knowledge of the 
gospel has not come,” for nothing keeps God from saving anyone he wishes.164 Yet 
unlike Tiessen, Zwingli concludes that  “faith is not of all the elect, as now is clear of 
elect infants.”165 But what he means is only that we cannot know whether someone 
who has no knowledge of the gospel in this life is of the elect, and in this context we 
“may not measure by the norm and touch-stone of faith.”166 Thus he is not saying that 
the standard of belief or unbelief will never apply to them, because faith is a 
necessary link in the “chain and order” of salvation167 – even if this must occur after 
death.168 In the end, Zwingli affirms that justification depends on faith and that faith 
depends on hearing the proclamation of the gospel169; also, that faith “is the fruit of 
election, predestination and calling, which is given in its fit time.”170 
With this in mind, although Zwingli holds that the elect who die before 
hearing the gospel will nonetheless obtain faith ‘beyond glorification,’ he does not 
explain how this posthumous addition of faith might occur. Thus, if Tiessen will place 
himself more firmly within a Zwinglian position, he might take up where Zwingli left 
off and seek to provide an explanation for how the unevangelized elect will receive 
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faith in Christ after death. One possible way forward is found in Zwingli’s 
explanation of salvation for Old Testament believers. He argues that they, like 
Abraham, were justified by faith because “they desired to see the day of Christ the 
Saviour.”171 Yet while they had epistemic awareness of a promised Savior it was not 
until later, after the incarnation, that they gained the ontological reality of Jesus and, 
thus, explicit faith in Christ. Meanwhile, before the incarnation they went to “the 
bosom of Abraham” to await the completion of their salvation, which, Zwingli says, 
“can be nothing else than the sodality of the early believers to be everywhere 
preserved for the coming of Christ.”172 Thus he holds that God prepared a temporary 
space and a period of time for the preservation of those who would be glorified in 
Christ. So, to the degree that we are “one people and one church with them,”173 
Tiessen may finally discover an appropriate analogical connection with Old 
Testament believers. For if God safeguarded those who had faith in the promise of 
Christ yet had to wait for his atoning work to be given in its fit time, then Tiessen 
might consider the possibility that God preserves those whom he has chosen to save 
yet who must wait for the justification of faith through the hearing of the gospel. And 
to this extent, Zwingli provides some scriptural and doctrinal clues for how one might 
develop such a proposal. 
 Stephens points out that from the wider context of Zwingli’s work, it is clear 
that the ‘heathen’ whom he names as members of heaven did not die with saving 
faith. Yet he also observes that Zwingli might have thought they would “receive 
eternal life only after hearing the Gospel, by analogy with preaching to the departed in 
1 Pet. 3.18-20.”174 More specifically, Zwingli refers to the passage in 1 Peter and to 
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the statement of Christ’s “descent into hell” in the Apostles’ Creed to express the 
reach of Christ’s salvation: “For to be reckoned with those below is to have gone from 
the land of the living, and shows that the efficacy of His redemption extended even to 
those below.”175 Yet while Zwingli speaks of obtaining faith after death, Tiessen is 
adverse to the possibility of postmortem evangelism and contends that there are no 
second chances after death.176 
We might point out that for the unevangelized this option constitutes a first 
chance. The problem, however, is that Tiessen has rooted his project in the notion that 
“all have the opportunity to respond to God in faith during their life” through “less-
complete forms of divine revelation.”177 Thus, if one does not respond with faith to 
the Spirit’s illumination of general revelation during their lifetime, their fate is sealed 
in death and their condemnation is just.178 Likewise: 
At the moment of death, those who had received forms of revelation less 
complete than the gospel, but who had responded in faith by a work of the 
Holy Spirit, will joyfully find in Christ the fulfillment of all their hopes and 
longings.179 
 
In light of our argument in the previous section, we can note that the weak point in 
this statement is the assertion that these responses constitute ‘faith.’ Yet if Tiessen 
will speak of the Spirit’s work of illumination in terms of preparation for faith rather 
than as faith itself, this will perhaps give him a firmer starting point for proposing an 
accessibilist option. Furthermore, a closer reading of Zwingli might also help him 
maintain his reasons for objecting to posthumous conversion in a way that does not 
depend on the existence of saving faith outside the preaching of the gospel. 
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 As his theory stands, however, Tiessen’s reformulation of the doctrine of faith 
based on ‘lesser forms’ of revelation compromises the regulative principles of the 
solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu. For a gospel-less faith is also a Christ-
less faith and thus a non-Christian faith. But if he will make better use of his 
particular theological and confessional resources, as demonstrated above, he may be 
able to find a way to affirm the possibility of salvation through faith for the 
unevangelized in accordance with the relevant doctrinal principles. 
 
The Agnostic Position of John Stott 
 
 While the positions of Strange and Tiessen characterize exclusivism and 
inclusivism within evangelical theology, Gerald McDermott and Harold Netland point 
out that “many evangelicals . . . find themselves somewhere between restrictivism and 
inclusivism, convinced that each goes beyond what the biblical data affirm.”180 One 
of their examples is John Stott, who muses: 
In the Old Testament people were “justified by faith” even though they had 
little knowledge or expectation of Christ. Perhaps there are others today in a 
similar position, who know that they are guilty before God and that they 
cannot do anything to win his favour, but who in self-despair call upon the 
God they dimly perceive to save them.181 
 
With this idea in mind, Stott claims to “have a solid biblical basis” for believing “that 
the majority of the human race will be saved.”182 But he insists that Christians should 
“remain agnostic about how God will bring it to pass.”183 Nevertheless, regarding 
those who might dimly perceive God and call upon him, he does not hesitate to assert 
that their salvation still comes through Christ by faith alone.184 Stott’s point is not that 
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Christians should remain agnostic about the possibility of salvation for the 
unevangelized, but about how God will save them through Christ by faith. 
  Inasmuch as Stott refrains from commenting extensively on the issue he does 
not provide us with enough material to warrant a threefold scriptural, theological, and 
historical evaluation of his approach. Thus, we will move directly to the doctrinal 
assessment and examine his treatment according to the solus Christus, sola fide, and 
fides ex auditu principles. 
 
A Doctrinal Assessment 
 
 Stott confesses, “I have never been able to conjure up (as some great 
Evangelical missionaries have) the appalling vision of the millions who are not only 
perishing but will inevitably perish.”185 And this reticence to declare the impossibility 
of salvation for the unevangelized seems to be a chief motivation for agnostic 
positions. For instance, Christopher Wright, who follows Stott, similarly states, “I 
find it hard to accept that the sovereign saving grace of God is limited to the 
evangelistic obedience or effectiveness of the church.”186 Yet he also affirms that the 
salvation of unevangelized people would still be through Christ by faith.187 Thus, we 
might commend Stott and Wright for seeking to extend a Christian hope for salvation 
among the unevangelized and for affirming that if this occurs it will happen by the 
sovereign grace of God through Christ by faith alone. But by refusing to resolve the 
apparent doctrinal discrepancy in the claim that God might save people ‘by faith’ 
outside the hearing of the gospel, they also complicate matters, and considering 
Stott’s view there are at least two issues. 
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 The first issue is with his comparison of Old Testament believers who were 
“justified by faith” and “others today in a similar position, . . . who in self-despair call 
upon the God they dimly perceive to save them.”188 Foregrounded by the question 
regarding the amount of knowledge necessary for salvation, Stott argues that the 
similarity lies in the fact that Old Testament believers were saved “even though they 
had little knowledge or expectation of Christ.”189 Yet it is important to recall the 
discussion from the previous sections, that while the Christological knowledge of Old 
Testament believers was less than what it is now for New Testament believers, Old 
Testament faith nonetheless obtained within the context of God’s special revelation 
about the Messiah. Hence, a key difference is that Old Testament believers still had 
knowledge and an expectation of Christ, whereas the unevangelized do not. As 
Strange rightly states, “All Israelite believers had a ‘forward looking’ faith in God’s 
promises and . . . they knew full well that they were saved not by their present ‘type’ 
of revelation but by the coming ‘antitype’ of which the ‘type’ was but a pre-
figurement and shadow.”190 In other words, while Old Covenant believers did not 
know the identity of Christ they knew the promise of Christ and awaited its 
fulfillment. 
 Once this aspect is affirmed, Stott’s notion of a ‘similar position’ between Old 
Testament believers and the unevangelized becomes too weak to support his theory 
without further explanation. Otherwise, as Walter Kaiser points out, “the only 
alternative . . . is to claim that there are two methods of salvation approved of in 
Scripture: the way of faith in Jesus Christ taught in the New Testament and that of a 
diminished faith, presumably allowed for in the Old Testament.”191 But given Stott’s 
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assertion that salvation is “on the grounds of Christ’s cross alone,”192 we may safely 
assume this is not what he has in mind. Thus, he would need to either forgo his 
analogy regarding Old Testament believers or seek to provide a fuller explanation to 
better demonstrate similitude with the situation of the unevangelized. 
 The second issue concerns the fides ex auditu principle. Stott argues that if 
God saves those who “call upon the God they dimly perceive,” then their salvation “is 
still only by grace, only through Christ, only by faith.”193 Yet rather than 
acknowledge the principle that faith comes from hearing and then simply choose to 
remain agnostic about how they will hear, he instead assumes that this faith will 
somehow obtain outside the preaching of the gospel and thus founds his agnosticism 
on the issue of how this faith (non auditu) might occur. Furthermore, after affirming 
the sola gratia, solus Christus, and sola fide for the possibility of salvation among the 
unevangelized, he goes on to say, “But of course it is hard for people to call on one 
they have not believed in, or to believe in one of whom they have not heard, or to hear 
if no-one preaches to them (Rom. 10:14).”194 However, as this statement relates to the 
fides ex auditu in verse 17, what could ‘hard’ possibly mean in this biblical context of 
calling, believing, and hearing based upon explicit knowledge of Christ? For while 
Stott claims that “it is much easier for people to believe once they have heard the 
gospel of Christ crucified,”195 we may question whether Paul in Romans 10 is 
speaking of the ‘easier’ way of faith in contrast to the ‘harder’ way, or if he is 
referring to the only way of faith. Stott appears to hold the latter interpretation, 
stating, “It is when they learn from the cross about God’s mercy to sinners that they 
cry ‘God be merciful to me, a sinner!’”196 Thus there is a disconnect between Stott’s 
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assertion that those who do not know Christ may yet “cry out to God and be 
saved,”197 and his recognition that it is only through learning of Christ that a person is 
then able to call on the name of the Lord and be saved. 
 With this internal tension in mind, a further look may show that while Stott 
attempts to remain neutral on the issue of the unevangelized, his particular agnostic 
approach falls eventually into a kind of doctrinally disordered inclusivist position. In 
other words, by insisting that the salvation of an unevangelized person is still “only by 
faith,”198 he also, in consequence, indicates a theological position on how they will be 
saved. As we saw with Tiessen, if one claims that an unevangelized person can be 
saved by faith outside hearing the proclamation of the gospel, then one must work out 
this assertion through the conceptual framework of implicit faith; a concept that 
Stott’s theory implies but which he never brings into view. To be sure, admitting that 
his approach entails the notion of implicit faith would compromise his claim to 
agnosticism, but it would also help resolve the internal tension in his theory. As 
Lindbeck states, when the idea of implicit faith is “ontologically interpreted, salvation 
is primarily an inward grace which is articulated and strengthened by explicit 
faith.”199 So from this perspective, Stott might argue that while the salvific faith of the 
unevangelized “is still only by grace,” it is nonetheless “easier for people to believe” 
when they hear the gospel preached because it is ultimately through knowledge of the 
cross that salvation is made sure.200 To do this, however, he would need to explain 
how implicit faith is mediated and how it will eventually reach its fulfillment in 
explicit faith (fides ex auditu). 
                                               
197 Ibid., 81. 
198 Ibid. 
199 George Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Christians,” in The 
Gospel and the Ambiguity of the Church, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1974), 116. 
200 Stott, The Authentic Jesus, 81-82. 
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 On the other hand, if this is not the direction that Stott intends, then substantial 
changes need to be made to his position. For instance, Lindbeck says that unlike 
implicit faith “explicit faith in Christ is understood, not as expressing or articulating 
the existential depths, but rather as producing and forming them.”201 Thus Stott, based 
on his conviction that there is ‘a solid biblical basis’ for hope that God will extend 
salvation to the unevangelized, might confess a valid hopeful agnostic position by 
affirming that not only will God do this through Christ by faith, but that he will bring 
it to pass through their hearing the proclamation of the gospel of Christ. From this 
position he might then choose to remain agnostic about how they will hear. 
 Nevertheless, once the fides ex auditu is given place in the discussion, there 
seems little reason to remain agnostic on the issue. For instance, when Stott leaves the 
fides ex auditu principle out of the conversation initially, we might agree with him 
that God “has not revealed how he will deal with those who have never heard.”202 But 
when the fides ex auditu is upheld in the discussion, then, as indicated in the previous 
sections, various scriptural, theological, and doctrinal materials become available for 
consideration. As his theory stands, however, there remains a disconnect between the 
sola fide and fides ex auditu principles suggesting that his view may represent less of 




 Our analysis showed that Strange, Tiessen, and Stott affirm salvation by faith 
through Christ alone and that the fullness of faith comes by hearing, but they arrange 
these principles differently. This observation is helpful because it indicates that we are 
on the right track in our application of rule theory. As Lindbeck states: 
The issue is not whether salvation is through Christ, or faith is necessary, or 
explicit faith is important, or unbelievers are saved. On the level of the 
                                               
201 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Christians.” 116 
202 Edwards, Evangelical Essentials, 327. 
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properly religious or Christian use of language in worship, preaching, and 
action, it is possible, so we shall suggest, to make all these affirmations no 
matter which position one chooses.203 
 
Thus we find that Strange, representing an exclusivist position, places all humanity in 
proximity to the fides ex auditu through the fall in Genesis 3, and argues that the 
unevangelized are not “invincibly ignorant”204 but are in a state of unbelief and false 
faith. On the other hand, representing an inclusivist (accessibilist) view, Tiessen 
places faith before the fides ex auditu principle and argues that the unevangelized 
receive the Spirit’s illumination of lesser forms of revelation during their lifetime and 
a person’s positive response constitutes saving faith. Neither theologian denies the 
doctrinal principles necessary for the discussion, but the contrast in the ways each 
applies these rules to their respective arguments is substantial. This is why Lindbeck 
insists that “our question is a second-order theoretical one in systematic theology 
regarding the best way to organize faith affirmations and relate them to each other and 
to other statements of both a theological and nontheological character.”205 
Nevertheless, while this task may be a ‘second-order theoretical one,’ it is no less 
important because, as we have seen, when theologians do not organize their material 
adequately they may profess correct faith affirmations – e.g., God will judge all those 
who remain in unbelief (Strange), or salvation is by grace through faith (Tiessen and 
Stott) – and yet express them through problematic applications of doctrinal rules – 
e.g., condemnation based on the notion of single-source revelation, or salvation based 
on a doctrine of lesser forms of revelation or on a vague scriptural hope. 
 With this in mind, the chief purpose of the rest of this thesis is to seek a better 
way to organize faith affirmations for offering a viable Reformation proposal to the 
                                               
203 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Christians,” 110; emphasis 
added. 
204 Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelised, 282; emphasis 
original. 
205 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu and the Salvation of Non-Christians,” 110. 
 135 
question of the unevangelized. From a cultural-linguistic perspective, we might say 
that if it is indeed ontologically true that God will extend salvation to the 
unevangelized, then there must be an appropriate intrasystematic way to affirm this 
truth. Moreover, categorially speaking any meaningful answer will be able to 
demonstrate this truth without proposing special revelation, saving faith, or false faith 
outside the explicit preaching and hearing of the gospel. Therefore the only available 










 In Chapter 4 we used the solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu 
principles to evaluate the theories of Daniel Strange, Terrance Tiessen, and John Stott 
on the theological question regarding the fate of the unevangelized. We observed, in 
part, that Strange connects all people to the fides ex auditu through the 
protoevangelium in Genesis 3:15, and claims that an unevangelized person has ‘false 
faith’ and is morally responsible for suppressing and distorting the pure knowledge of 
God.1 In contrast, we saw that Tiessen supports the idea that God gives lesser forms 
of special revelation to unevangelized people and that this ‘word’ is sufficient for 
faith to obtain ex auditu.2 Finally, our examination of Stott revealed that while he 
believes that God will save many unevangelized people through Christ by faith, he 
nonetheless neglects the fides ex auditu principle and abstains from explaining how 
saving faith might obtain apart from the proclamation of the gospel. Thus, all three 
evangelical theologians posit the existence of faith (in either false or saving form) 
outside a person’s awareness of the gospel message. The problem with this conclusion 
is that the rule instantiated by the fides ex auditu principle specifies that faith obtains 
through the explicit preaching and hearing of the word of Christ (Rom 10:14-17).  
 In light of these findings, this chapter will evaluate Lindbeck’s fides ex auditu 
approach along with two other related proposals in order to become familiar with the 
theological ground upon which prospective theories are cultivated. We should also 
note that the theories to be assessed after Lindbeck’s are by Roman Catholic 
                                               
1 For instance, see, Daniel Strange, For Their Rock Is Not as Our Rock: An 
Evangelical Theology of Religions (Nottingham: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 93. 
2 For instance, see, Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation 
in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 268-269. 
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theologians Joseph DiNoia and Gavin D’Costa.3 While it might seem unusual to 
review DiNoia and D’Costa in light of our ‘Reformation’ emphasis of the fides ex 
auditu, the reason for doing so comes down to the simple fact that they are the only 
theologians whose theories are associated with Lindbeck’s. This is not to say there are 
no prospective fides ex auditu theories by Protestant theologians, but these proposals 
are not genealogically connected to Lindbeck in the history of ideas.4 Nevertheless, 
we may discover that DiNoia and D’Costa bring some rich theological resources to 
the discussion that otherwise might have gone unheeded. 
 Another item of note that effects our rule theory evaluation of these 
prospective theories is the tradition which teaches that a person’s eternal fate is sealed 
at death – i.e., the doctrine of particular judgment. On the Catholic side, the notion of 
particular judgment is implied by the dogmatic statement in the Constitution issued by 
Benedict XII in 1336, which states that after death all purified souls will experience 
the divine essence “immediately revealing itself plainly, clearly and openly, to 
them.”5 Likewise, “the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin immediately 
after their death descend to hell where they are tortured by infernal punishments.”6 In 
this way, if one goes ‘immediately’ to heaven or hell after death, then particular 
                                               
3 J. A. DiNoia, The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992); Gavin D’Costa, Christianity and 
World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions (Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009). 
4 For instance, Gabriel Fackre develops his theory out of the debate on a future 
probation for the unevangelized from nineteenth century American 
Congregationalism, while Jerry Walls roots his theory in the Wesleyan Armenian 
notion of holiness and a reinterpretation of the doctrine of purgatory. See Gabriel 
Fackre, “Divine Perseverance,” in Gabriel J. Fackre, Ronald H. Nash, and John 
Sanders, What About Those Who Have Never Heard?: Three Views on the Destiny of 
the Unevangelized (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 71-95; and Jerry 
Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 45-51. 
5 DS, 198. 




judgement is implied. On the Protestant side, dogmatic statements that imply 
particular judgment appear only in a few Reformed confessions; such as the 
Westminster Confession of Faith, which states that souls, 
having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them: 
The souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received 
into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and 
glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies. And the souls of the 
wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, 
reserved to the judgment of the great day.7 
 
Nevertheless, even if the teaching of particular judgment is not a formal doctrine 
across the spectrum of Protestant traditions, Walter Elwell states that “the mainstream 
of Protestant theology urges that death is the end of man’s probation and that the 
spiritual condition of man after death is fixed, not fluid.”8 So it is perhaps safe to say 
that this teaching functions as an informal doctrine within Protestantism, and that our 
rule theory examination will need to consider the ways in which each proposal 
considers the rules instantiated by the doctrine of particular judgment. 
 
George Lindbeck’s Theory of Religions and the Fides ex Auditu 
 
 Lindbeck introduces his prospective theory as a response to the approach of 
Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. As noted in Chapter 1, Rahner uses the 
notion of implicit faith and coins the term “anonymous Christian” to propose that if it 
is indeed possible for a person to obtain saving faith “without being reached by the 
proclamation of the Church’s message, then it must be possible to be not only an 
anonymous theist but also an anonymous Christian.”9 He reasons that faith for an 
unevangelized person is implicit and grace leads their “consciousness subjectively, 
                                               
7 “Westminster Confession of Faith,” Ch. 32.1. Also see, “The Second Helvetic 
Confession,” Ch. 26; “The Irish Articles of Religion of 1615,” Art. 101; “The Baptist 
Confession of Faith of 1689,” Ch. 31.1. 
8 Walter A. Elwell, ed., Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed., Baker reference 
library (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 1080; emphasis original. 
9 Rahner, Theological Investigations: V, 132. 
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even though it is not known objectively.”10 Thus, when an anonymous Christian hears 
the gospel this proclamation becomes “the expression in objective concepts of 
something which this person has already attained or could already have attained in the 
depth of his rational existence.”11 In response, Lindbeck argues for a Protestant 
alternative which emphasizes the explicit nature of saving faith. 
 To this purpose, he first points out that Protestant theologians have had little to 
say on this subject of the unevangelized, and muses that “one reason for Protestant 
silence is no doubt the traditional suspicion, grounded in the sola scriptura, of 
speculative efforts to answer questions which are not directly dealt with in the 
Bible.”12 In this case, because the Bible does not reveal how or if God will save those 
who never hear the gospel, Lindbeck surmises that Protestant theologians remain 
uncomfortable with discussing the issue.13 He also complains that Protestant theology 
in America occurs more in the academic realm than in the ecclesial context, and that 
in this “university-oriented” environment the subject of the salvation of non-
Christians is not “fashionable or intellectually respectable.”14 So although this issue 
“troubles a great many people in the churches,” Lindbeck says “the professional 
theologians of the major denominations are either unaware of this or do not take it 
seriously.”15 He agrees that a certain reticence towards theological speculation is a 
good communal value in itself, but he also points out that this particular hesitation has 
never functioned as an absolute interdiction within Protestantism: 
                                               
10 Ibid., 131. 
11 Ibid.; for more on Rahner see, Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of 
Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1997), 143-149; Paul Knitter, Introducing 
Theologies of Religions (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), 72-74; Gavin D’Costa, Theology 
and Religious Pluralism (New York: Blackwell, 1986), 80-116; and D’Costa, 
Christianity and World Religions, 19-23. 
12 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu,” 107. 
13 Ibid., 104. 
14 Ibid., 108 
15 Ibid., 109. 
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From the time that Luther developed his theory of ubiquity, through the era of 
Orthodoxy and down into the modern period, Protestants have not been averse 
to discussing problems which go much beyond anything which Scripture says. 
It could be replied that what the Reformation is concerned with is the 
avoidance of useless speculation. Clearly many new questions have arisen in 
the course of history of which the biblical authors knew nothing, but these 
should be discussed only if they are important for the concrete life of faith.16 
 
For his part, Lindbeck argues that the question of salvation for non-Christians is 
indeed an important issue for the church and is therefore worthy of theological 
inquiry. 
 Nevertheless, Lindbeck does not seem keen to develop a comprehensive 
theory himself, as his main purpose is to demonstrate that a prospective fides ex 
auditu option is at least as reasonable an option as Rahner’s anonymous Christian 
approach.17 He points out that even Rahner is forced to acknowledge that death marks 
the moment when the implicit faith of an anonymous Christian is transformed into 
explicit salvation through an encounter with Jesus Christ.18 Thus he argues that the 
chief difference between Rahner’s theory and the fides ex auditu option is in where 
one places the actualization of salvation – either in “a primordial, prereflective 
experience of Christ’s grace” or in a future fides ex auditu encounter.19 To be sure, 
Lindbeck is dubious of the former: 
There is something arrogant about supposing that Christians know what 
nonbelievers experience and believe in the depths of their being better than 
they know themselves, and that therefore the task of dialogue or evangelism is 
to increase their self-awareness. The communication of the gospel is not a 
form of psychotherapy, but rather the offer and the act of sharing one’s own 
beloved language—the language that speaks of Jesus Christ—with all those 
                                               
16 Ibid., 107; Luther’s theory of ubiquity refers to his eucharistic explanation of the 
substantial presence of Christ’s body and blood in, with, and under the elements. As 
to the speculative nature of this position, Philip Schaff says, “The ubiquity of Christ’s 
body involves an important element of truth, but is a dogmatic hypothesis without 
sufficient Scripture warrant,” see, Schaff, History of the Christian Church, Second 
Edition., vol. VII (Eerdmans, 1910), 373-374. 
17 See, Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu,” 120; Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 44, 49. 
18 See, Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu,” 115; Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 45. 
19 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 45. 
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who are interested, in the full awareness that God does not call all to be part of 
the witnessing people.20 
 
One nontheological reason for this perspective stems from Lindbeck’s cultural-
linguistic theory of religions. 
 Recall that in Part 1 we noted Lindbeck’s argument that a religion is “like a 
culture or language, it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of 
individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities.”21 And 
like any cultural-linguistic system, a religion consists of a distinct vocabulary and 
grammar within a form of life which makes “possible the description of realities, the 
formulations of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings, and 
sentiments.”22 With this definition of religion Lindbeck then hypothesizes that the 
religious community which contains the particular concepts and categories capable of 
actually referring to “whatever in fact is more important than everything else in the 
universe,” would be the unsurpassable religion.23 He states: 
This religion would then be the only one in which any form of propositional, 
and conceivably also expressive, religious truth or falsity could be present. 
Other religions might then be called categorially false, but propositionally and 
expressively they would be neither true nor false. They would be religiously 
meaningless just as talk about light and heavy things is meaningless when one 
lacks the concept of “weight.”24 
 
If then Christianity is the unsurpassable religion (as Lindbeck holds), then we must 
assume that other religions cannot be alternative salvific structures as they do not 
speak the language of Christ (i.e., their beliefs, practices, symbols, vocabulary, 
grammar, experiences, and ways of being in the world are not cultivate by the 
Christian form of life). Lindbeck does not mean to say that followers of other 
                                               
20 Ibid., 47. 
21 Ibid., 19. 
22 Ibid. 




religions are lost, but that the question of their salvation becomes relevant only once 
they begin to come into salvation’s determinate setting: 
If this is so, there is a sense in which those unskilled in the language of faith 
not only fail to affirm but also cannot deny that “Jesus is Lord.” . . . 
 Nonbelievers are not yet confronted by the question of salvation 
because it is only by acquiring some familiarity with the determinate settings 
in which religious utterances acquire propositional force that one can grasp 
their meaning well enough genuinely to reject (or accept) them.25 
 
Yet Lindbeck asserts that unsurpassability does not mean that Christians are incapable 
of error26 or that other religions have nothing to teach the Christian community.27 For 
instance, on a second-order level “perhaps . . . Buddhists know more about 
contemplation, and Christians about social action, and perhaps they can learn from 
each other in these domains even while retaining their categorially different notions of 
the maximally important.”28 Moreover, he leaves open the possibility that other 
religions have an eschatological salvific value, stating: 
One can admit the unsubstitutable uniqueness of the God-willed missions of 
non-Christian religions when one thinks of these faiths, not as objectifying 
poorly what Christianity objectifies well (as Karl Rahner proposes), but as 
cultural-linguistic systems within which potentialities can be actualized and 
realities explored that are not within the direct purview of the peoples of 
Messianic witness, but that are nevertheless God-willed and God-approved 
anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom.29 
 
Hence, the main point Lindbeck tries to make with the notion of unsurpassability is 
that Christians have only just begun to learn ex auditu what non-Christians have yet to 







                                               
25 Ibid., 54. 
26 Ibid., 37. 
27 Ibid., 39. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 40-41. 
30 Lindbeck, “Fides Ex Auditu,” 118. Also see, Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 46. 
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A Critical Review of Lindbeck’s Proposal 
 
 We will frame our review of Lindbeck by considering some relevant 
objections raised by Kenneth Surin in his critique of Lindbeck’s theory of religions.31 
Having already dealt with a number of Lindbeck’s critics in chapters 1-2, Surin will 
be our chief interlocutor for this section as his prime objective is to dismantle 
Lindbeck’s fides ex auditu option. We should note, however, that while Surin’s 
postmodern view of truth permits him to agree with the cultural-linguistic claim that 
religions are incommensurable, he does not agree with the notion “that there will be 
just one paradigm for ‘interiorising the language of Christ’”; an idea, says Surin, that 
“falls well short of being truly ‘postmodern.’”32 Yet we should also recall that 
Lindbeck himself is ambivalent towards postmodernism,33 and refers to it as a 
“parasitic negation” of modernity.34 But to the extent that Surin makes Lindbeck’s 
theory of truth and the fides ex auditu option the main object of his criticism, his 
review remains important for our study. 
 With this in mind, we will begin with a footnote in which Surin gives a brief 
evaluation of Lindbeck’s view of truth: 
There is an ambiguity in Lindbeck’s delineation of the [sic] ‘unsurpassability’. 
When he likens a ‘lived religion’ to a ‘gigantic proposition’ (p. 51), Lindbeck 
indicates that what makes this proposition ‘true’ is ‘the extent that its 
objectivities are interiorised and exercised by groups and individuals’. . . . 
However, on p. 52 he states that an unsurpassable religion is one which ‘is 
capable of being rightly utilized’. . . . In the former case the ‘utilisation’ in 
question is evidently deemed to be one that is in fact realised or which has in 
fact to be realised, in the latter it is clear that only a ‘capacity’ for such 
‘utilisation’ is being talked about. Lindbeck is keen to stress that it is the 
historical practice of the community of faith which is determinative for the 
issue of truth, and this would favour the first reading of ‘unsurpassability’. But 
this reading sits less easily with a ‘prospective fides ex auditu’ theory than the 
                                               
31 Kenneth Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith’: An Examination of 
Lindbeck’s Chapter Three,” Modern Theology 4, no. 2 (January 1988): 187-209. 
32 Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith,’” 204. 
33 George Lindbeck, “The Church’s Mission to a Postmodern Culture,” in Postmodern 
Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed. Frederic B. Burnham (Eugene: 
Wipf And Stock, 2006), 50-51. 
34 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, xxxi. 
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second one, and this must cause us to favour the latter gloss: the ‘ex auditu’ 
theory, after all, is absolutely crucial for Lindbeck’s theology of religions.35 
 
Surin’s argument here is that Lindbeck’s view of truth results in a contradiction, that 
it sees Christianity as both corresponding to and not corresponding to ultimate truth at 
the same time. In one instance Christianity is in fact true, while in another instance 
Christianity is merely capable of being true contingent upon right use of communal 
practices. He cannot have it both ways, so Surin wants to know which view of truth 
Lindbeck intends. 
 Although Surin recognizes the unique quality of Lindbeck’s epistemology, 
calling it “an ingenious hybrid truth-theory,”36 he nonetheless appears to interpret the 
implications of Lindbeck’s theory of truth through a cognitive-propositional lens 
rather than from a cultural-linguistic perspective. That is to say, a closer look at his 
response to Lindbeck’s statement about a religion being like a “single gigantic 
proposition”37 may reveal that Surin conflates Lindbeck’s “three senses of ‘true’” 
(categorial, propositional, and ontological), and thus neglects the “three contrasting 
interpretations” of unsurpassability.38 As we discussed in the second chapter of this 
thesis, the cultural-linguistic determination of whether a religion (as a whole system) 
is true or false depends not on the actions of the community per se, but rather on its 
categorial adequacy. For it is only from a categorial sense of truth that the religion 
“which has the concepts and categories that enable it to refer to the religious object, 
i.e., to whatever in fact is more important than everything else in the universe” is 
deemed true – unsurpassable.39 
                                               
35 Ibid., 205n6. Surin references an earlier printing of The Nature of Doctrine by 
SPCK, 1985. 
36 Ibid., 192. 
37 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 37. 
38 Ibid., 35. 
39 Ibid., 36. 
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When this understanding of religious truth is then added to Lindbeck’s second 
sense of truth (propositional truth – the communal practice of religious concepts and 
categories), we find that the categorially true religion is also the only religion that is 
propositionally true (as a single gigantic proposition).40 To be sure, this means all 
other religions are deemed categorially false, but it also means “propositionally and 
expressively they would be neither true nor false.”41 It is, then, only with the addition 
of the third sense of truth, ontological truth, that one may speak of the correspondence 
of first-order propositions. In other words, just as categorial truth makes propositional 
truth or falsity possible, ontological truth makes categorial truth or falsity possible. 
For instance, if the Triune God of Christianity is in fact “the Most Important, the 
Ultimately Real,”42 then Christianity is thereby the only categorially true religion and 
the only propositionally true cultural-linguistic system – i.e., the only ‘gigantic 
proposition’ with the concepts and categories that in fact correspond to ontological 
truth. 
 With this in mind, we see that Surin interprets Lindbeck’s statement that a 
lived religion is like a ‘gigantic proposition’ to mean that unsurpassability relies on 
right utilization of “the historical practice of the community of faith.”43 Yet, in regard 
to Lindbeck’s three senses of truth, if Christianity is in fact the categorially true 
religion, then it is also the unsurpassable religion irrespective of any particular 
utilization of its beliefs and practices by individual Christians or sub-groups of 
Christianity. So when Surin states, “Given that religions are historical entities, the 
capacity of a religion to function in a ‘categorially true and unsurpassable’ way will 
be crucially affected by historical particularities and socio-economic forces,”44 he 
                                               
40 Ibid., 50-51. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 51. 
43 Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith,’” 205n6. 
44 Ibid., 193. 
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appears to overlook the fact that the ‘function’ of categorial truth is to make 
propositional “error as well as truth possible.”45 Which means that the categorially 
true and unsurpassable religion is in no way crucially affected by any particular 
wrong use of its practices, for the capacity to err is part and parcel to unsurpassability. 
 Having said this, perhaps Surin’s frustration is warranted on some level. For 
instance, in Lindbeck’s explanation of propositional truth he states, “A religious 
utterance, one might say, acquires the propositional truth of ontological 
correspondence only insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create 
that correspondence.”46 Yet if this performance “is not always and perhaps not even 
usually so employed,”47 then, as Surin argues, how can one hold this understanding of 
correspondence “without ultimately derogating from the claim that Christianity (or 
the other faith in question) truly has the capacity to be character-forming and action-
guiding ‘in a way that corresponds to ultimate reality’”?48 This is a valid question, and 
to address it fairly we will need to recall Lindbeck’s explanation of propositional 
truth. 
 A simple explanation of the cultural-linguistic view of propositional truth is 
that this truth obtains through the exercise of beliefs and practices by members of the 
community. When applied generally, this definition means that because a religion is a 
cultural-linguistic system – i.e., “a total pattern of speaking, thinking, feeling, and 
acting”49 – a living religion is itself a propositional truth claim. In other words, there 
is never a moment when a religion as a whole, “as actually lived,” is not uttering “a 
single gigantic proposition.”50 As Bruce Marshall explains, “In at least this respect, 
                                               
45 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 37. 
46 Ibid., 51. 
47 Ibid., 38. 
48 Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith,’” 193. 
49 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 50. 
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the ‘truth’ of a religion belongs to the language itself of the religion and is not 
affected by appropriate or inappropriate performance on the part of the speakers of the 
language.”51 From this perspective, when individuals or sub-groups within 
Christianity utilize the concepts and categories wrongly, this does not necessarily 
affect the system’s capacity to shape lives. As Lindbeck explains elsewhere, when 
viewed from a Christian perspective: 
One theological warrant for giving priority to practice is confidence that the 
Holy Spirit guides the church into the truth. 
 If one believes this is so, one will think that the burden of proof rests 
on those who deny that the Christian mainstream has on the whole and in the 
long run rightly discerned God’s word in Scripture.52 
 
So rather than negate the is-in-fact-realized element of Lindbeck’s delineation of 
religious truth (as Surin argues),53 we find that historical practice (mixed with right 
and wrong use) is itself evidence of Christianity’s capacity to conform lives to God. 
As Lindbeck explains in his example of the crusader’s battle cry, it is only on an 
individual or sub-group level that an utterance can be true in one instance and false in 
another.54 
 That said, even if a religion remains unsurpassable when individuals and sub-
groups within Christianity utter false propositions, the usual way non-Christians make 
judgments about Christianity is through the second-order application of propositions 
(i.e., individual and communal speech-acts). And in this respect, we might assume 
that false cognitive-propositional utterances by individuals or groups of Christians 
will at least affect the perception and reception of the historical evidence for 
Christianity’s categorial truth. Or as Surin puts it: 
Given that Christianity was (at least notionally) the religion of the majority of 
those who adminstered [sic] the Nazi death camps, it would seem to follow 
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from Lindbeck’s definition that Christianity is precluded from being a 
‘categorially true and unsurpassable religion’ when viewed from the standpoint 
of the inmates of Dachau, Treblinka, Auschwitz, Sobibor, Bergen-Belsen, 
Majdanek, Buchenwald, Ravensbruck, Sachsenhausen, Belzec, Mauthausen, 
etc.55 
 
It is perhaps safe to assume that Lindbeck would agree with this statement. And to be 
fair, he is not seeking to present a theodicy but to outline a cultural-linguistic theory 
of religions. As he states in the first sentence of his chapter: 
It is not the business of a nontheological theory of religions to argue for or 
against the superiority of any one faith, but it does have the job, if it is to be 
religiously useful, of allowing the possibility of such a superiority.56 
 
Thus, having observed that categorially different religions hold incommensurable 
notions of objective reality, he discusses what it might mean for one of these religions 
(Christianity) to actually correspond to ultimate truth. 
Nevertheless, Surin maintains that Lindbeck’s fides ex auditu approach 
destroys a person’s socially constructed self, and he centers his argument on a 
paragraph where Lindbeck speaks of a universal encounter with the gospel and Christ 
in death. The paragraph states: 
The proposal is that dying itself be pictured as the point at which every human 
being is ultimately and expressly confronted by the gospel, by the crucified 
and risen Lord. It is only then that the final decision is made for or against 
Christ; and this is true, not only of unbelievers but also of believers. All 
previous decisions, whether for faith or against faith, are preliminary. The 
final die is cast beyond our space and time, beyond empirical observation, 
beyond all speculation about “good” or “bad” deaths, when a person loses his 
or her rootage in this world and passes into the inexpressible transcendence 
that surpasses all words, images, and thoughts. We must trust and hope, 
although we cannot know, that in this dreadful yet wondrous end and climax 
of life no one will be lost. And here, even if not before, the offer of 
redemption is explicit. Thus it is possible to be hopeful and trusting about the 
ultimate salvation of non-Christians no less than Christians even if one does 
not think in terms of a primordial, prereflective experience of Christ’s grace.57 
 
                                               
55 Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith,’” 193. 
56 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 32. 
57 Ibid., 45. 
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Surin homes in on the idea that in death ‘a person loses his or her rootage in this 
world,’ and he responds: 
The author of The Nature of Doctrine posits a quite definite disjunction 
between a state of existence in which we have a ‘rootage in this world’ and 
one in which this ‘rootage’ has disappeared. . . . 
 If it is acknowledged that our bodily (and hence our ‘personal’) 
identities are socially and culturally constituted, . . . then the non-Christian 
individual who, as Lindbeck sees it, confronts Christ and the gospel at the 
eschaton will certainly not do so as a tabula rasa. He or she will be someone 
whose body had, in ‘this’ life, been the bearer of a quite specific set of cultural 
and social inscriptions.58 
 
He goes on to argue that Lindbeck’s description of life before and after death affects a 
“two tracks” view of time and eternity which, according to Surin, means that 
we picture God’s existence as a timeless state in which things do not happen 
successively, as a non-durational state which runs parallel to the historical 
process, so that when we die we ‘jump the tracks’ and continue to exist in this 
non-temporal divine sphere. . . . This picture is highly misleading.59 
 
He says that even from a ‘two tracks’ view of time and eternity, Lindbeck must admit 
that a person’s socially and culturally formed self will not simply dissolve in the next 
life.60 
 Turning again to the example of the Jewish victim, Surin asks, what if she 
were so moved by her experiences of what Christian anti-semites had done to 
her that she is not able in a Lindbeckian ‘after-life’ to attach any sense, let 
alone credence, to the notion of Christianity as a religion which, in his words, 
is ‘capable of being rightly utilised . . . in a way that corresponds to ultimate 
reality’?61 
 
He suggests Lindbeck might answer that “she would be so profoundly healed” that 
her previous experiences would not keep her from recognizing the unsurpassability of 
Christianity.62 For if she were not so healed, argues Surin, then “there would be, for 
                                               
58 Surin, “‘Many Religions and the One True Faith,’” 195. 
59 Ibid., 194. 
60 Another reason Surin thinks this position is misleading is because he holds a 
Thomist version of time and eternity espoused by Nicholas Lash. For an example of 
Lash’s position, see, “Eternal Life: Life ‘After’ Death?,” The Heythrop Journal 19 
(1978): 271-284. 




this one individual at any rate, no ‘prospective fides ex auditu’” and Lindbeck’s 
theory would fall apart.63 Yet because Lindbeck does indeed propose a universal fides 
ex auditu experience, Surin asserts that his theory “can appropriately be described as 
an eschatologically-qualified ‘universalism.’”64 
 
Dealing with the Gaps in Lindbeck’s Theory 
 
 To begin, Surin asserts that Lindbeck’s universalism “robs the question of the 
unsurpassability of Christianity of any real point or urgency.”65 Which is to say, the 
cultural-linguistic approach “views religion as something irreducibly communitarian” 
which, in the case of Christianity, makes the church the “necessary condition of both 
salvation and damnation.”66 And in light of Lindbeck’s fides ex auditu theory and his 
‘two tracks’ view of time and eternity, Surin claims this approach means that 
at the eschaton (glossed in terms of the Lindbeckian version of the 
‘subsequence’ theory) all human beings will at least be endowed with the 
capacity for hearing and accepting the true religion, and so, as required by the 
‘cultural-linguistic’ model, all would have been incorporated into the 
linguistic community that is the church. All would, willy-nilly, have been 
‘moulded’ by the Christian language, and so all will be ‘in’ the church, 
regardless of whether or not they are disposed to reject Christ.67 
 
In other words, if when unevangelized people ‘jump the tracks’ in death they also find 
themselves suddenly able to speak the language of Christ, then according to Surin this 
means they will also suddenly find themselves to be capable members of the Christian 
community – including the Jewish victim who we might assume was personally 
disposed to reject Christ before her death. Therefore, Surin concludes that Lindbeck’s 
prospective fides ex auditu theory makes the notion of unsurpassability and decisions 
for or against Christ irrelevant, for if at the moment of death each person suddenly 
                                               
63 Ibid., 195-196. 
64 Ibid., 196. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 197. 
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becomes a capable speaker of the language of Christ, then the logical conclusion is 
that they must be de facto members of the church.68 
 In order to consider Surin’s objections adequately, we must first take note of a 
particular misapplication that occurs at the beginning of his argument. As noted 
earlier, Surin constructs his argument around a particular idea drawn from a particular 
paragraph in The Nature of Doctrine – that in dying “a person loses his or her rootage 
in this world and passes into the inexpressible transcendence that surpasses all words, 
images, and thoughts.”69 And it is this idea which leads him to conclude that 
Lindbeck holds a ‘two-tracks’ view of time and eternity. The problem is, this 
paragraph is not Lindbeck’s summation of his own prospective fides ex auditu theory, 
but rather it is his summation of the experiential-expressivist notion of implicit faith. 
More precisely, this paragraph is Lindbeck’s description of the position of Rahner. 
 Lindbeck sets up his argument by contrasting Rahner’s concept of anonymous 
Christianity with the cultural-linguistic emphasis of Paul’s fides ex auditu (Rom 
10:17), and in this way he claims that “on the scriptural issue, the prospective fides ex 
auditu option seems to have the advantage.”70 He then briefly considers the early 
Christian view of non-Christians, concluding that they “appear to have had an 
extraordinary combination of relaxation and urgency in their attitude toward those 
outside the church,” but that whatever theological means they used to maintain this 
tension went unrecorded.71 Next, he moves ahead to the nineteenth century 
(inexplicably passing over the patristic and medieval contributions) to point out that 
during this period there were Protestant theologians who attempted to explain 
salvation for non-Christians through “what might be called a ‘second chance’; but a 
                                               
68 Ibid. 
69 Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 45. 
70 Ibid., 44. 
71 Ibid.; he does not reference any sources to support this assertion concerning the 
early Christian view of non-Christians. 
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long tradition (dogmatized on the Catholic side) holds that the ultimate fate of every 
human being is definitively decided at death.”72 Yet his introduction of this notion 
signifies an important moment in his argument, for he goes on to state that recent 
Roman Catholic scholars, “including Karl Rahner,” have sought to construe the idea 
of a future opportunity so as not to violate the tradition and dogma prohibiting salvific 
decisions after death.73 Thus we come to the paragraph under consideration. 
 In this paragraph, Lindbeck summarizes Rahner’s position and highlights the 
fact that even in the case of anonymous Christianity “the offer of redemption is 
explicit” in death.74 With this observation he then reasons that because Rahner’s 
position ultimately admits to the necessity of explicit faith for the salvation of non-
Christians, perhaps the prospective fides ex auditu approach has yet another 
advantage (along with the scriptural one).75 Indeed, he asserts that the notion of 
implicit faith can appear “arrogant” and may increase “the temptation to religious 
pretentiousness,”76 while the fides ex auditu approach reminds Christians that 
“judgment begins in the house of the Lord (1 Peter 4:17), and many of the first shall 
be last, and the last first (Matt 19:30).”77 So from a prospective fides ex auditu 
approach the healing of Surin’s Jewish victim (and those like her) would not come 
upon her willy-nilly when she dies, but would come as an offer to receive healing 
from Christ in the consummation.78 
This is also why Lindbeck claims that “experiential-expressivist descriptions 
of implicit faith are far too glorious even for the fides ex auditu and must rather be 
                                               
72 Ibid., 45; he does not cite any of these proposals. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 115. 
75 Ibid., 47-48. 
76 Ibid., 47. 
77 Ibid., 45. 
78 Ibid., 47. 
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applied to ultimate completion when faith passes into the beatific vision.”79 It seems, 
then, that Lindbeck’s argument is less about the dissolution of a person’s socially 
constructed self, and more about bringing every person into the only determinate 
setting in which they can “experience and accept the abysmal mystery on which they 
are grounded.”80 So how does this alternative reading of Lindbeck effect Surin’s ‘two 
tracks’ characterization? 
 We see that for Rahner (according to Lindbeck), the explicit offer of 
redemption to an individual occurs “beyond our space and time.”81 But for Lindbeck, 
the offer of redemption and decisions about Christ are distinct movements within a 
single integrated cultural-linguistic process. The capacity to hear obtains only as one 
acquires a level of competence in the language and practice of the Christian 
community: “One must, in other words, learn the language of faith before one can 
know enough about its message knowingly to reject it and thus be lost.”82 Rather than 
result in a personal disjunction between this life and the afterlife, the cultural-
linguistic approach implies that death involves some kind of active communal process 
of transformation, which in turn implies some kind of duration. 
 For example, we can discern this process in Lindbeck’s description of 
Christian salvation: 
The Holy Spirit which is in them [Christians] is the pledge of, not the 
participation in, future glory. They have not yet learned to love God above all 
things and their neighbors as themselves, for this is what comes at the end of 
the road in eschatological fulfillment. What distinguishes their love from that 
of the non-Christian is, not its present subjective quality, but rather the fact 
that it is beginning to be shaped by the message of Jesus’ cross and 
resurrection. Only at the end of the road, only in the eschatological fulfillment, 
will they have learned to love God above all things and their neighbors as 
themselves.83 
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First, loving God above all things and one’s neighbor as oneself is a learning process. 
Second, this learning process is perfected within the form of life cultivated by the 
message of Jesus’ cross and resurrection (i.e., the church). Third, this learning process 
for Christians is not complete at the moment of death, because “only at the end of the 
road, only in the eschatological fulfillment, will they have learned.”84 This delineation 
is helpful in that it not only indicates a communal transformative process, but it also 
exposes a conceptual gap in Lindbeck’s fides ex auditu approach. That is to say, 
between the second and third points we see that Christians go from ‘still learning’ in 
this life to ‘have learned’ in the eschaton. To be sure, it may be this conspicuous jump 
from ‘not yet’ to ‘already’ that is the source of Surin’s dissatisfaction with Lindbeck’s 
view of time and personal identity. 
Yet it is important to also recognize that this anomaly in Lindbeck’s design 
represents a gap within the already existing structure of the cultural-linguistic project 
and is not itself a structural flaw. For instance, we might picture a newly constructed 
house where all the rooms are finished except one; where the kitchen should be there 
is an empty space – no flooring, no cabinets, no appliances. The absence of 
furnishings does not compromise the structure of the house, but everyone can agree 
that a ‘kitchen’ should occupy this space. So in order to move towards making the 
house habitable one might begin by sketching a layout that is conscious of the 
physical dimensions and intended purpose of the space, and which is consistent with 
the overall esthetic and design of the house. In other words, to fill this space and make 
it functional there is no need to demolish the house. 
 Similarly, because the idea that a person will obtain immediate communal 
competence in death goes against the whole tone, organization, and character of 
Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory of religions, perhaps a better method of 
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conjecture is to consider the logical flow of the material argument in which this 
conceptual gap exists. For instance, in regard to non-Christians, Lindbeck writes: 
Nonbelievers are not yet confronted by the question of salvation because it is 
only by acquiring some familiarity with the determinate settings in which 
religious utterances acquire propositional force that one can grasp their 
meaning well enough genuinely to reject (or accept) them.85 
 
Whereas Christians ‘have not yet learned,’ here we find that non-Christians ‘are not 
yet learning.’ So if we assume that from a cultural-linguistic perspective the 
movement from ‘not yet learning,’ to ‘learning,’ to ‘have learned’ involves a real 
process delimited by an unequivocal context and a measure of time – and if at the 
moment of death this process is incomplete for Christians and just beginning for non-
Christians – then we might also assume a certain symmetry exists between life before 
death and life after death in regard to the necessary conditions of faith. Conditions, 
according to Lindbeck, that include the proclamation of the gospel through word and 
deed, the hearing and receiving of the word through communal participation, and the 
salvific activity of the Holy Spirit: 
Faith, so the cultural-linguistic interpreter would say, comes from the 
acceptance and internalization of the external word (that is, the verbal, 
sacramental, and behavioral witness to Jesus Christ). The salvific role of the 
Holy Spirit is to join hearers and potential hearers (publically and communally 
and thereby internally) to that Word who is Jesus Christ.86 
 
Thus, perhaps a more natural conclusion is that in death an unevangelized person will 
encounter the gospel through acquiring the habitude of the community of faith so that 
their future encounter with Christ in the consummation will be with a practiced 
awareness of who he is. As this understanding relates to the Jewish victim, perhaps it 
means that she will receive a true witness to Christ in the intermediate state in a way 
that will not affect her freedom to choose in the eschaton. 
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Having said this, Surin argues that the prospective fides ex auditu approach 
causes the non-Christian to find themselves suddenly “‘in’ the church, regardless of 
whether or not they are disposed to reject Christ,”87 and to a certain extent he is 
correct. For if one can come to faith only within the life of the Christian community, 
and if death marks this opportunity for non-Christians, then the only logical 
conclusion is that when they die they will be ‘in’ the church. One thing to consider, 
however, is that from a cultural-linguistic perspective it is only from within the life of 
the church that the disposition to either accept or reject Christ even becomes 
possible.88 The logical frame here is that to be in Christ one must be in the church, but 
being in the church (i.e., one who is more or less learning the language of faith) does 
not necessarily mean one is also in Christ (i.e., having come to a point in which they 
are competent enough to accept or reject Christ). And according to Lindbeck, this 
situation is normative until the consummation when the true church will be revealed.89 
 Yet even if Lindbeck’s approach does not necessarily view non-Christians as a 
kind of tabula rasa in death, Surin’s objection does indicate another gap in his 
prospective theory. For if personal identity remains intact in death, then when a non-
Christian dies “he or she will be someone whose body had, in ‘this’ life, been the 
bearer of a quite specific set of cultural and social inscriptions.”90 Or as Stephen Stell 
writes: 
Lindbeck’s focus on the explicit faith of a cultural-linguistic tradition, and 
thus his emphasis on the future, is crucial; yet his polarization of experience 
and tradition, and thereby of present and future, is hermeneutically and 
theologically problematical. While one may affirm that the ‘final die’ is cast 
beyond our space-time existence, this does not mean that it can be so 
thoroughly severed from that existence. . . . Not that the final decision is 
necessarily made [before death]; but if there is any continuity to the ‘self’ after 
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death, surely the cultural-linguistic preparation for that decision will influence 
one’s abilities and orientations in making it.91 
 
We can assume that Lindbeck agrees with this statement, but he neglects to carry 
forward this theological datum into his prospective fides ex auditu option. As 
Marianne Moyaert observes: 
By emphasizing what happens in the eschaton so much, Lindbeck seems, first, 
to say that people no longer have these inscriptions after death. Second, he 
seems to suggest that the “falling away” of these specific social and cultural 
inscriptions makes people receptive to the gospel.92 
 
Thus, we find another gap between Lindbeck’s claim that other religions (other 
cultural-linguistic systems) can be viewed as “God-willed and God-approved 
anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom,” and his assertion that non-Christians 
begin learning the language of Christ only in death.93 Yet, as Moyaert suggests, one 
way to work through this issue theologically is to consider “the universal activity of 
the Spirit.”94 For if the salvific role of the Holy Spirit is to join “potential hearers” to 
Christ,95 then this might open up ways to explain the importance and relevance of a 
non-Christian’s form of life and personal identity in preparation for their encounter 
with the gospel and Christ in death. 
 
Some Tentative Conclusions 
 
 Lindbeck organizes his prospective theory in a way that seems to fit 
comfortably within the doctrinal environment of the solus Christus, sola fide, and 
fides ex auditu principles. First, he foregrounds the discussion by pointing out that 
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“the major doctrinal concern has been to preserve the Christus solus, not to deny the 
possibility of salvation to non-Christians,” and his notions of incommensurability and 
unsurpassability assure that his theory admits to no other way of salvation.96 Indeed, 
in a later writing he asserts that God “is the one who justifies, by grace alone, through 
faith alone, in Christ alone. This is the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae, the 
meta-dogma by which all other doctrines and uses of doctrine are to be judged.”97 
Second, by denying the need for the concept of implicit faith to explain the salvation 
of non-Christians, Lindbeck is able to use the scriptural precept of explicit faith as a 
ligature to bind together the solus Christus and sola fide principles. An approach 
which ensures that “saving faith cannot be wholly anonymous, wholly implicit, but 
must be in some measure explicit: it comes, as Paul puts it, ex auditu (Rom. 10:17).”98 
So epistemologically, the possible salvation of a non-Christian initiates only when 
they come into faith’s determinate setting. 
 Nevertheless, Lindbeck frames his proposal as a nontheological approach and 
his goal is merely to convince the reader “that the salvation of non-Christians in the 
eschatological future makes at least as much theological sense as the myth of a 
primordial, prelinguistic experience of the gratia Christi.”99 One result of this 
approach is that his prospective fides ex auditu option seems to raise more theological 
questions than it answers. First, when we recall the delineation of the doctrine of 
particular judgment from the introduction we see that Lindbeck is perhaps too quick 
to assume that Rahner’s position overcomes the teaching that a person’s eternal fate is 
fixed at death. To be sure, Rahner’s answer – that in death a person with implicit faith 
receives explicit faith and redemption – offers a creative way through the doctrinal 
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impasse, but it also opens him up to the full force of Surin’s argument concerning 
time, personal identity, and decisions for or against Christ. This section has sought to 
defend Lindbeck against some of these concerns, but if we have succeeded in this 
endeavor then we have also succeeded in showing how Lindbeck neglects the 
principle of particular judgment. For if an unevangelized person does not come into 
the necessary conditions of faith until after death, then what else can their acceptance 
be but a postmortem conversion? 
 A second related problem in need of theological attention is that Lindbeck’s 
description of the eschatological moment of ultimate decisions includes all people 
generally with no distinction of persons. Perhaps by giving careful attention to the 
doctrine of particular judgment there could be a way for him to argue that the sola 
fide and fides ex auditu principles make it nomologically possible that an 
unevangelized person will have the opportunity to learn the language of faith after 
death before the eschatological judgment, but his general explanation of the 
possibility leaves little recourse for him to explain how his theory is any different 
from other ‘second chance’ options. Maybe it is not. 
 Third, bracketing out the doctrine of particular judgment, let us recall the 
observation that Lindbeck’s prospectus fides ex auditu approach implies some kind of 
duration after death as people must acquire a certain level of proficiency in the 
language of Christ. We described this facet as a conceptual gap in his theory and also 
visualized it as an empty space in an otherwise furnished house. In this way, we were 
able to see that it is the active presence of the Holy Spirit and the witnessing church 
that should occupy this space in Lindbeck’s theory, but his cultural-linguistic 
structure does not provide any theological resources for furnishing this conceptual 
space between death and resurrection, and yet this material is greatly needed. 
Dovetailing with this concern, we also identified a conceptual gap between his claim 
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that other religions have a present missions value and his assertion that the salvific 
possibility for non-Christians begins only in death. Thus, his alternative solution fails 
to account for how the cultural-linguistic self-identity of a non-Christian prepares 
them for a future encounter with the gospel of Christ. Keeping these issues in mind, 
let us now consider the prospective fides ex auditu approaches of DiNoia and 
D’Costa. 
 
Joseph DiNoia’s Prospective Theory 
 
 The chief focus of this section is the prospective theory of Gavin D’Costa. But 
as he follows Joseph DiNoia in his development of a prospective approach, we will 
begin our assessment with a cursory description of DiNoia’s proposal.100 In his book, 
The Diversity of Religions, DiNoia dispenses with the notion of implicit faith and the 
idea that other religious structures can mediate salvation, and he appropriates instead 
Lindbeck’s idea of the “unsubstitutable uniqueness” of other religions within God’s 
salvific plan.101 In this way, he suggests that while religions differ in their claims to 
ultimate reality, this need not rule out the possibility that certain moral aspects of non-
Christian religions could end up being a boon to salvation rather than part of that 
which will be forfeit in the consummation. So while these moral aspects do not 
produce a present salvific effect, they might nonetheless function as a preparatio 
evangelica orienting a person towards salvation at a future time. DiNoia explains: 
A theology of religions developed along these lines could acknowledge the 
goodness and uprightness of other religious people without ascribing 
immediate salvific value to these qualities. . . . 
 At the same time, appropriate Christian valuations of such qualities 
could be framed in terms of an “eschatological” rather than a present salvific 
value. The specific ways in which the presently observable and assessable 
conduct and dispositions of non-Christians will conduce to their future 
salvation are now hidden from view and known only to God.102 
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His point here is a practical one. Christians can affirm that non-Christians are within 
the purview of God’s salvific plan without imposing a direct Christian significance to 
their religious beliefs and practices. They can trust that “other religious communities, 
while pursuing their distinctive aims, foster rather than obstruct the development in 
their members of the disposition to attain and enjoy the true end of life, fellowship 
with the Blessed Trinity.”103 
 DiNoia insists that this kind of prospective view means Christians can accept 
the moral practices and doctrinal self-descriptions of other religious communities at 
face value, while also ascribing “an indirect contributory (broadly providential rather 
than specifically salvific) value to them.”104 In this way, if part of their socially 
constructed self includes elements of preparatio evangelica, then a person’s cultural-
linguistic inscriptions plays a vital part in their eschatological salvation. Nevertheless, 
how does a non-Christian move from merely having a disposition that is conducive to 
Christian fellowship to actually having a personal relationship with God if they die 
before hearing the gospel? DiNoia suggests that this issue might be overcome “by 
appeal to the doctrine of purgatory.”105 
 Similar to what we observed with Lindbeck, DiNoia’s theoretical framework 
does not envision the possibility of moving from the state of a partially fostered 
disposition to a state of full fellowship with the Triune God outside a real interval of 
personal transformation. Indeed, he notes Surin’s complaint against Lindbeck’s view 
of time and identity and points out that “between earthly life and the life to come . . . 
the doctrine of purgatory supposes a real continuity: a link obtains between purgation 
in this life and purgation in the next.”106 And given DiNoia’s assertion that salvific 
                                               
103 Ibid., 67; a description DiNoia sees as being consistent with Vatican II, see no3. 
104 Ibid., 90. 
105 Ibid., 104. 
106 Ibid., 191. 
 
 162 
knowledge “is ineradicably particular insofar as it is transmitted in sources entrusted 
by God to the Christian community,” this transformative process for him also 
involves the active presence of the witnessing church.107 Moreover, DiNoia addresses 
the doctrinal principle of particular judgment stating that the notion of purgatory 
cannot be used to support life-changing decisions after death: 
The interval between individual judgment and the general judgment cannot be 
considered as one in which conversion could now occur when none had taken 
place prior to death, or that the fundamental orientation of one’s life could be 
altered. The decisions taken in life cannot turn out to have been irrelevant to 
the shape of the life to come.108 
 
The key idea here is that those who die with a disposition conducive to fellowship 
with God might be able to continue moving towards this destination in purgatory. 
Except that in the case of non-Christians, DiNoia insists that “purgatory would 
involve the realization of the continuities as well as the discontinuities between what 
they had practiced and believed and what is indeed the case about the true aim of 
life.”109 Thus he argues that their salvation does not involve a postmortem reversal of 
life-shaping decisions, but embraces a process of personal transformation that is 
consistent with the decisions made in life as shaped by moral elements within their 
cultural-religious environments.110 
 
Gavin D’Costa’s Further Development of DiNoia 
 
 In his book Christianity and World Religions, D’Costa grounds his discussion 
of the unevangelized in the express teaching of the Roman Catholic Church – that a 
non-Christian can be saved – and “the problems thus left unresolved” by this 
affirmation.111 For instance, Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium states: 
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Those also can attain to salvation who through no fault of their own do not 
know the Gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely seek God and moved 
by grace strive by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them through the 
dictates of conscience.112 
 
The difficulty in working out this statement is that the Catholic Church also teaches 
that salvation, even for the unevangelized, “is always given by means of Christ in the 
Spirit and has a mysterious relationship to the Church.”113 So the question is, how can 
a person who does not know Christ and his church receive salvation if it is always 
given through this very knowledge? D’Costa says the “usual answer” given by 
Catholic theologians is that good non-Christians “can implicitly know Christ and his 
church through an implicit or unconscious desire.”114 Yet he argues that this response 
does not explain how these people are saved in an eschatological sense, because “final 
salvation requires not only an ontological and causal, but also an epistemological 
relationship to Christ.”115 More precisely: 
This salvation won by Christ is only available through faith in Christ, which 
comes from hearing the gospel preached in this life or the next (fides ex 
auditu), requiring repentance, baptism, and the embracing of a new life in 
Christ.116 
 
From this position, D’Costa claims that the postmortem option “is actually implied in 
. . . Roman Catholicism” through the resources provided by the confession of Christ’s 
descent into hell (from the Apostles’ Creed).117 
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To set up his argument, D’Costa begins by characterizing the type of 
unevangelized person the Catholic Church teaches can attain salvation by introducing 
a hypothetical scenario involving a practicing Buddhist called Jane, who has never 
heard the gospel but “has lived a good life, following the truth to the best of her 
ability in the light of her conscience”; also, “it is assumed that possibilities of the 
good, true, and beautiful life might be found in positive elements within her religion” 
– i.e., opportunities for her to respond “to the promptings of the Holy Spirit.”118 With 
this description in place, he states: 
The question is: how can original and personal sins be forgiven, how can 
persons consciously share in the beatific vision, how can they participate in 
the joy and glory of the risen Lord, without knowing Christ and his church in 
any possible way when they die as a non-Christian?119 
 
In other words, how does one account for the fides ex auditu in the salvation of Jane? 
  One observation at this point is that while DiNoia ascribes only a future-
oriented salvific value to aspects of other religions, D’Costa does not hesitate to 
ascribe a present-tense salvific value to these elements. This is not to say that he 
thinks Jane is now saved; he maintains that there is no salvation outside an objective 
relation to Christ and his church (e.g., the problem question above). Rather, in light of 
his reading of the Vatican II statements on non-Christians and other religions, 
D’Costa seeks to affirm “that there are elements, not structures, of grace within 
them.”120 Similar to DiNoia, he posits a future-oriented salvation and yet argues 
further for a present-tense relation to grace and the work of the Holy Spirit (through 
conscience and “positive elements” within the religion).121 It is, then, from this 
perspective that he circumscribes the problem further, stating: 
Ontologically, they have become “related” to the reality of God through grace, 
but epistemologically do not know God in the way God has revealed himself 
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so that the lack of unity between the epistemological and ontological is deeply 
unsatisfactory, for the beatific vision requires both.122 
 
He suggests that the statements from Lumen Gentium and Dominus Iesus encourage 
an after-death solution to the dilemma, and in search of a resolution he follows the 




 As mentioned earlier, implied in the doctrine of particular judgment is the 
notion that a person’s eternal fate is fixed at death. D’Costa highlights this doctrinal 
principle by noting Augustine’s denial of postmortem conversion and he points out 
that “Lindbeck’s solution falls foul of the Augustinian prohibition against such 
changes and freedom after death.”124 On the other hand, while DiNoia’s solution 
seeks to uphold this prohibition D’Costa argues that there is an internal tension in his 
theory. This tension is caused by two conflicting claims: “Other religions should be 
seen as professing different means and ends to that of Christianity while at the same 
time, he argues, non-Christians in these religions may be justified or in a state of 
grace.”125 The problem is, if the particular aims of other religions are not 
Christological and their means are not ecclesiological, then how can they orient 
members towards the beatific vision? 
Furthermore, even if the moral elements within other religions do indeed 
develop the dispositions of members to attain fellowship with God, D’Costa states, “I 
question whether purgatory can be assimilated to the non-Christian without further 
argument, as it has traditionally been understood as the process for those who are 
already epistemologically ‘in Christ.’”126 In other words, the established 
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understanding of purgatory is that it is an opportunity extended to Christians alone; 
for instance: 
If those truly penitent have departed in the love of God, before they have made 
satisfaction by worthy fruits of penance for sins of commission and omission, 
the souls of these are cleansed after death by purgatorial punishments; and so 
that they may be released from punishments of this kind, the suffrages of the 
living faithful are of advantage to them, namely, the sacrifices of Masses, 
prayers, and almsgiving, and other works of piety, which are customarily 
performed by the faithful for other faithful according to the institutions of the 
Church.127 
 
According to this Roman Catholic formulation, DiNoia’s good non-Christians need 
explicit faith before they can enter purgatory (e.g., suffrages ‘performed by the 
faithful for other faithful’). So the question is, how does a non-Christian who dies 
with a disposition conducive to faith subsequently obtain faith through hearing the 
proclamation of the gospel when, in principle, the purgatorial doors are close to non-
Christians? D’Costa argues that incorporating the doctrine of Christ’s descent into 
hell, as it relates to the traditional teaching on the limbo of the just, will help resolve 
this issue. He writes, “Given the various dogmatic parameters, . . . only in the event of 
the ‘descent’ does the unity of the epistemological and ontological take place to 
answer satisfactorily the question about Jane.”128 
 
Christ’s Descent and the Limbo of the Just 
 
 D’Costa recognizes that the theology of Christ’s descent into hell presents “a 
complex and shifting picture,” so he seeks to frame the discussion by noting some of 
the more consistent elements within the Roman Catholic tradition.129 First, he 
explains that in Catholic theology hell consists of four dimensions: 1) hell proper, 
which is “the place of damnation” and “a perduring reality”; 2) the limbo of 
unbaptized infants, “a state that has always been disputed” and “if it exists, is a 
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perduring reality”; 3) the limbo of the just, “empty after Christ’s descent” and “not a 
perduring reality”; and 4) purgatory, “a place of purification.”130 Second, D’Costa 
considers the traditional Catholic interpretation of the doctrine of descent in light of 
the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar.131 
The general understanding of the descent is that while Christ’s victory on the 
cross was made known throughout all the levels of hell, he redeemed only those in the 
limbo of the just. Yet D’Costa explains that “Balthasar argues that the limbos and 
purgatory are irrelevant” to the doctrine of descent, because “death and damnation are 
the outcome of sin.”132 In other words, Christ not only had to experience death but 
also alienation, which means “the Son descends into the depths of damnation,”133 an 
assertion that looks rather different from the traditional view but which Edward Oakes 
nonetheless insists represents “a legitimate doctrinal development.”134 The reason for 
this insistence, says D’Costa, is that Oakes argues for Balthasar’s solution for the 
descent into hell in relation to non-Christians because “it allows Christ to ‘bestow 
grace eschatologically on whom he will’ (2007, 188); which means that all non-
Christians might be saved.”135 Yet D’Costa is unsatisfied with this quasi-universalism 
position, and he turns next to Alyssa Pitstick’s critical evaluation of Balthasar’s 
theology.136 
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D’Costa explains that for Pitstick, Balthasar’s theology is not a doctrinal 
development but rather it “corrupts a true doctrine.”137 Indeed, she argues that the 
definitive Catholic teaching is that Christ’s redeeming work was finished on the cross 
and that the descent was “Christ’s application of the fruit of redemption.”138 D’Costa 
agrees with Pitstick, stating: “I would conclude that Balthasar’s descent into hell 
teaching is both in danger of contradicting the teachings of the Catholic church, . . . 
and in danger of advancing a deeply problematic Christology and trinitarian doctrine 
of God.”139 For if Christ experienced genuine alienation, then he experienced an 
ontological separation from the Father resulting in “a rupture in the Godhead.”140 
Thus D’Costa maintains that Christ descended “in his soul to the limbo of the just and 
not in this manner to the other regions, although his power and authority are known in 
all four regions through his descent.”141 
Finally, he points out that the early teaching on the subject “was grounded on 
a number of biblical texts: 
The most important being Luke 16:22 – the parable of Dives and Lazarus at 
“Abraham’s bosom”; Luke 23:43 – where Jesus on the cross tells the penitent 
thief that “today you shall be with me in paradise”; Ephesians 4:9 – where 
Paul says that before Jesus ascended he “also descended first into the lower 
parts of the earth”; and 1 Peter 3:10-4:6.142 
 
He then states that the 1 Peter passage (which speaks of Christ’s proclamation “to the 
spirits in prison” - 3:19) “is probably the most pivotal,” and he proceeds to give a 
concise survey of the patristic interpretation of this passage.143 
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 D’Costa begins with Clement of Alexandria (150-215) who argues that 
because it is the work of Christ to save, his descent into hell occasioned salvation for 
both the Jew and the non-Jew alike. For example, Clement declares, “Do not the 
Scriptures show the Lord preached the Gospel to those that perished in the flood?”144 
D’Costa says that in this way, Clement initiated “a long tradition that includes both 
Jews and pagans in the limbo of the just.”145 Yet he also highlights Clement’s use of 
the Shepherd of Hermas (first or second century), which teaches that when the 
apostles and other teachers of the gospel died they went and preached to those who 
had “fallen asleep” before them, so that these too might be “made to know the name 
of the Son of God” and be saved.146 
 Another interpretation he notes is from Origen (184-254), who reads 1 Peter 
3:19-20 (and Ezekiel 16:53) as a message of hope. For Origen, God’s just punishment 
of sinners is given “with the prospect of improvement, . . . of which hope Peter 
himself thus speaks in his first Epistle” concerning those destroyed in the flood.147 
However, D’Costa is careful to point out that “in his response to Celsus (Against 
Celsus 2.43), Origen says Christ converted only those ‘who were suitable and were 
willing to hear him’ (30), which runs counter to any easy universalism.”148 He also 
mentions Cyril of Alexandria (378-444) and John Damascene (676-749) as examples 
of those in the Greek church who maintained Origen’s interpretation of the 1 Peter 
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passage – “although John is very clear that Christ saves only the righteous who 
deserve salvation.”149 Finally, he turns to Augustine (354-430) in the Latin tradition in 
order to concentrate on his reading of the 1 Peter passage and his prohibition against 
postmortem conversion. 
 D’Costa explains that Augustine “suggests 1 Peter 3-4 be understood as 
Christ’s pre-existent nature preaching to Noah’s sinful contemporaries during their 
lifetime, through the person of Noah.”150 For example, in Augustine’s comparison of 
the nature and purpose of the flood event with the present age of the church, he 
writes: 
For that transaction had been typical of future events, so that those who do not 
believe the gospel in our age, when the Church is being built up in all nations, 
may be understood to be like those who did not believe in that age [during the 
time of Noah].151 
 
D’Costa also claims that Augustine’s commentary on this point argues that the 
passage refers “to those who responded positively to Noah’s/Christ’s teaching just 
before the flood.”152 So even though the flood destroyed those who had repented, 
these particular souls were permitted a place among the just in limbo to await the 
completion of their salvation in Christ. He writes, “Without necessarily following 
Augustine’s interpretation of the pre-existent Christ operating in Noah, the descent 
was increasingly understood as Christ’s coming to set the just free, rather than 
preaching the gospel to those who had earlier rejected God.”153 
We should note, however, that while D’Costa is correct regarding Augustine’s 
Noah/Christ interpretation, it was not Augustine who considered the possibility that 
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some people repented before dying in the flood. Rather, as Stephen Bullivant notes, 
“this reading belongs to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit cardinal (and 
later saint and Doctor of the Church) Robert Bellarmine.”154 For Augustine, the very 
fact that these people perished in the flood is itself proof that they rejected the gospel, 
and there is then no hope for their salvation.155 Nevertheless, in light of the fathers’ 
use of the teaching of Christ’s descent into hell to explain the salvation of Jews who 
died before the incarnation, and the tradition which includes righteous non-Jews in the 
limbo of the just, D’Costa writes: 
Can we analogically argue that the limbo of the just must conceptually exist in 
relation to non-Christians like Jane who are in a similar situation to the pre-
Christian just? . . . The answer I think is a yes and a no.156 
 
As regards this yes and no answer, D’Costa explains that one obstacle to an easy 
comparison is in the teaching that after his resurrection Christ emptied the limbo of 
the just, and “if the limbo of the just is empty, . . . then the analogy breaks down.”157 
He proposes a solution to this dilemma, referring to the penitent thief on the 
cross in Luke 23:40-43 (sometimes called Dismas) he observes that “most of the 
fathers” say that after his death Dismas is located in “the limbo of the just [i.e., 
paradise], not in heaven (for no one could enter until Christ’s resurrection).”158 And 
because Dismas was both a recent convert and a recent thief, we might assume he was 
not ready for the beatific vision when Christ opened the doors of heaven at the time of 
his ascension, so perhaps Dismas, along with the repentant souls who perished in the 
flood (from his reading of Augustine), “still require ‘time’ to mature into the new life 
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of faith that they had begun.”159 D’Costa concludes that even though Christ emptied 
the limbo of the just and opened the doors of heaven after his resurrection, this does 
not necessarily mean that everyone was prepared to experience the Blessed Trinity at 
that time. He states, “I am not arguing that Christ is unable to transform the individual 
instantaneously. Rather, from the human point of view, if one inhabitant of the limbo 
of the just, Dismas for example, might still require purification, why not others?”160 
 Another objection D’Costa addresses is in regard to the special status of Israel 
as a covenant people. He asserts that while other religions are in no way comparable 
to “the sui generis nature of Judaism, both after and before the time of Christ,” the 
analogy may yet lie in the fact that Christ’s descent completes what is lacking for 
those who were on their way to salvation before their death.161 Therefore he suggests 
that “if the righteous Jew is not said to ‘convert,’ but rather to come to fulfillment, it 
is fair to conclude that this is also possibly true, with a very different sense of 
fulfillment, in the case of the righteous pagan.”162 That is to say, as Christ’s descent 
into the limbo of the just explains how those who were ontologically related to God 
before death became epistemologically related to Christ after death, perhaps a 
qualified application of this teaching will also support a similar explanation for the 
salvation of good non-Christians since the time of Christ’s ascension. 
 With this delineation in mind, we can now observe that the chief elements of 
D’Costa’s theory are: 1) the Roman Catholic Church’s affirmation that certain non-
Christians can be saved; 2) an emphasis of Christ’s descent into hell in relation to the 
limbo of the just; 3) the patristic inclusion of good non-Jews with those who benefited 
from Christ’s descent into hell; and 4) the notion that Christ’s descent not only 
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emptied the limbo of the just but also opened the doors of purgatory for those in need 
of further transformation. D’Costa concludes: 
First, the limbo of the just conceptually explains the entry of non-Christians 
into a relationship with Christ and his church, and their subsequent enjoyment 
of the beatific vision. Second, the limbo of the just illuminates the necessity of 
Christ and the church as a means of salvation and unites the ontological 
(which has already begun in this life, in ways that have already been 
articulated in part – through conscience, through noble and good elements 
within a person’s religion, through the activity of grace and the Holy Spirit in 
both these modes) with the epistemological, thus allowing the fulfillment of 
salvation to come about and addressing the entire cluster of problems related 
to Jane. Third, conceptually, it is very likely that some of the just, after their 
encounter with Christ and his church in the analogical space of the limbo of 
the just, will require purification, and then they, like their Christian brothers 
and sisters, may enter the Christological fires of purgatory.163 
 
He reiterates that the postmortem response to the gospel by the good non-Christian 
does not constitute a conversion, “but a coming to maturation and completion.”164 
 
A Critical Review of D’Costa’s Proposal 
 
 Before proceeding we should note that along with the teaching of Christ’s 
descent into hell, the limbo of the just, and purgatory D’Costa’s argument also 
includes the Roman Catholic teaching on the “Eucharistic mediation” of the church 
and the tradition regarding the children’s limbo.165 To be sure, his proposal deserves a 
review which attends to all its composite parts, and it is only for the sake of our 
intended goal that we have limited our assessment of his theory to just a few 
elements. Our primary interlocutors for this assessment will be Tan Loe Joo, Wouter 
Biesbrouck (Protestant), and Stephen Bullivant (Roman Catholic).166 
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 In the initial development of his theology of religions D’Costa followed 
Rahner’s version of inclusivism, which proposes that other religions serve as 
provisional salvific structures by which non-Christians can be saved.167 D’Costa no 
longer holds this view, and one important reason for this change is that “the fides ex 
auditu is missing from Rahner’s position.”168 So while he still maintains that non-
Christians are ontologically united to God through their positive response to elements 
(not structures) of grace and the activity of the Spirit within their religions, he also 
argues that outside hearing the gospel with faith these elements are insufficient for 
salvation. As Wouter Biesbrouck explains: 
Whereas for Rahner, it seems that this causal and ontological link with 
God/Christ is sufficient for the salvation of the non-Christian, it is not so for 
D’Costa. . . . The implication is that non-Christians, who are linked to Christ 
in an ontological way, must also be confronted with Christ epistemologically 
in one way or another.169 
 
Therefore, D’Costa seeks to develop a proposal that is able to maintain the tension 
between Vatican II’s statements on the possibility of salvation for non-Christians and 
the biblical principle of hearing with faith. Nevertheless, Tan surveys a broad 
spectrum of D’Costa’s work in the theology of religions and insists that a critical 
theological shift occurs within his main statements on the subject in regard to the 
universal salvific will of God and his notion of universal salvific grace.170 
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 Tan begins by noting D’Costa’s confirmation of the universality of God’s 
salvific will in one of his early works, Theology and Religious Pluralism,171 and then 
compares it to a later work, stating: 
Subsequently, in his paper, “Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions”, 
this universality axiom became modified as, “God loves and desires the 
salvation of all men and women, thereby emphasising the universality of 
grace.” . . . There is an unaccounted movement here from the assertion of a 
universal salvific will to universal salvific grace which affects the subsequent 
trajectory of his theology.172 
 
To demonstrate this trajectory he turns to D’Costa’s next monograph, The Meeting of 
Religions and the Trinity,173 in which the “underlying assumption of a priori grace 
remains” and where, says Tan, “the categories of natural and supernatural grace were 
collapsed such that all grace is viewed as salvific and universal.”174 Indeed, perhaps 
the most telling example of this ‘collapse’ of grace is when D’Costa suggests that it is 
possible for one to hold that other religions are not salvific per se, “while holding at 
the same time, without contradiction, that supernatural saving grace is operative in 
other religions and that in those other religions there is much that is true, good, and 
holy.”175 It is one thing to claim that grace is present in other religions, but another 
thing altogether to call this grace ‘saving.’ Tan concludes: 
Given the prior assertion of salvific grace to be found universally, the 
conclusion of “Christ-like” religious Others to be found in the religions is 
almost theologically inevitable, and does not appear to differ in kind from the 
theory of anonymous Christians, even though he had rejected Rahnerian 
transcendental anthropology and posited a closer Spirit-Christ connection. 
Because of the lack of a clear economic connection between grace with the 
operations of the Spirit and Christ, the subsequent outworking of his theology 
at times seems more governed by an implicit theology of grace rather than the 
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operations of the divine Persons as should befit a Trinitarian theology of 
religions.176 
 
This is an interesting argument. Tan claims that while D’Costa has rejected Rahner’s 
notion of implicit saving faith he has nonetheless replaced it with a notion of 
equivalent consequence – i.e., implicit saving grace. 
To support his assertion, Tan highlights D’Costa’s analogical use of the limbo 
of the just for explaining the salvation of non-Christians. He writes: 
Placing the non-Christian in the limbo of the just suggests the non-Christian 
occupies a theological position analogous to the OT Fathers, which 
contravenes his own assertion of a sui generis Judaism-Christianity 
connection.177 
 
His argument is that D’Costa’s utilization of Christ’s descent into limbo for satisfying 
the fides ex auditu principle obscures a crucial difference between the Old Testament 
righteous and the good non-Christian. That is, the righteous Old Testament figures 
were not in limbo merely because they responded positively to elements of grace 
outside the covenant, but “because they had already exhibited fides through the 
hearing of God’s Word proclaimed by the OT prophets.”178 Thus Tan argues that 
D’Costa’s construal of Jane “runs the danger of downplaying the special revelation 
received by the Fathers, over-elevating the significance of the general revelation she 
has received, and casts doubts on his system’s ability to preserve a singular Judaism-
Christianity relationship.”179 To be sure, D’Costa claims that his analogous 
application does not have in view “the reality of the covenant embedded within Israel, 
which is not embedded in other religions,” but rather “the righteousness that might be 
present within Israel and other religions.”180 Yet Tan’s concern remains valid to the 
extent that the qualifications for ‘righteousness’ – and thus entrance into the limbo of 
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the just – includes Old Testament figures having been the particular recipients of the 
messianic promise. So while D’Costa’s analogy hinges on the notion of Old 
Testament righteousness, this righteousness was still contingent upon an act of 
believing God’s proclaimed word. 
 The point here is not that the Old Testament figures knew the person of Jesus 
before his descent, but that like Abraham (and the analogy concerns ‘the bosom of 
Abraham’) they possessed an explicit faith in the promise of a Savior. And when we 
look to Abraham as the exemplar of faith we find that instead of being something that 
is added to an already existing righteousness, the explicit act of faith itself signifies 
the beginning of righteousness (Gen 15:6; Rom 4:3). This is not to deny God’s 
gracious work among non-Christians through the Spirit’s activity or to say that a non-
Christian cannot be deemed ‘good,’ ‘just,’ or even ‘righteous’ simply because they 
lack Christian faith. Rather, it is to say that perhaps further argument is needed before 
the analogical doors of the limbo of the just can be opened to non-Christians.  
 Finally, just as it is important for DiNoia that a non-Christian be able to die 
“justified or in the state of grace” so that they might thereby gain entrance into 
purgatory,181 it is also important for D’Costa that a non-Christian be able to “begin to 
participate in the life of the triune God” before death so that their response after death 
“does not require conversion.”182 For his part, D’Costa stops short of claiming that a 
non-Christian can die in a state of justification, but he nonetheless argues that the 
good non-Christian (e.g., Jane) has an ontological relation with Christ through ‘saving 
grace.’183 Yet what remains uncertain is the exact nature of Jane’s ontological relation 
to Christ. Presumably it is a state of grace, but how is this particular work of grace 
deemed ‘supernatural’ and ‘saving’ when it occurs outside the church’s proclamation 
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of the gospel of Christ? For as D’Costa himself affirms, “Based purely on tracing the 
contours of what scripture permits us to say: as far as we know the conditions of 
salvation require solus Christus, fides ex auditu, and extra ecclesiam nulla salus.”184 
Yet if salvation is through Christ alone by faith alone and faith comes from hearing 
the church’s proclamation of the gospel, then what else can Jane’s postmortem 
response to the gospel be except a conversion? As Bullivant states: 
It could be argued that D’Costa minimizes here what one might call the 
necessary newness of faith. This may be seen most clearly if Jane’s post-
mortem ‘coming to maturation and completion’ is instead extrapolated 
backwards into her earthly life. Suppose, then, that she is ‘existentially’ 
confronted with the gospel proclamation while still alive, and hence leaves 
Buddhism in order to be baptized into the Catholic Church. In this case, one 
would surely be justified in speaking of ‘conversion’. . . . Jane herself may 
well view her becoming a Christian as ‘a fulfillment of what was already 
present [...] coming to its full maturation’ (172). Yet she would almost 
certainly regard it as being something more besides (perhaps incalculably so), 
and as very much ‘a new decision’.185 
 
Based on D’Costa’s approach we can assume that all who obtain faith in Christ when 
confronted with the gospel are also those who have already been responding 
positively to the “elements of preparatio evangelica that allow God’s grace to work 
toward the final salvation of such persons.”186 Yet, as Bullivant points out, if this 
moment of decision constitutes a conversion in life before death, then why should the 
nature of this decision be any different for those who are confronted by the gospel 
after death? 
 Let us take stock. Jane, who is a Buddhist, responds positively to the good and 
beautiful elements in her religion through her conscience and through the work of 
grace and the Holy Spirit through these elements and is thereby on her way to 
salvation. She is not saved insofar as her response is not yet secured by faith, but she 
is nonetheless ontologically related to Christ through her positive response and is 
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186 D’Costa, Christianity and World Religions, 211. 
 
 179 
therefore on her way to salvation. In death she will receive faith and this prospective 
fides ex auditu solution is countenanced largely through an analogical application of 
Christ’s descent into the limbo of the just and the doctrine of purgatory. Our noted 
concerns, then, revolve around one main issue – the nature and work of grace in 
Jane’s life before her death. For if this grace is ‘saving’ then in effect Jane is saved 
before faith. If, however, this grace only orients her towards salvation then her 
decision to accept faith in Christ after death must constitute a conversion. 
 
A Few Observations and Tentative Suggestions 
 
  Recall Tan’s accusation that D’Costa collapses natural and supernatural grace 
within the notion of God’s universal salvific will; that “there is an unaccounted 
movement here from the assertion of a universal salvific will to universal salvific 
grace which affects the subsequent trajectory of his theology.”187 With this in mind, 
Tan insists that D’Costa’s theory lacks “a clear economic connection between grace 
with the operations of the Spirit and Christ.”188 We suggested that the difficulty lies 
with D’Costa’s use of the terms ‘salvific,’ ‘saving,’ and ‘supernatural’ for describing 
this universal grace, and tentatively concluded that his theory needs further 
explanation concerning the nature and function of grace outside the context of gospel 
proclamation and faith. 
 To this purpose, we might look more closely to the theological environment in 
which D’Costa makes his argument; i.e., Roman Catholicism. For instance, Ludwig 
Ott explains that in its “wider sense” natural grace refers to “the Creation and gifts of 
the natural order, such as bodily health and mental soundness.”189 Yet Catholic 
theology also teaches that a person, by nature, is able to “perform good works without 
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help of Divine grace, by his natural powers alone” and “can know God by the sole 
light of reason” (albeit in a limited way mixed with error).190 Nevertheless, because of 
“the ‘wound of ignorance’ . . . caused by the Fall” no one is saved by natural grace 
alone, which requires ‘supernatural’ grace bestowed through “supernatural 
Revelation” (i.e., Scripture and tradition through the Roman Catholic Church).191 So 
even though a person can know something about God and can do good works through 
‘the sole light of reason’ and by their own ‘natural powers,’ this natural achievement 
in no way merits saving grace nor does it constitute a preparation for grace. As Ott 
states, “A natural positive disposition for grace is not possible, since between nature 
and grace there is no inner proportion.”192 In other words, if a person has a positive 
disposition for grace (i.e., for saving grace), this is due solely to the supernatural work 
of God “which intrinsically moves the soul, that is, actual grace by way of preparation 
for the reception of sanctifying grace.”193 Hence, the issue for D’Costa and other 
Catholic theologians is in how to explain “the way in which the salvific grace of God 
– which is always given by means of Christ in the Spirit and has a mysterious 
relationship to the church – comes to individual non-Christians.”194 How does a 
person who has only natural grace receive supernatural preparation for saving grace? 
 D’Costa’s proposal is that the Vatican II position appears to expand the 
traditional understanding of preparatio evangelica so that what was once viewed as 
strictly ‘natural’ elements might now be understood in supernatural terms.195 As noted 
above, D’Costa does not suggest that other religions are alternative ways of salvation, 
but that perhaps good and true elements within them function as supernatural means 
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by which an unevangelized person can become ontologically related to Christ.196 Yet 
it is this very point to which Tan objects, saying that without this distinction between 
natural and supernatural grace the categories of grace are “collapsed such that all 
grace is viewed as salvific and universal.”197 But a closer reading may show that 
D’Costa has a rather different interpretation in mind. 
 Tan uses a partial quote from The Meeting of Religions to support his claim 
that D’Costa’s theory collapses the categories of grace, which states, “Thus, the grace 
in other religions was seen as ‘not in terms of a division between the grace of creation 
and the grace of salvation.’”198 But the context of this statement is D’Costa’s 
summation of two writings by Pope John Paul II regarding the Council’s position on 
other religions.199 In short, the Pope emphasizes the preparatio evangelica while also 
affirming the Holy Spirit’s work through that which is good and true in the world. For 
example, in Redemptoris Missio he states, “Whatever the Spirit brings about in human 
hearts and in the history of peoples, in cultures and religions serves as a preparation 
for the Gospel and can only be understood in reference to Christ.”200 D’Costa’s 
conclusion, then, is that based on the statements by Pope John Paul II and the 
Council, although other religions do not serve as salvific structures, 
it is also clear that the grace encountered in non-Christian religions is viewed 
as a preparatio evangelica, though not in terms of a division between the 
grace of creation and the grace of salvation, or of natural and supernatural 
grace, but only because within the historical church is this grace finally 
properly ordered toward its eschatological fulfillment. Therefore, this grace is 
“not an alternative to Christ.”201 
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 His point is that ‘this grace’ does not fit into the traditional division of natural and 
supernatural grace per se. For this grace is like natural grace in that it occurs outside 
the church’s proclamation of the gospel and is thereby, in itself, insufficient for 
salvation. Yet it is also like supernatural grace in that it is a work of the Holy Spirit to 
prepare a person for the gospel. Thus, we find that rather than a collapse of categories 
D’Costa’s theory seeks to address the need for defining how the Spirit draws 
individuals outside the church towards an eschatological salvation in Christ. As he 
asserts in Christianity and World Religions, his solution 
allows for the real variety of religious ends in the world’s religions, while still 
recognizing that within these differences there may be sufficient elements of 
preparatio evangelica that allow God’s grace to work toward the final 
salvation of such persons.202 
 
If we consider D’Costa’s example of Jane, then the idea here is that Jane is not merely 
responding to “the light of her conscience” and to “the good, true, and beautiful . . . 
found in positive elements within her religion,” but in doing so she “is acting in 
response to the promptings of the Holy Spirit.”203 
 That said, until this particular grace is labeled and better defined, Tan’s 
objection remains valid. For if, as D’Costa rightly claims, the true and good elements 
by which this grace is mediated do not constitute supernatural revelation, and if this 
grace is still insufficient for salvation, then calling it ‘salvific,’ ‘saving,’ and 
‘supernatural’ only confuses the point. Moreover, as regards the ecumenical 
discussion, Protestant theology (especially in the Reformed tradition) does not often 
distinguish the grace present among all people and the grace given only to believers 
as ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural.’ Unlike the Catholic view, Protestant theology holds 
that by nature a person cannot reason their way towards God nor perform morally 
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good acts. As Herman Bavinck states, “Nothing good remained in fallen man; all his 
thoughts, words, and deeds were polluted by sin.”204 Therefore the existence of the 
good, true, and beautiful in the world is not due to nature, but to divine intervention, 
and in this way the distinction is expressed as common grace (also called ‘general’ or 
‘universal’ grace) and special grace, so that common grace includes not only physical 
blessings but also the divine restraint of sin. P. E. Hughes explains: 
Were it not for the restraining hand of God, indeed, our world would long 
since have degenerated into a self-destructive chaos of iniquity, in which 
social order and community life would have been an impossibility. That a 
measure of domestic, political, and international harmony is enjoyed by the 
generality of humankind is due to the overruling goodness of God.205 
 
From this perspective, we can say that in a technical sense both common grace and 
special grace are forms of ‘supernatural’ grace, as both constitute the work of the 
Spirit. Hence, as Bavinck argues, the difference is “between the working of the Spirit 
in all creation [to restrain sin and compel towards the good] and the work of 
sanctification that belongs only to those who believe.”206 Thus the idea that elements 
of natural revelation mediate ‘supernatural’ grace is not a problem for Protestant 
theology per se, and only becomes an issue when this grace is called ‘saving.’ So a 
Protestant equivalent to the issue in D’Costa’s Catholic proposal would be to seek a 
clear category and definition for a grace that is not merely common grace or special 
grace, but which nonetheless constitutes a ‘preparing’ work of the Spirit for orienting 
a person towards the attainment of salvation at a future time. 
 For instance, we noted earlier that Ott labels the grace which prepares a person 
for receiving sanctifying grace as “actual grace.”207 He explains that actual grace (also 
called ‘assisting’ or ‘helping’ grace) “is a temporary supernatural intervention by God 
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by which the powers of the soul are stirred up to perform a salutary act which is 
directed to the attaining or preservation or increase of sanctifying grace.”208 We might 
say, then, that in Jane’s case the temporary divine intervention which enables her 
positive response to the work of the Holy Spirit directs her towards the attaining of 
sanctifying grace at a future time. Thus, we will discuss this theological notion of 
grace in more detail in the following chapter as we seek to develop a Reformation 




 Our examination of Lindbeck showed that his prospective fides ex auditu 
theory requires a cultural-linguistic space and time after death so that an 
unevangelized person can become competent enough to accept or reject the gospel in 
the eschaton. Yet he does not provide a theological explanation of this conceptual 
space, nor does he deal adequately with the doctrine of particular judgment. 
Furthermore, although an unevangelized person will not enter this intermediate state 
as a blank slate per se, Lindbeck’s theory seems to imply that their socially 
constructed self will have little value for determining their ultimate fate. Thus, he 
leaves us with two conceptual gaps in need of theological explanation. 
 Next, we saw that DiNoia attempts to give a measure of salvific weight to the 
socially constructed self of an unevangelized person as well as resolve Lindbeck’s 
conceptual gap between death and resurrection. First he notes Lindbeck’s comment 
that there may be “unsubstitutable” features in other religions which are “God-willed 
and God-approved anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom,” and then he 
develops this notion within the preparatio evangelica tradition proposing that even 
though other religions have different aims perhaps the moral elements within these 




religions foster dispositions that allow for the possibility of a future fellowship with 
God.209 Yet because these dispositions are insufficient for experiencing the beatific 
vision after death, DiNoia suggests that good non-Christians might be able to 
complete their personal transformation in purgatory. The problem is, this interval of 
purification is only for those who already have explicit faith in Christ. 
 Finally, D’Costa seeks to open the doors of purgatory to good non-Christians 
via the teaching of Christ’s descent into hell and the traditional inclusion of righteous 
non-Jews in the limbo of the just. He proposes that the good and true within other 
religions may be ‘supernatural’ elements of grace through which a person’s positive 
response connects them ontologically to Christ so that when they are confronted by 
the gospel in death the epistemological element of their salvation is added. Yet a 
crucial weakness in D’Costa’s theory is the nature of ‘saving’ grace outside the 
proclamation of the gospel. 
 So in light of our analysis of Lindbeck, DiNoia, and D’Costa, Part 3 will give 
careful consideration to the universal work of the Holy Spirit within the preparatio 
evangelica tradition, Christ’s descent into hell, the limbo of the just and purgatory, 
and the Augustinian prohibition (particular judgment) as we seek a solution that is 







                                               































































 In the previous chapter we evaluated George Lindbeck’s prospective fides ex 
auditu solution and found two conceptual gaps in his theory. The first concerns the 
nature and means of an unevangelized person’s encounter with the gospel in death, 
while the second gap lies between Lindbeck’s affirmation of a present-tense 
‘missions’ value of other religions and his ‘emphatic insistence’ that the potential 
salvation or condemnation of a person starts only after they begin to learn the 
language that speaks of Christ.1 This chapter will focus on the latter issue in an 
attempt to understand how the cultural-linguistic context of non-Christians figures 
into the future salvation of an unevangelized person. We will then deal with the 
former issue in the next chapter. 
 To this purpose, recall Gavin D’Costa’s theory in which he suggests that the 
good and true aspects in other religions are elements of grace that prepare an 
unevangelized person for the gospel. His argument relies on the Second Vatican 
Council’s application of the preparatio evangelica tradition to non-Christians. For 
instance, as regards the tradition itself, Joseph Carola explains: 
The praeparatio evangelica . . . does not date back to the creation of the 
human race but rather finds its origin in God’s choice of a people whom he 
gathers together and to whom he singularly reveals himself for the sake of the 
world’s salvation.2 
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Thus, “without exception the patristic texts . . . envision the praeparatio evangelica to 
be uniquely a matter of God’s revelation to the Hebrew people,”3 and Carola says the 
Council, in reference to the people of Israel, “faithfully express this theological idea 
which comes to us from the Fathers” (Lumen Gentium 2, 9).4 Yet in regard to those 
who are outside Abrahamic faith, Carola notes that the statement “declares whatever 
good or truth is found among them to be a praeparatio evangelica” (Lumen Gentium 
16), and that “such usage goes beyond the patristic term’s traditional meaning.”5 
 D’Costa argues that this untraditional application is not a mistake, but rather 
represents an intentional effort by the Council to develop the notion of preparatio 
further. He states, “What was traditionally only applied to Israel because of its 
supernatural revelationary history is now being applied to what was formerly thought 
of as natural religions”; thus, he tentatively suggests that this new application to non-
Christians “opens the door to see that all religions may have what are called 
‘supernatural’ elements in the way that Israel did.”6 Or as he states in Christianity and 
World Religions, “There may be sufficient elements of preparatio evangelica that 
allow God’s grace to work toward the final salvation of such persons [those who 
respond to these elements].”7 
 With this in mind, Marianne Moyaert argues that what Lindbeck’s approach 
lacks is reference to natural theology and the work of the Holy Spirit in the world.8 
Yet she also indicates an aspect of Lindbeck’s approach that may serve to our 
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advantage, which is that “Lindbeck does speak about the Spirit as verbum internum, 
that is, the capacity of the human being to receive God’s Word. The Paraclete 
prepares people to receive God’s Word in Christ.”9 Indeed, in his theological 
application of the cultural-linguistic approach Lindbeck says the verbum internum is 
“crucially important.”10 
Taking D’Costa’s and Moyaert’s cues, we will begin to construct our 
Reformation approach by first considering the positions of Magisterial Reformers 
Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli on the question of salvation for the 
unevangelized.11 Both reformers affirm the possibility of salvation for an 
unevangelized person, and it will help us to know their reasons for doing so and 
thereby discover some important rules of discourse. Second, we will evaluate the 
ways in which Zwingli and Luther utilize the natural law tradition. This exercise will 
demonstrate that Luther is more consistent than Zwingli in upholding the fides ex 
auditu principle and, for our purposes here, provides a better theological framework 
for addressing the subject at hand. Thus, the third step will consist of a creative 
extrapolation of Luther’s teaching on the ‘proper function’ of the law and its relation 
to grace. The point of this section is not to critically examine Luther’s reading of 
Scripture, but rather to incorporate certain themes and ideas into our own Reformation 
application of the preparatio evangelica. Finally, the chapter will end with a 
statement on Christian missions and a summary of the proposal. 
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Luther and Zwingli on the Question of the Unevangelized 
 
Martin Luther once wrote a letter to a wealthy supporter of the Reformation 
called Hans von Rechenberg, to counsel him “on the question whether God can or 
will save people who die without faith.”12 Before giving his answer, Luther insists 
that only mature Christians should ponder this question. In particular, those who have 
reconciled the truths that not all will be saved, and that God is always fair and loving 
in his judgments even when we do not understand his reasons. His concern is to guard 
against notions of universalism and charges of divine injustice, and his answer is 
simple and straightforward: “We have formidable passages of Scripture [to the effect] 
that God cannot and will not save anyone without faith.”13 
 Luther says the reason God will not save anyone without faith is because he 
cannot save them, and the reason God cannot save them is because he has given his 
word that salvation is through faith alone and God cannot deny himself. Indeed, “it is 
as impossible for God to save without faith as it is impossible for divine truth to lie.”14 
Yet Luther also introduces a possible way forward in the discussion by changing the 
question altogether. While it is true that Scripture teaches salvation by faith through 
Christ alone: 
It would be quite a different question whether God can impart faith to some in 
the hour of death or after death so that these people could be saved through 
faith. Who would doubt God’s ability to do that?15 
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Thus Luther does not hesitate to affirm God’s ability to grant saving faith to someone 
just before or after death. He only cautions that this notion must remain speculative as 
Scripture is inconclusive on the matter.16 
 In contrast, Luther’s contemporary reformer Ulrich Zwingli demonstrates no 
such reluctance to the question. As we noted in the previous chapter, Zwingli 
emphasizes the concept of divine election above all else – even faith. He argues that 
salvation has always been by grace through God’s election alone, and this election is 
“free and not at all bound, and above baptism and circumcision; nay, above faith and 
preaching.”17 From this perspective, Zwingli reasons that “the elect were chosen 
before they were conceived; they are at once then sons of God, even if they die before 
they believe or are called to faith.”18 His point here is that faith is merely the evidence 
and not the cause of election. As Timothy George explains, “It was true that some of 
those elected outside the visible sphere of Christendom might never come to faith in 
this life. Yet even that was a negligible consideration because faith follows (rather 
than precedes) election.”19 
 Nevertheless, while Zwingli views faith as a secondary issue he still 
recognizes an order of salvation that includes the addition of faith at a certain point in 
time: “The first thing is God’s deliberation or purpose or election, second his 
predestination or marking out, third his calling, fourth justification [by faith].”20 So 
although he claims that elect people are saved even before they believe, we also see 
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that the actual salvation of these people (i.e., justification) comes only as they hear 
with faith. In this way, says W. P. Stephens, salvation 
begins in God’s election and depends entirely on his will and purpose, and not 
on us. God’s election, however, is in Christ, which does not simply mean the 
eternal Christ, but the Christ who was born, suffered, died, rose, and ascended 
for the salvation of mankind. Salvation, however, is not accomplished in us, 
until the Spirit leads us to faith. For Zwingli therefore salvation was seen to be 
altogether the work of God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.21 
 
Hence, in regard to the elect who die before hearing the gospel, justification occurs 
for them after death; for “faith is in that order the last thing beyond glorification.”22 
Thus Zwingli not only affirms God’s ability to impart faith after death, he also 
maintains the conviction that God does indeed do this for certain individuals.23 
 It is important to recognize that neither Luther nor Zwingli argues for the 
possibility of a second-chance option – that those who reject Christ in this life will 
have the opportunity to accept him in the next. Their discussions concern only those 
who have had no opportunity to hear the gospel message before death. As Zwingli 
puts it, “It is not . . . a universal rule that he who has not faith is damned, but him who 
has heard the doctrine of faith expounded and remains and dies in unbelief, we can 
perhaps count among the wretched.”24 So their affirmations concern only 
unevangelized persons and is contingent upon the addition of faith during the time of 
death. 
 We might now tentatively suggest that the idea that God, should he so choose, 
is able to grant saving faith to certain unevangelized people just before or after death 
is a valid statement within Reformation theology. Which is to say, there is no 
historical theological contradiction per se in the simple claim that God is able to 
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perform this action. This is not to say that God will in fact grant salvation in this way 
(despite Zwingli’s confidence), but rather that this notion signifies an actual 
possibility and is therefore worthy of consideration. Which leads us to another 
question: can a Reformation approach support the notion that God prepares these 
individuals by grace through conscience and good and true elements in the world; i.e., 
through natural law? 
 
Natural Law and the Unevangelized 
 
 Although the theological concept of natural law is part of a long tradition in 
historical Christianity (as discussed in Chapter 1), the Lutheran theologian Carl 
Braaten declares that “one of the most surprising developments in the twentieth 
century was the nearly wholesale rejection of the natural law tradition in modern 
Protestantism.”25 Also observing this general opposition by Protestants, Reformed 
theologian J. Daryl Charles argues that this dismissal is both unprecedented and in 
danger of reductionist thinking. He states: 
Many, Protestant evangelicals in particular, presume that natural-law thinking 
fails to take seriously the condition of human sin and places misguided trust in 
the powers of human reason debilitated by the Fall. Consequently, natural-law 
theory is thought to be insufficiently Christocentric and located outside the 
realm of grace, thereby engendering a version of works-righteousness. . . . 
 But the belief, however widespread, that natural-law thinking is 
insufficiently Christocentric and therefore detracts from divine grace is 
misguided. Nothing of the sort was believed by the early Church Fathers, the 
medieval fathers, or the Protestant Reformers. . . . 
 However deeply entrenched the bias against natural-law thinking is 
among Protestant thinkers, it cannot be attributed to the Reformers of the 
sixteenth century themselves.26 
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Concordia Pub. House, 2011).Ibid. 
26 Daryl J. Charles, “Protestants and Natural Law,” First Things, last modified 




Considering our effort to develop a Reformation approach using the natural law 
tradition, Charles’ assertion is intriguing. Thus, we will turn again to Zwingli and 
Luther to see how these two reformers utilize natural-law thinking. 
 
Zwingli’s Use of the Natural Law 
 
 In Romans 2 the apostle Paul says that even though the Gentiles do not have 
the law of Moses, they nonetheless show “that the work of the law is written on their 
hearts” when they “do by nature things required by the law” (v. 15). Moreover, it is 
not merely the hearers of the law but the “doers . . . who will be justified” (v. 13), 
hence, “a person is a Jew who is one inwardly; and circumcision is circumcision of 
the heart, by the Spirit, not by the written code. Such a person’s praise is not from 
other people, but from God” (v. 29). Alluding to these verses, Zwingli writes: 
When, therefore, we see the uncircumcis[ed] do what the law directs, why do 
we not recognize the tree by its fruit? Why do we not perceive that God hath 
engraved the works of the law upon his heart? If, therefore, he doeth the work 
of God under impulse from God, why do we damn him because he has not 
been baptized or circumcised, especially when, again, the apostle attributes to 
such [people] accusation or absolution of conscience in the day of judgment.27 
 
Once again, Zwingli warns Christians not to assume that all those who do not now 
have faith are under condemnation, and he points out that it is God who inscribes the 
work of the law on people’s hearts so that if an unevangelized person acts in 
accordance with this law then they do so ‘under impulse from God.’ In this way, says 
Stephens, “the Spirit is not limited to those who have explicit faith in Christ,” and 
this is related to Zwingli’s understanding of the Spirit as the Creator Spirit and 
to his doctrine of election. As the Spirit was not limited to Palestine in the 
creation, for he created the whole world, so he is not limited to Palestine in his 
continuing work. The Spirit’s work is also manifest in the writing of law in the 
hearts of the Gentiles in Romans 2: 14-15. . . . Yet the renewing in the 
Gentiles of the image of God by the Holy Spirit is related to Christ, precisely 
because they are those who were elected in Christ before the foundation of the 
world.28 
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The idea here seems to be that outside the enabling work of God a person cannot do 
what the law requires. Thus, if there are indeed people who follow the natural law 
outside knowledge of Christ, then these works indicate an internal work of God. 
Zwingli concludes: 
Hence children and those who have not heard the Gospel are not bound by this 
law [belief or unbelief], but with grown persons the point is whether the law of 
God is written on their hearts or not. For thus again they stand or fall unto the 
Lord, through Christ Jesus the only way to salvation. . . . 
 In a word, election is unshaken and the law written on the hearts of 
men, but so that those who are elect and do the works of the law in accordance 
with the law written on their hearts come to God through Christ alone.29 
 
For Zwingli, God writes the law upon the hearts of all people so that the moral lives 
of some indicate his election of those individuals unto salvation. But what about the 
doctrinal principle of faith by hearing? In what way is election ‘unshaken’ outside 
explicit faith in Christ? 
 To the charge that his explanation constitutes a works-righteousness position, 
Zwingli writes: 
This point also arises—If a heathen shows by the works of the law that the law 
is written in his heart, and Paul really prefers him to the circumcised, then the 
office of faith is done away with and everything comes back to works. To this 
I answer, that Paul presupposes that he who does the works of the law, does 
them in consequence of faith.30 
 
But it is not at all clear what Zwingli means here by faith. He also appears to 
contradict his own delineation of the order of salvation as this statement places 
justification by faith before calling. Indeed, in another writing he considers the notion 
of ‘heathen’ faith in regard to Socrates and Seneca, and Stephens notes: 
The lack of clarity about faith continues to the end, for Zwingli quotes 
Augustine to show that when the heathen do what the law requires they do so 
“by grace, by faith, by the Spirit of God, and are to be counted among those 
justified by the grace of Christ” (S VI/I 242.6-243.1).31 
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Perhaps Zwingli is merely speaking by figure of speech, but at the Marburg Colloquy 
(1529) he agreed with Luther that faith comes through Christ alone and that God 
gives faith through the Holy Spirit “when we hear the gospel or the word of Christ.”32 
For Luther, the notion that one can be saved by faith outside knowledge of Christ is 
unacceptable. So when Zwingli later claims that every “single pious heart or believing 
soul” will be in heaven,33 Luther declares, “What can such an author, preacher, and 
teacher believe about the Christian faith except that it is no better than any other faith 
and that everyone can be saved by his own faith.”34 Stephens explains, “Luther’s 
concern was with Zwingli’s placing in heaven with the apostles and prophets, who 
manifestly had faith in Christ, the heathen who clearly did not.”35 
To put it another way, if the natural law mediates God’s election among the 
unevangelized, then we must also recognize that the mediation of the natural law (i.e., 
its apprehension and interpretation) occurs through particular cultural and religious 
forms of life. Zwingli affirms the former but neglects the latter, which then leads 
Luther to the logical conclusion that Zwingli views other religions as alternative 
means of salvation. For the nature of such faith by an unevangelized person would 
have to be something other than Christian. To be fair, Zwingli never follows this line 
of reasoning and his primary concern is to uphold the concept of God’s free election 
in salvation. G. W. Bromiley explains: 
The pious heathen might well be the recipients of divine grace and redemption 
even though they remained outside the temporal reach of the Gospel. They 
were not saved because of their piety, but because of the eternal activity of 
God in election and atonement.”36 
                                               
32 “Marburg Colloquy,” The Marburg Colloquy and the Marburg Articles (1529), 
article 6. Also see articles 3-5,7-8. 
33 Huldrych Zwingli and Johann Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli and Bullinger, ed. G. W. 
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Nevertheless, in the end Zwingli’s use of the natural law to explain salvation among 
the unevangelized falls short of satisfying the sola fide ex auditu principle when he 
speaks of justifying faith outside knowledge of the gospel. 
 Thus, considering Luther’s strong emphasis of faith by hearing alone, we may 
find that his delineation of the natural law will take us further than Zwingli in our 
effort to formulate a Reformation approach to the question of the unevangelized. 
Again, it is important to remember that we are not seeking to critically assess Luther’s 
reading of Scripture, but rather to discover and cultivate some of the theological 
concepts provided by his explanation of the law’s purpose and its relationship to 
grace. 
 
Luther on the Law 
 
 Luther sets up his exposition of Romans 2:12-16 by noting that “the Law in 
this passage, that is, in this entire chapter, means the complete law of Moses, where 
both the Ten Commandments and also the love of God and of neighbor are 
enjoined.”37 Yet how does this interpretation apply to the Gentiles who do not have 
the law of Moses? Luther says that even though the Gentiles do not have the Mosaic 
Law, they nonetheless 
have received a spiritual law which the rites and ceremonies indicated in the 
moral sense (quite apart from the fact that they symbolized Christ). This law is 
impressed upon all people, Jews and Gentiles alike, and to this law all people 
are bound.38 
 
He therefore claims that the law “is inborn and present in creation.”39 
 When he focuses on Romans 2:14 – “For when Gentiles . . . by nature do what 
the law requires” – he considers it in light of two possible interpretations given by 
                                               
37 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on Romans, trans. Helmut T. Lehmann 
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38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 182-183. 
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Augustine. He says Augustine suggests that the term “Gentile” could refer to Gentile 
Christians whose natures have been restored “by the Spirit of the grace of Christ,” or 
that it refers to those who “even though they lead an ungodly life, . . . are doing some 
of the things which are of the law.”40 After noting that Augustine favors the first 
interpretation, Luther explains why he thinks both options fall short of Paul’s intended 
meaning. 
 He argues that if one views these as the ungodly Gentiles who merely do some 
of the works of the law, then “this interpretation is opposed to the word that says they 
do by nature the things which are of the Law, and those who do the Law are 
righteous.”41 Yet if one says Paul is referring to Gentile believers, then “this 
interpretation of ‘by nature’ is forced.”42 Thomas Pearson explains: 
Here we see that Luther understands φύσις, “nature,” as posited in opposition 
to grace. Grace does not perfect our sinful nature, but operates independently 
to separate us from our sinful nature; grace stands to justification as nature 
stands to unbelief. Thus, for Luther, Christians (including, in this case, Gentile 
believers) are positioned in a different relationship to the law than are non-
Christians: the former do not receive the law, nor do they perform the works 
of the law, naturally.43 
 
We find, then, that this is a key moment in Luther’s exposition. For although 
Augustine teaches that “sin, indeed, is contrary to nature, and it is grace that heals 
it,”44 here Luther initiates his argument that nature itself is sinful and thus contrary to 
grace. Regarding this turning point in Luther’s soteriology, George writes: 
Luther believed he had recovered the original meaning of the Greek verb used 
by Paul in Romans [δικαιόω]. Augustine and the scholastic tradition had 
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interpreted it as “to make righteous,” whereas Luther insisted on its legal 
connotations, “to declare righteous.”45 
 
In other words, by nature a person can achieve the righteousness of works but God 
still regards that person as an unrighteous sinner.46 
 In this way, Luther does not deny the human capacity to achieve good works 
through “purely natural endowments” or even “from a gift from God,” but these 
activities constitute a righteousness of works by which people justify themselves and 
are thus contrary per se to “the righteousness of faith, which God imputes to us 
through Christ without works.”47 As Oswald Bayer explains: 
The passive righteousness of faith takes place when justifying thinking 
(metaphysics) and justifying doing (morality), together with the unity of both 
that some seek, are all radically destroyed. In other words, both metaphysics 
and morality with their claim to justify our being are brought to nothing by the 
work of God. God slays, but he does so only to make alive.48 
 
As Deanna Thomson states, for Luther “grace does not equip human beings to 
become righteous; rather, the gift of grace fundamentally alters the situation for 
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humanity coram Deo [before God].”49  Nevertheless, if these verses in Romans 2 do 
not refer to the Gentiles who do good works or to Gentile Christians, then to whom do 
they refer? Luther states: 
I prefer to think . . . of the people who are in the middle between the ungodly 
Gentiles and the believing Gentiles, those who through some good action 
directed toward God as much as they were able earned grace which directed 
them farther, not as though this grace had been given to them because of such 
merit, because then it would not have been grace, but because they thus 
prepared their hearts to receive this grace as a gift.50 
 
Yet Luther argues that Paul in Romans 2, “did not intend thereby to assert that they 
are righteous, except with a particular and legal righteousness, but not with the 
universal, infinite, eternal and wholly divine righteousness, which is not given to us 
except in Christ.”51 So both the good Jew and the people who are in the middle “still 
need the grace and mercy of Christ, . . . both are under sin, no matter how much good 
they may have done.”52 As Bernhard Lohse states, “Spiritually construed, this law in 
no way assists us to achieve righteousness. On the contrary, it only reveals our 
sinfulness and increases it.”53 
 Nevertheless, if outside of Christ people remain sinners before God, and if 
they cannot in fact fulfill the law outside of faith, then how do the people in the 
middle ‘prepare’ their hearts for grace? As Thomas Schreiner notes, “Luther rejected 
the idea that human beings can do anything to prepare for grace. They cannot do their 
best and as a result receive God’s righteousness.”54 So what then is the nature of this 
‘good’ and ‘humble’ action directed towards God by the people in the middle? To be 
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sure, answering this question is of utmost importance for our efforts to work out a 
Reformation approach to the question of the unevangelized. 
 
The Proper Function of the Law 
 
 At this point in the discussion we can say for sure that the particular quality of 
Luther’s ‘people in the middle’ is inextricably linked to the inborn natural law. Yet 
more explanation is needed before we can discern the exact nature of this relationship. 
As regards the law, Luther teaches a two-fold function; “that is, politically, for 
restraining the wicked; and theologically, for terrifying and bruising the proud.”55 
And yet it is the latter, the theological function, that “is the true and proper use of the 
Law.”56 Luther states: 
The proper function of the Law is to make us guilty, to humble us, to kill us, 
to lead us down to hell, and to take everything away from us, but all with the 
purpose that we may be justified, exalted, made alive, lifted up to heaven, and 
endowed with all things. Therefore it does not merely kill, but it kills for the 
sake of life.57 
 
What Luther is at pains to show is that the works of the law do not themselves prepare 
a person for salvation, but rather preparation comes through the realization and 
acceptance that these works cannot make one righteous. In other words, preparation is 
not through doing that which is in one (i.e., the good) but through being shamed that 
one is a sinner (i.e., the convicting use of the law). A person is not prepared for grace 
by doing good works, but by being “tortured in their conscience” when they 
“recognize the evil they have done.”58 As Paul Althaus explains, the law “intends to, 
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and actually does, awaken men out of their unawareness, make them feel the power of 
the law, recognize their sin, experience God’s wrath, and be led to repentance.”59 In 
short, “What is the value of this effect, this humiliation, this wounding and crushing 
by the hammer?” says Luther, “It has this value, that grace can have access to us. 
Therefore the Law is a minister and a preparation for grace.”60 
 Moreover, as regards the proper function of the law Luther sees no difference 
between the Law of Moses and the natural law. For instance, highlighting the ‘law of 
love’ in 1 Timothy 1:5 and Matthew 7:12, he states: 
There is one law which runs through all ages, is known to all men, is written 
in the hearts of all people, and leaves no one from beginning to end with an 
excuse, although for the Jews ceremonies were added and the other nations 
had their own laws, which were not binding upon the whole world, but only 
this one [the law of love], which the Holy Spirit dictates unceasingly in the 
hearts of all.61 
 
Concerning this view, Althaus writes: 
Moses thus is not really the author of the Decalog. He has a more modest rank. 
Properly understood, he only interprets and clarifies the natural laws written in 
men’s hearts. . . . Christ, too, only interprets the law. He, also, is not a 
lawgiver but only wants to make clear to us what the law written in our hearts, 
or respectively, the Decalog, really demands.62 
 
To this extent, we find that a common characteristic of the people in the middle is a 
tortured conscience due to the convicting function of the law. But until they receive 
the righteousness of faith given by the Holy Spirit “through God’s Word or gospel, 
which preaches Christ,”63 they are still regarded before God as “sinners and in need of 
the mercy of God.”64 Yet there remains a critical issue that we must address, which is 
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the nature of grace in relation to the proper function of the law for preparing the 
people in the middle. 
 
Considering Law and Grace 
 
 Outside of grace how can the natural law prepare people for grace? For “on 
the part of man,” says Luther, “nothing precedes grace except indisposition and even 
rebellion against grace.”65 As discussed above, a chief element of Luther’s theology is 
that salvation does not involve the healing of an inherent righteousness, but consists 
of “a righteousness that comes completely from the outside and is foreign.”66 So even 
though by nature a person might have the righteousness of works, Luther maintains 
that these good works do not meet the divine standard for fulfilling the law: “What the 
law wants, the will never wants, unless it pretends to want it out of fear or love [of 
temporal things].”67 How then shall we proceed? 
 A way forward might be found through a creative extrapolation of Luther’s 
view of the convicting use of the law. The intent here is not to represent Luther’s 
position per se, but rather to incorporate motifs and ideas from his writings which will 
aid our discussion of the unevangelized. That said, our method will remain rooted in 
Luther’s view of justification by faith. This means that as we consider the notion of 
law and grace in relation to the unevangelized, the only dogmatic assumption is that 
while this preparation by the law might be seen as a kind of grace, it is not itself the 
grace of faith (i.e., justifying and sanctifying grace). 
 In regard to Luther’s view of grace, Lohse states, “What is striking is that he 
made little use of the terminology developed to such an extraordinary degree in 
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scholasticism, with its numerous distinctions regarding the doctrine of grace.”68 Yet 
Thompson points out that “for Luther, a crucial error for scholastic theologians was 
their appropriation of Aristotelian categories within the realm of grace.”69 In 
particular, Aristotle taught that people have inherent qualities that give them the 
capacity to act virtuously towards others, which he calls ‘an act of friendship’ for 
which the benefits are reciprocated.70 And it was the appropriation of this Aristotelian 
concept within theology (i.e., the nominalist tradition) that Luther opposes in his 
Disputation Against Scholastic Theology. For instance, he writes: 
An act of friendship is not the most perfect means for accomplishing that 
which is in one. Nor is it the most perfect means for obtaining the grace of 
God or turning toward and approaching God.71 
 
On the contrary, a person “is by nature unable to want God to be God” and the only 
valid act of friendship “is an act of conversion already perfected, following grace both 
in time and by nature.”72 
 An interesting aspect of this last statement is Luther’s insistence that grace 
precedes conversion (i.e., precedes faith) ‘both in time and by nature.’ Even more, he 
defines this preceding grace in another statement when he writes, “An act of 
friendship is done, not according to nature, but according to prevenient grace.”73 
Having already stated that the law prepares a person for justification, here Luther 
rightfully calls this preparation ‘prevenient grace.’74 To be sure, Luther argues that the 
convicting use of the law is itself a preparation for grace, as it teaches people “that 
they need grace, to destroy their own righteousness.”75 But considering that by nature 
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people cannot know they need grace, it seems that any realization and subsequent 
seeking by a person can be due only to a preceding grace. In other words, the core of 
Luther’s disagreement with the nominalist view of grace is against the idea that a 
good act merits a response from God, or that in some sense God ‘owes’ grace to those 
who do good works.76 
Yet once we establish Luther’s theological position that there is no “work 
performed before grace” and that the “the Law only shows sin, terrifies, and humbles; 
thus it prepares us for justification and drives us to Christ,”77 then we might say that 
to the extent that the natural law effectively terrifies and humbles an unevangelized 
person, this preparation is itself an act of grace. Indeed, Lohse states that “Luther did 
not describe this effect of the law as a causa efficiens (efficient cause) but rather as a 
causa ostensiva (ostensive cause). The law is to lead to sin’s becoming ‘great.’”78 
And, as Althaus points out, “making sin great is inseparably connected with exalting 
and praising grace.”79 Thus, as this understanding of the relation between law and 
grace takes shape, I suggest that the theological concept of ‘actual grace’ best suits the 
argument for preparation through the natural law. 
 
Considering Actual Grace 
 
 Thomas Oden defines “actual grace” as “the help of God by which one is 
made fit to act in a way accountable to God.”80 More specifically: 
Actual grace is to be distinguished both from ordinary providence (the 
ordering of causality by which God sustains all creation), and from natural 
talent, since it is specifically defined as supernatural gift – unmerited internal 
divine assistance which enables the performance of salutary acts.81 
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Furthermore, Ludwig Ott explains that the traditional understanding of actual grace 
teaches that this salutary act “is directed to the attaining or preservation or increase of 
sanctifying grace,” and he subdivides it further into three categories.82 The first 
distinction of actual grace is “gratia illuminationis, i.e., the enlightenment of the 
intellect and gratia inspirationis, i.e., the strengthening of the will.”83 To this extent, 
Oden says that “the process by which each person is illumined by grace is specific to 
that person’s own story.”84 This means that in regard to the proper function of the law, 
the way in which this grace stirs an individual’s moral conscience is contingent upon 
their particular cultural understanding of good and evil (more on this later). 
Ott’s second subcategory is “gratia praeveniens . . . which precedes and 
affects a deliberate act of will, and gratia subsequens . . . which accompanies and 
supports the deliberate act.”85 For our purposes here, this delineation is helpful 
because, as Oden states: 
Prevening grace antecedes human responsiveness so as to prepare the soul for 
the effective hearing of the redeeming Word. This preceding grace draws 
persons closer to God, lessens their blindness to divine remedies, strengthens 
their will to accept revealed truth, and enables repentance.86 
 
If we view these distinctions as ‘movements’ within the operation of actual grace, we 
see that this process first prepares the intellect and the will to be able to understand 
and to seek, and then it gives illumination to the intellect and strength to the will in 
support of a subsequent salutary act. And these movements of actual grace are 
summed up nicely by the final distinction, which is: 
Sufficient grace (gratia sufficiens) and efficacious grace (gratia efficax). The 
former gives a person the power to accomplish the salutary act, the latter de 
facto secures that the salutary act is accomplished.87 
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So not only does actual grace prepare and empower the soul for a salutary act, it also 
ensures the completion of that act. Or as Oden puts it, grace “is effective as it elicits 
willing cooperation and sufficient insofar as it does what is necessary to lead the will 
to cooperate, even when the deficient will is resistant.”88 
If we then apply this sense of grace to the proper function of the law, we might 
say that in the case of the unevangelized actual grace directs a person towards the 
attaining of sanctifying grace at a later time. So while in itself this grace is not 
sufficient for salvation, it is nonetheless given for the benefit of salvation. Yet for our 
Reformation approach, we must not understand the notion of a salutary act as 
connoting a meritorious work, but rather as an act of humility where the act itself is a 
person’s conscience tortured by the knowledge “that they have done evil.”89 In other 
words, the emphasis here is not on the inherent knowledge of the natural law, but on 
the divine act of illumination; not a healing of human reason, but a gift of enabling 
and apprehension. As Oden explains: 
What this grace transforms in its work of enabling is not simply our 
understanding of truth, but more so our disposition to embody the truth. The 
willingness and desire of the seeker behaviorally to embody the truth is made 
increasingly possible.90 
 
Thus, while actual grace is not itself sufficient for salvation, it is nonetheless 
sufficient and efficacious according to its purpose; that is, the salutary act directed 
towards the attaining of salvation at a future time. This grace does not change an 
unevangelized person’s situation as a sinner before God, but it does work to expose 
their wickedness in relation to the law. To be sure, to the extent that actual grace is 
mediated through the natural moral law outside the proclamation of the gospel, an 
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unevangelized person does not possess the promise of salvation. Yet Luther does 
provide us with a measure of hope. 
 As discussed above, Luther says the proper function of the law is to condemn 
and convict people of sin. Indeed, the law humiliates, wounds, and crushes, but its 
purpose in doing so is to prepare a person for salvation: 
Now once a man has thus been humbled by the Law and brought to the 
knowledge of himself, then he becomes truly repentant; for true repentance 
begins with fear and with the judgment of God. . . . 
 Terrified by the Law, he despairs of his own strength; he looks about 
and sighs for the help of the Mediator and Savior. Then there comes, at the 
appropriate time, the saving Word of the Gospel, which says: “Take heart, my 
son; your sins are forgiven (Matt. 9:2). Believe in Jesus Christ, who was 
crucified for your sins.”91 
 
So even though the convicting, crushing, condemning function of the law “is the true 
and proper use of the law, . . . it is not permanent,” and Luther asserts that “this terror, 
humiliation, and custody are not to last forever; 
they are to last until faith should come. That is, they are for our salvation and 
for our benefit, so that we who have been terrified by the Law may taste the 
sweetness of grace, the forgiveness of sins, and deliverance from the Law, sin, 
and death, which are not acquired by works but are grasped by faith alone.92 
 
It is, then, from this perspective that we can suggest that when the convicting use of 
the natural law is efficacious in the life of an unevangelized person, this preparation is 
an act of actual grace directing them towards salvation. Nevertheless, an ‘act’ implies 
an actor and we must further circumscribe this sense of grace as a temporary 
intervention by a Person – the Holy Spirit. For as Oden states, “Although all grace as 
such is the work of the triune God, the enabling and appropriation of grace is 
primarily the constant work of God the Spirit.”93 
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The Holy Spirit and the Proper Use of the Law 
 
 As regards the Lutheran perspective, Steven Paulson observes that “the early 
Lutherans carefully distinguished favor (grace as God’s reckoning) and donum (the 
gift of grace) as Paul did in Romans 5:5.”94 To be sure, this distinction between grace 
and the gift of grace already existed in the traditional language of theology.95 But 
what set the early Lutherans apart was the assertion that “the gift of grace is the Holy 
Spirit himself, not a quality given to us.”96 For example, Luther’s fellow reformer 
Philip Melanchthon makes this distinction in his Loci Communes, where he writes 
that grace is 
the favor of God by which he has loved Christ and, in Christ and on account of 
Christ, all the saints. Next, because he is favorable, God cannot but pour out 
his gifts upon those on whom he has had mercy. . . . But the gift of God is the 
Holy Spirit himself.97 
 
The gift of grace, wherever it is found, is the gift of the Holy Spirit. This is not to say 
that the unevangelized receive the gift of communion, “for sins are not removed by 
the Law, nor is the Spirit granted through it.”98 Rather, it is to suggest that even 
though this gift is not the indwelling of the Spirit – as it is for Christians – it is 
nonetheless a singular work of the Spirit upon lost hearts (John 16:8). 
 Therefore, as we apply Luther’s explanation of the convicting use of the law 
to the situation of the unevangelized and call this application an act of ‘actual grace,’ 
we must also establish that it is the Holy Spirit who is the chief agent of this use. For 
as Luther declares, “The grace of God is never present in such a way that it is 
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inactive, but it is a living, active, and operative Spirit.”99 This does not mean that 
grace outside the church is itself sufficient for salvation, but it is to recognize that the 
Holy Spirit (who is “the Spirit of grace” Heb 10:29) is at work to convince the world 




 In light of our reading of Luther’s understanding of the natural law and the 
proper function of the law, the proposal here is that we expand the notion of 
preparation for the gospel to include more than just human conscience and elements 
of truth and goodness. For if this preparation of ‘the people in the middle’ is itself an 
act of actual grace by the Holy Spirit, then the notion cannot merely refer to 
‘elements’ of truth and goodness. Rather, from this perspective the idea of preparation 
signifies an integral process that in some sense involves the whole social, cultural, 
philosophical, linguistic, political, educational, familial, physical, psychological, 
geographical, temporal, historical, religious environment in which each person lives 
and moves and has their being in God (Acts 17:26-28). For although we have called 
this preparation a kind of internal grace that works directly upon the soul through the 
universal moral law, this law is nonetheless mediated through the cognitive, emotive, 
experiential dimensions of ‘the soul’ which are formed by particular external 
contexts. 
 For instance, Luther asserts that the natural moral law “is impressed upon all 
people” and it is this law to which “all people are bound.”100 Yet while this law is 
common to all it is nonetheless perceived in various ways. The Jews learned it 
through the Mosaic Law, while others “learned to know in a different way.”101 In 
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other words, the universal natural law is first an inherent human capacity for knowing 
and doing good and evil, which is then cultivated into knowledge and action by 
numerous external factors (e.g., cultural-linguistic contexts which may include but are 
not limited to religious and philosophical structures). 
 Thus, the immediate standard of God’s judgment (according to Luther) is not 
some abstract notion of good and evil or even one particular interpretation of the 
natural law. Instead, God’s immediate judgment is according to the specific measures 
by which each society (and thus each person) judges themselves.102 This, says Luther, 
is why Paul states that the Gentiles “‘will perish without the Law’ just as they are 
saved without the Law if they have kept their law, the law that is inborn and present 
in creation.”103 His conclusion is that irrespective of one’s cultural delineation of good 
and evil, no one can fulfill even their own interpretation of the universal law and thus 
all “are sinners and in need of the mercy of God.”104 We might assume, then, that if 
the Spirit prepares a person to receive this mercy through the convicting use of the 
natural law, then this use is particular to the moral conscience of the individual which 
is itself determined by their contextual situation. 
To be sure, Luther does not intend to deny the sui generis nature of the Mosaic 
Law. It is only through the apprehension of one’s position under the law as it is 
revealed through Scripture that one is truly prepared for Christ. As Althaus explains, 
Luther maintains that “the proclamation of the law is the indispensable and necessary 
presupposition for the preaching of the gospel,” for “the law is to be interpreted 
through the gospel; and its intention is to be understood on the basis of the gospel.”105 
Nevertheless, the point here is that if we limit the concept of preparation to just 
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‘elements’ of truth and goodness, then we risk overstating the importance of these 
particular elements for salvation. For if we say that the good and true are elements of 
grace, then it is by these elements and these elements alone that the Spirit must work 
to prepare unevangelized people for the gospel. This then entails a sense of grace that 
is in danger of equating these elements with other outward means of grace thus 
making proclamation and faith superfluous. Yet if we understand preparation of the 
unevangelized as a temporary special action by the Holy Spirit through the natural 
law rather than as enduring things within religions and cultures, then these issues fall 
away. 
For instance, Simon Chan argues that “primal religious societies” tend to be 
more receptive to the Christian message than “societies dominated by the axial 
religions,” and he claims that this openness is due to traces of ancient knowledge 
about God subsiding within the “collective memory” of these societies.106 He 
concludes: 
Whether the knowledge of the supreme being in many ancient cultures owes 
its origin to some primeval revelation or traces of ancient people’s memory of 
a prelapsarian state, the fact of the matter is that it is often a concrete point of 
contact between primal religious societies and the gospel. It constitutes a de 
facto praeparatio evangelica. It prepares the way for the gospel and accounts 
for its ready reception in these societies.107 
 
From the perspective of this chapter, we can agree with Chan that this lingering 
knowledge of God (if it exists) would constitute an element of truth and therefore 
might provide a good ‘point of contact’ for sharing the gospel. We can also agree that 
to the extent that this residual theistic awareness plays an obvious role in a person’s 
coming to faith it can be said to have functioned as part of a preparatio evangelica. 
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However, what we do not want to say is that this or any other element of truth 
is itself the thing which ‘accounts for’ a society’s openness to the gospel.108 As argued 
above, it is grace alone that accounts for a person’s preparation and this grace is the 
work of the Holy Spirit. To be sure, the Spirit may use various notions of a higher 
being embedded in the collective memory of a society to orient them towards Christ 
(e.g., Acts 17:16-32). But we must also recognize that the Spirit might choose to 
forego the use of such notions of the divine (e.g., Acts 14:8-18). Thus, while vestiges 
of truth in primal religious societies can indeed serve the work of preparation, this 
element does not itself function as a necessary medium by which the Spirit prepares 
these communities for hearing the gospel. 
Nevertheless, the crucial question at this point is how does this expression of 
preparatio evangelica resolve the issue at hand in Lindbeck’s theory? Let us recall his 
assertion in full: 
One can admit the unsubstitutable uniqueness of the God-willed missions of 
non-Christian religions when one thinks of these faiths, not as objectifying 
poorly what Christianity objectifies well (as Karl Rahner proposes), but as 
cultural-linguistic systems within which potentialities can be actualized and 
realities explored that are not within the direct purview of the peoples of 
Messianic witness, but that are nevertheless God-willed and God-approved 
anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom.109 
 
If we compare this statement to the ‘elements’ version of preparatio evangelica, we 
find that Lindbeck’s emphasis is not on the present-tense nature of ‘aspects’ within 
non-Christian religions, for he qualifies these as ‘anticipations of the coming 
kingdom’ and thus gives them a future-tense value. Instead, the present-tense value of 
‘the God-willed missions of non-Christian religions’ is characterized by certain 
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actions rather than by certain elements; namely, the exploration of realities and the 
actualization of potentialities. Thus, in the case of an unevangelized person, if we say 
that these actions constitute the Spirit’s work of actual grace through the natural law, 
then that person’s cultural-linguistic self-understanding has a great deal to do with 
how they will respond when confronted by the gospel in death. This also means that 
for the unevangelized, the commencement of this process involves ‘realities’ and 
‘potentialities’ that are currently outside the purview of the church but are not outside 
the present work of the Spirit in the world. 
The point is simply that the Holy Spirit is free to use any created element 
necessary to stir the moral conscience of a person or a people. For this work of grace 
operates through the socio-cultural identity of the individual or society to cultivate 
dispositions to the attainment of faith at a future time. So while a deep sense of shame 
is the common factor, the way in which the Spirit brings a person or group of people 
to this moral self-awareness is dynamic and affectingly personal. The idea here is not 
to deny the importance of human conscience and elements of the good and true for 
orienting people towards God, but rather to place these elements within the sovereign 
grace of God through the work of the Holy Spirit. And it is, then, in this way that we 
offer a Reformation contribution towards filling the first gap in Lindbeck’s 
prospective fides ex auditu option. For as Lindbeck states, “The salvific role of the 
Holy Spirit is to join hearers and potential hearers (publically and communally and 
thereby internally) to that Word who is Jesus Christ.”110 We therefore have offered a 
theological proposal for how the Spirit might prepare ‘potential hearers’ for this 
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What About World Missions? 
 
 If we acknowledge that God is able to impart faith to an unevangelized person 
just before or after death, then what happens to missionary zeal and urgency? Why 
bother going to the ends of the earth to make disciples if, as Zwingli states, “The elect 
were chosen before they were conceived; they are at once then sons of God, even if 
they die before they believe or are called to faith”?111 To be sure, this is no small 
concern. 
 During a candid interview in 2016 with the emeritus Pope Benedict XVI, he 
admits that Vatican II’s contingent affirmation of the possibility of salvation for an 
unevangelized person “seems to remove any motivation for a future missionary 
commitment.”112 Moreover, he rightly points out that “if faith and salvation are no 
longer interdependent, faith itself becomes unmotivated.”113 Benedict is not 
suggesting that the Council erred with this affirmation, but he recommends careful 
reflection on the issue and warns against “simplistic” solutions which engender 
“unmotivated” approaches.114 
 The point is, believing that God can save certain unevangelized individuals 
might contribute to an indifferent attitude towards missions and faith, but this 
particular response is not a necessary consequence. Any good and necessary 
consequence as deduced by Scripture will maintain that the definitive solution to the 
problem of the unevangelized is the missionary activity of the church under the 
sovereign grace and election of God. Only from this perspective can one affirm a 
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conditional hope for the unevangelized without compromising the urgent need to 
preach repentance to all people in the name of Christ. 
For instance, the Anglican missiologist Roland Allen (1868-1947) claims that 
Scripture itself maintains this tension between hope and urgency. He argues that even 
though some people use the belief that God can save unevangelized people to try and 
weaken support for missions, the conviction of hope is not itself the cause of such a 
result.115 On the contrary, he insists that a biblical hope for the unevangelized is one 
that upholds the conviction of urgency: 
In face of this difficulty it is well to return to the Acts and to read again the 
history recorded by St Luke. The apostolic missionaries, in his story, saw both 
sides of this question, they stated both sides, yet their zeal was not diminished 
at all. On the contrary, they lived and died in earnest, eager effort to bring the 
world to Christ. That is the fact set before us in the Acts. Obviously hope for 
the heathen does not necessarily weaken zeal for the propagation of the 
gospel.116 
 
The only way to strike this balance between hope and urgency, says Allen, is by 
regarding the issue as a spiritual reality to be lived out rather than as an academic 
problem to be solved, for “missionary zeal does not grow out of intellectual beliefs, 
nor out of theological arguments, but out of love.”117 And in this case ‘love’ is not 
merely the human emotion, but the presence of the Holy Spirit. 
 With this point in place, Allen then makes a distinction between reasons for 
doing missions and the motive of missions. He states: 
Belief that the religion of the heathen is bad is not the motive which impels 
men to preach Christ; belief that the religion of the heathen has much truth in 
it is not the motive. These are only opinions which may change; the motive is 
the presence in the soul of the Redeeming Spirit of Christ, the Spirit which 
seeks to bring all men back to God in Christ. That motive does not change.118 
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In other words, within Christian history and among contemporary Christians we find 
various justifications given for why the church should take the gospel to the 
unevangelized – e.g., belief in the imminent return of Christ; belief in the superior 
morality (civilization) of Christians; belief that those who die before hearing will be 
condemned; belief that the church must seek out God’s elect; etc. Yet Allen argues 
that these views and others like them simply represent opinions and reasons for why 
we do missions, and that such motivations change over time and usually vary from 
person to person. What does not change, however, is the true missionary zeal for 
reaching the lost. This is because the prime motive of missions is rooted not in 
communal or personal reasons, but in the active immutable presence of the Holy 
Spirit. True missionary zeal remains constant in the midst of changing views because 
it “is grounded in the nature and character of the Holy Ghost.”119 In this way, Allen 
also indicates a conceptual space in which we might locate the theological hope for 
the unevangelized; that is, within the nature and character of God. 
 We have noted that the theological hope for the unevangelized is not based on 
a promise, as God never said whether he would grant faith to those who die before 
hearing the gospel. Yet we might now suggest that while this hope is not based on a 
promise, it is nonetheless based on the revealed nature and character of God, and to 
this extent Luther once again provides us with a way forward in the discussion. 
 In his commentary on Genesis Luther discusses the curse put upon Cain for 
killing his brother Abel, and he notes that although God sent Cain into exile he 
nonetheless granted him a measure of mercy – i.e., protection and a wife. Luther 
writes: 
These are two favors which should not be regarded lightly and which Cain 
could not even have hoped for when he first heard his sentence from his 
father. Their purpose was that he might have opportunity and time for 
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repentance, although they are a matter of accident and not one of 
command. . . . 
 This was, to express myself in this way, accidental mercy, of which no 
assurance had previously been given through a promise.120 
 
In other words, God was in no way obligated to bestow mercy upon Cain or his 
descendants, so Luther argues that the only way to explain the preservation of Cain 
and the subsequent salvation of many of his descendants (and others), is in reference 
to the divine prerogative: 
I do not think that all [of Cain’s descendants] were condemned without 
exception. But those who were converted to the faith were not saved as the 
result of a definite promise made to them; they were saved as the result of 
what I would call “irregular grace.” Thus the Gibeonites and others were 
saved when the people of Israel occupied the land of Canaan. Similarly, Job, 
Naaman the Syrian, the Ninevites, the widow of Zarephath, and others from 
among the heathen were saved, not as the result of a promise but as the result 
of irregular grace.121 
 
If then we apply these notions of ‘accidental mercy’ and ‘irregular grace’ to the issue 
at hand, we can base the theological hope for the unevangelized on the fact that it is 
within the nature of God to sometimes grant saving faith to those who have no 
promise of salvation. 
 To be clear, this is not to say that God will indeed act in this way towards the 
unevangelized, but to say that the conviction of hope is not a wholly unfounded 
position. Indeed, theologically speaking, we might simply rest on Zwingli’s assertion 
that “nothing prevents God from choosing from among the heathen men to revere 
Him, to honor Him, and after death to be united to Him. For His election is free.”122 
And yet the quality of this hope is such that it reinforces the conviction of urgency, 
for no one knows whether God will do this. It is, then, due to the scriptural and 
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theological nature of this hope, and to the active immutable presence of the Holy 
Spirit in the hearts of believers, that this view of the unevangelized does not 
necessarily weaken missionary zeal. As John Stott writes: 
Our supreme motivation in world evangelisation will not primarily be 
obedience to the great commission, nor even loving concern for those who do 
not yet know Jesus, important as these two incentives are, but first and 
foremost a burning zeal (even ‘jealousy’) for the glory of Jesus Christ.123 
 
Summary and Recognition of Issues for Further Study 
 Through a creative extrapolation of Luther’s view on the theological use of the 
law we have attempted to develop a Reformation interpretation of preparatio 
evangelica in regard to the fate of the unevangelized. To this end, we described the 
preparation of unevangelized individuals for hearing the gospel as occurring through 
the Holy Spirit’s temporary use of the proper function of the natural law to bring ‘the 
people in the middle’ to an understanding of themselves through a genuine sense of 
shame for the wrong they have done, and a dawning realization that they can never 
understand nor obtain that which is true, good, and holy by their “own strength, effort, 
or works.”124 We then called this preparation an act of ‘actual grace’ whereby the 
Holy Spirit enables and strengthens the soul to receive the convicting use of the law, 
and also ‘accompanies and supports’ a subsequent act of humility.125 Yet this salutary 
act is not a good work that merits grace, but is itself a work of grace by which a 
person is prepared for the hearing of the gospel at a future time. In this case, that time 
would come just before or after death. 
 In short, this chapter argues that the assertion that God is able to impart faith 
in the hour of death or after death is best understood in relation to his gracious activity 
                                               
123 David L. Edwards and John Stott, Evangelical Essentials: A Liberal-Evangelical 
Dialogue (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1989), 328-329. 
124 Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 131. 
125 Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 222. 
 
 220 
in this life. For if we confess that God can do something, then this affirmation, no 
matter how tentative it might be, derives its certainty from standard doctrinal and 
theological principles. Hence, by drawing upon the relevant principles there must also 
be a way to explain how God can do this thing, no matter how speculative it might be. 
This then is what we have tried to do here in regard to a Reformation approach to the 
question of the unevangelized. 
 Having said this, even if we accept the proposal as it stands, there still remain 
at least two related issues in need of further study. First, it is not often that a person 
comes to faith in Christ upon hearing the gospel for the first time. Usually, an act of 
conversion is a process that takes time so that even when the Holy Spirit has prepared 
an unevangelized person for hearing the gospel, it is still through ‘hearing’ that this 
person is then prepared for faith. The act of believing and calling upon Christ often 
occurs after a period of additional learning, contemplation, observation, participation, 
and discussion. Thus, the idea that someone might obtain saving faith during the time 
of death, whether just before or immediately after, is perhaps the most unrealistic 
aspect of this proposal. For even Luther understands the concept of “accidental 
mercy” as the “opportunity and time for repentance.”126 
 Nevertheless, we might resolve this issue by specifying that the preparation of 
these unevangelized individuals will continue after death, thereby granting an 
opportunity and time for repentance – presumably before the final judgment. To this 
purpose, we will pursue an answer to this question in the next chapter through a study 
of the early church and Reformation teachings on Christ’s descent into hell and the 
intermediate state, as well as a closer reading of D’Costa’s appropriation of these 
theological materials. Thus, guided by the same doctrinal rules which frame this 
chapter – no universal or second-chance option, God is just in all his judgments, 
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salvation is through Christ alone by faith alone and faith comes from hearing – 
perhaps this endeavor will reveal a rich theological environment in which the 





















 In the previous chapter we sought to resolve the issue in George Lindbeck’s 
prospective fides ex auditu theory regarding the present-tense missions value of other 
religions and the potential therein for orienting a person towards a future salvation. To 
this purpose, we followed Gavin D’Costa’s lead and considered the problem in light 
of the preparatio evangelica tradition. But rather than view this preparation as 
occurring through elements of truth, goodness, and beauty in other religions we 
proposed that this preparation is a work of actual grace by the Holy Spirit through the 
convicting use of the natural law. In itself this grace does not save a person, but it 
nonetheless prepares individuals for hearing the proclamation of the gospel at a future 
time. The focus of this chapter, then, is on the subsequent issue in Lindbeck’s theory 
concerning the time when the fides ex auditu obtains, presumably after death. Our 
examination of Lindbeck revealed that his theory requires a cultural-linguistic space 
and time after death so that an unevangelized person can become competent enough 
to receive Christ as Lord. Yet he does not provide a theological explanation for how 
this opportunity might occur after death. 
 Recall Joseph DiNoia’s proposal that the doctrine of purgatory could help fill 
this gap in prospective theories (like Lindbeck’s), as it allows for an interval of 
transformation for those who die with a disposition for faith but who are unprepared 
for the beatific vision.1 Yet D’Costa points out that because it is traditionally taught 
that purgatory is available only to those who die with explicit faith in Christ, further 
explanation is needed to understand how a non-Christian might be able to experience 
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this transformative process. He then seeks to open the doors of purgatory to certain 
unevangelized people through an analogical application of the descensus article in the 
Apostles’ Creed; i.e., ‘He descended into hell.’2 D’Costa follows the teaching which 
says that Christ descended not to the place of torment but only to the abode of the 
righteous, and there is no possibility for conversion after death. He then interprets the 
abode of the righteous through the theological concept of the limbus patrum – the 
limbo of the fathers – and the long tradition that includes righteous Gentiles with 
those whom Christ saved in his descent. With this proposal in mind, we will now seek 
to develop an alternative application of the descensus doctrine for a Reformation 
approach. 
Our first step will be to consider a claim made by a few within evangelicalism 
that the descensus article in the Apostles’ Creed should be removed. I will point out 
several critical weaknesses in the argument and explain why retaining the article is in 
our best interest. Second, we will survey some early church treatments of the 
descensus doctrine as well as the teachings of Magisterial Reformers Ulrich Zwingli, 
Martin Luther, and John Calvin. The reason for this exercise is to try and apprehend 
the doctrinal rules instantiated by the early church fathers and familiarize ourselves 
with the theological grammar of Reformation teachings on the subject. Third, we will 
note some of the difficulties associated with D’Costa’s analogical use of the limbo of 
the just and offer an alternative theological framework to allow for an objective 
connection to the analogical use of Christ’s descent into hell. Fourth, we will consider 
Augustine’s argument that Christ descended only to the righteous in hell and that 
there is no possibility for repentance after death. Through a closer reading of his 
treatments of the descent, this section will seek a way to affirm the possibility of 
                                               
2 See, Gavin D’Costa, Christianity and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the 
Theology of Religions (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 161-211. 
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posthumous salvation and still keep an Augustinian trajectory. The chapter will then 
conclude with a summation of the ways in which the proposal contributes to the 
discussion of the unevangelized. 
 
The Argument for Removing the Descensus Article 
 
 Evangelical theologian Wayne Grudem argues that the phrase, ‘He descended 
into hell,’ should be excluded from the Apostles’ Creed. He asserts that this article is 
“a late intruder into the Apostles’ Creed that never really belonged there in the first 
place and that, on historical and Scriptural grounds, deserves to be removed.”3 
Grudem points out that the Creed developed “from about A.D. 200 to 750,” and that 
although the phrase appeared in several versions from A.D. 390 “it is not included 
again in any version of the Creed until 650.”4 He then asserts that “unlike the Nicene 
Creed and the Chalcedonian Definition, the Apostles’ Creed was not written or 
approved by a single Church council at one specific time.”5 Furthermore, he evaluates 
some of the biblical proof texts traditionally used to support this doctrine and claims 
that everyone “should be able to agree at least that the idea of Christ’s ‘descent into 
hell’ is by no means taught clearly or explicitly in any passage of Scripture.”6 He 
therefore concludes that “there would be all gain and no loss if it were dropped from 
the Creed once for all.”7 This is a bold claim, and further consideration might show 
that both history and church teaching are rather on the side of retaining the descensus 
article. 
                                               
3 Wayne Grudem, “He Did Not Descend Into Hell: A Plea for Following Scripture 
Instead of the Apostle’s Creed,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 34, 
no. 1 (1991): 103. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 112.  
7 Ibid., 113; John Piper holds a similar position. See, “Did Jesus Spend Saturday 




 For instance, Grudem asserts that the Creed “has no claim to being apostolic 
and no warrant (in the sense of a ‘descent into hell’) from the first six centuries of the 
Church.”8 But there are at least two critical problems with this statement. First, 
Christians accept the Creed as authoritative based not on the assumption of apostolic 
authorship but, as Calvin puts it, because the Apostles’ Creed “gives, in clear and 
succinct order, a full statement of our faith, and in every thing which it contains is 
sanctioned by the sure testimony of Scripture.”9 Even more, Calvin uses the Creed as 
an outline for his treatise on the salvation of Christ; 
because it states the leading articles of redemption in a few words, and may 
thus serve as a tablet in which the points of Christian doctrine, most deserving 
of attention, are brought separately and distinctly before us.10 
 
And the late addition of the descensus article and the question of authorship does not 
bother Calvin, who states: 
It is of little consequence by whom and at what time it was introduced. The 
chief thing to be attended to in the Creed is, that it furnishes us with a full and 
every way complete summary of faith, containing nothing but what has been 
derived from the infallible word of God.11 
 
Hence, the authority of the Apostles’ Creed with all its articles rests not in its 
authorship or date, but in its concise, faithful, and ‘complete summary of faith’ in 
accordance with the Scriptures. 
Second, concerning historical evidence, Martin Scharlemann asserts: 
The fact . . . that the statement on the descensus was incorporated in the 
Creeds at a rather late date does not mean to suggest that there was no doctrine 
of Christ’s descent in the early church. On the contrary, it has become 
abundantly evident that the subject matter of Christ’s κατάβασις came under 
discussion very early in the life of the church.12 
 
                                               
8 Ibid. 
9 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge, vol. 2 
(Edinburgh: The Edinburgh Printing Co., 1845), 325. 
10 Ibid., 324. 
11 Ibid., 317. 
12 Martin H. Scharlemann, “‘He Descended into Hell’: An Interpretation of 1 Peter 3: 
18-20,” Concordia Journal 15 (1989): 312. 
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Regarding this abundance of early evidence, Wouter Biesbrouck points out that 
“nearly all the early Fathers, starting from the beginning of the second century, make 
mention of it,”13 and Jared Wicks notes that “we have twelve different attestations of 
this belief in works dated before A.D. 180.”14 Nevertheless, while we might have 
sufficient historical warrant for maintaining the article’s inclusion, what about the 
scriptural support? 
Biesbrouck writes, “It is certainly true that there is no direct unambiguous 
biblical reference to Christ’s descent. Yet, if we look at the Scriptural witness that is 
put forward by the Church Fathers, a whole battery of proof texts is proffered.”15 The 
most common reference is 1 Peter 3:18-21; 4:6, and Grudem seeks to discredit a 
descensus interpretation by arguing that “the most satisfactory explanation” of this 
passage is by Augustine, who does not see this text as referring to Christ’s descent but 
rather to “Christ ‘in spirit’ . . . preaching through Noah to the hostile unbelievers 
around him.”16 What Grudem fails to consider, however, is that despite Augustine’s 
reading of 1 Peter 3:18-20, he nonetheless does affirm the doctrine of Christ’s descent 
based on Psalm 16:10 and Acts 2:24, 27, and he declares, “Who, therefore, except an 
infidel, will deny that Christ was in hell?”17 Thus, in the end, Grudem’s argument for 
excluding the descensus article from the Apostles’ Creed is unpersuasive. 
Having said this, as regards the intent of this thesis we need only recall that 
this work is an application of Lindbeck’s rule theory approach to doctrine, which 
means that our use of the descensus article rests on the fact that “historically, . . . the 
                                               
13 Wouter Biesbrouck, “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus, Sed Extra Mundum Nulla 
Damnatio: Reappropriating Christ’s Descent into Hell for Theology of Religions,” 
Louvain Studies 37 (2013): 116. 
14 Jared Wicks, “Christ’s Saving Descent to the Dead: Early Witnesses from Ignatius 
of Antioch to Origen,” Pro Ecclesia 17, no. 3 (2008): 282. 
15 Biesbrouck, “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus,” 112. 
16 Grudem, “He Did Not Descend into Hell,” 110. 
17 Augustine, “Letter 164,” Ch. 2, trans. J. G. Cunningham, New Advent, accessed 
November 30, 2013, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102164.htm. 
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articles of the Apostles’ Creed . . . have been treated as unconditionally and 
permanently essential.”18 In other words, like the solus Christus, sola fide, and fides 
ex auditu principles, the descensus article also functions as an irreversible doctrine for 
Christian theological discussion.19 Thus, let us consider the doctrinal rules instantiated 
by early church treatments of Christ’s descent into hell. 
 
The Doctrinal Rules Instantiated by the Early Church Fathers 
 
 Fergus King explains that “in its classic form the Descent into Hell is a 
doctrine that addresses the fate of those who died in the period before the Incarnation, 
that is, those who had no opportunity in their earthly life, to hear and accept Christ.”20 
From this premise, early Christian thought on the subject is rather straightforward in 
its teaching; e.g., because Jesus proclaimed salvation to the living during his time on 
earth, it is reasonable to assume that he did the same during his time among the dead. 
Indeed, the idea that the events in hades in some ways mimic the events which 
occurred upon the earth is a common theme in the early treatments. 
For instance, the Orthodox theologian Hilarion Alfeyev notes that Hippolytus 
“was one of the first to speak of John the Baptist preaching in Hades before Christ’s 
descent therein.”21 The idea is that just as John prepared the way for Christ on earth, 
so also he prepared the way for Christ’s descent to the place of the dead. Moreover, J. 
A. MacCulloch states in his comprehensive study of the descensus doctrine that “the 
                                               
18 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
Age (Louisville: WJK Press, 2009), 72. 
19 For Lindbeck’s taxonomy of doctrines, see, Ibid., 70-71. 
20 Fergus King, “‘He Descended to the Dead’: Towards a Pastoral Strategy for 
Making Peace with the Living Dead,” Soma: An International Journal of Theological 
Discourses and Counter-Discourses (2012): 7; also see, Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, Light in 
Darkness: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Descent 
Into Hell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 9-85. 
21 Alfeyev, Christ the Conqueror of Hell, 45. Also see, Hippolytus, “On Christ and 




announcement of the good news of salvation in Hades forms the earliest and most 
widely diffused conception of the purpose of the presence of Christ’s soul in 
Hades.”22 One example of this interpretation of the descent is from Clement of 
Alexandria, who asserts: 
If, then, He [Jesus] preached the Gospel to those in the flesh that they might 
not be condemned unjustly, how is it conceivable that He did not for the same 
cause preach the Gospel to those who had departed this life before His 
advent?23 
 
Within this frame of thought early Christian treatments often signify a two-fold 
purpose for Christ’s descent into hell: 1) to proclaim freedom to those held captive 
therein, and 2) to assert his victory over sin, death, and the devil.24 For instance, 
Origen expresses this two-fold purpose when he writes: 
By this death he [Christ] destroyed him who possessed the power of death 
(mortem imperiam), that is the devil, in order to liberate those held by death. 
For, having bound the strong man and having conquered him by the cross, he 
entered into his house, which is the house of death, or Hades, and spoiled his 
goods, that is, liberated the souls which death held.25 
 
Yet this liberation does not mean these souls went directly to heaven. As Jacques Le 
Goff explains: 
He [Origen] assures his readers that the righteous go to Paradise the moment 
they die, but this Paradise, he says, is different from heaven, in which the soul 
arrives only after the Last Judgment and trial by fire, a trial that may last for a 
shorter or longer period.26 
 
                                               
22 J. A. MacCulloch, The Harrowing of Hell: A Comparative Study of an Early 
Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1930), 240. 
23 Clement of Alexandria, “Stromata,” 6.6, trans. William Wilson, New Advent, 
accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02101.htm. 
24 See, Malcolm L. Peel, “The ‘Decensus Ad Inferos’ in ‘The Teachings of Silvanus’ 
(CG VII, 4),” Numen 26, no. Fasc. 1 (1979): 39-47; Wicks, “Christ’s Saving Descent 
to the Dead”; Biesbrouck, “Extra Ecclesiam,”116-119; Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, Light in 
Darkness, 30-60; Hilarion Alfeyev, Christ the Conqueror of Hell, 43-82. 
25 Origen, Commentary on Romans 5, 10, in Alfeyev, Christ the Conqueror of Hell, 
51; also see, Malcolm L. Peel, “The ‘Decensus Ad Inferos’ in ‘The Teachings of 
Silvanus’ (CG VII, 4),” Numen 26, no. Fasc. 1 (1979): 39-47. 
26 Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 




The power of sin, death, and the devil is spoiled but heaven must wait till the 
consummation. 
We find a similar position with Tertullian, who considers the parable of the 
rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), and states: 
It must therefore be evident to every man of intelligence who has ever heard 
of the Elysian fields, that there is some determinate place called Abraham’s 
bosom, and that it is designed for the reception of the souls of Abraham’s 
children, even from among the Gentiles (since he is “the father of many 
nations,” which must be classed among his family), and of the same faith as 
that wherewithal he himself believed God, without the yoke of the law and the 
sign of circumcision. This region, therefore, I call Abraham’s bosom. 
Although it is not in heaven, it is yet higher than hell, and is appointed to 
afford an interval of rest to the souls of the righteous, until the consummation 
of all things shall complete the resurrection of all men with the “full 
recompense of their reward.”27 
 
From this perspective, Tertullian argues that until the time of the resurrection the 
doors of heaven remain closed to all except martyrs, for “the sole key to unlock 
Paradise is your own life’s blood.”28 So even after Christ’s descent Abraham’s bosom 
remains the abode of all who will be saved in the consummation, both Jews and 
Gentiles. 
Irenaeus also teaches the continuation of the intermediate state after Christ’s 
descent, saying that the souls of the righteous do not go immediately to heaven after 
death, but “shall go away into the invisible place allotted to them by God, and there 
remain until the resurrection, awaiting that event.”29 His reason is simple – disciples 
are not greater than their master; hence, just as “the Lord observed the law of the 
                                               
27 Tertullian, “Against Marcion,” 4.34, trans. Peter Holmes, New Advent, accessed 
May 6, 2016, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/03124.htm. 
28 Tertullian, “A Treatise on the Soul,” Ch. 55, trans. Peter Holmes, New Advent, 
accessed December 7, 2016, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0310.htm. Perhaps 
referring to Revelation 6:9. 
29 Irenaeus, St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against Heresies, ed. Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson (Ex Fontibus, 2010), 638 (5.31.2). 
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dead” before his resurrection and ascension, so must his disciples do likewise.30 He 
writes: 
As our Master, therefore, did not at once depart, taking flight [to heaven], but 
awaited the time of His resurrection prescribed by the Father, . . . and rising 
again after three days was taken up [to heaven]; so ought we also to await the 
time of our resurrection prescribed by God and foretold by the prophets, and 
so, rising, be taken up, as many as the Lord shall account worthy of this 
[privilege].31 
 
Thus, however Irenaeus envisions the nature of the ‘invisible place,’ he is certain that 
this place is not yet heaven. 
 Finally, the Shepherd of Hermas states that the apostles also descended after 
their deaths to preach to those who had “fallen asleep” so that these too might be 
“made to know the name of the Son of God” and be saved.32 Clement refers to this 
passage in the Shephard of Hermas and insists that the purpose of the apostles’ 
descent was to preach the gospel to the Gentiles: 
For it was requisite, in my opinion, that as here, so also there [hades], the best 
of the disciples should be imitators of the Master; so that He should bring to 
repentance those belonging to the Hebrews, and they the Gentiles.33 
 
Commenting on this statement, MacCulloch says: 
Clement thus argues that, as was insisted on by other writers, Gentiles were as 
acceptable to God as Jews; but, as no other had yet done, he applies this 
argument to those Gentiles who had passed away before Christ’s coming.34 
 
Clement reasons that because God is a just judge and is not a respecter of persons, he 
will make sure that all have the opportunity to respond to the preaching of the gospel 
– both Jews and Gentiles, both the living and the dead.35 However, Wicks surveys a 
broad spectrum of early writings on the issue, and notes: 
                                               
30 Ibid., 637. 
31 Ibid. 
32 “The Shepherd of Hermas,” Similitude 9.16, trans, F. Crombie New Advent, 
accessed December 6, 2016, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02013.htm. 
33 Clement of Alexandria, “Stromata,” 6.6, trans. William Wilson, New Advent, 
accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/02101.htm. 
34 MacCulloch, The Harrowing of Hell, 98. 
35 Clement, “The Stromata.” 6.6. 
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In most cases the preached message extends Christ’s salvation to the righteous 
dead of Israel, to whom Hippolytus added Adam (2.3). Others, however, 
increase the number of those whom Christ addresses to include the rest of 
humanity, for example, Pseudo-Hippolytus (1.12), Clement of Alexandria 
(2.4), and Origen in De principiis (2.5 [2]).36 
 
In this way, the early Christian writings demonstrate various opinions regarding the 
extent of Christ’s liberating descent into hades. 
Through this concise survey of the early church treatments of the descent we 
discover that, notwithstanding some differences, these writings present a rather 
organic picture of Christ’s descent into hades. Just as the fulfillment of the messianic 
promise was announced by John the Baptist among the living, so likewise he prepared 
the way among the dead. After which time Christ descended in triumph and 
proclaimed his salvation to the souls in hades – either to the righteous alone (with the 
possible inclusion of Gentiles) or to all captive souls in general. In so doing he also 
either brought them to a heavenly state, or he brought comfort and rest to those who 
still must await their full redemption in the consummation.37 Finally, some taught that 
the evangelistic ministry of the apostles did not end with their deaths, but that they too 
descended and preached to the Gentiles.38 
 With this picture of the descent in mind, we might consider these early 
formulations of the doctrine as comprising a kind of standard doctrinal lexicon for 
subsequent theological discussions on the subject. For example, following Lindbeck’s 
taxonomy of doctrines we might say that the ‘unconditionally essential’ rules are that 
Christ died an actual death upon the cross, and yet he was not a victim of death but 
rather a victor who conquered the grave and secured freedom from sin, death, and the 
                                               
36 Wicks, “Christ’s Saving Descent to the Dead”: 308; see, Hippolytus, “Exegetical 
Fragments: On Psalm 109 or 110,” trans. S. D. F. Salmond, New Advent, accessed 
December 2, 2016, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0502.htm. 
37 See Wicks’ summation of this point, “Christ’s Saving Descent to the Dead,” 309. 
38 Alfeyev gives a similar synopsis. See, Christ the Conqueror of Hell, 51. 
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devil for those bound by “the law of the dead.”39 Hence, any expression of the 
descensus doctrine must affirm these principles. 
On the other hand, concerning the issues of the extent of this offer and of 
whether those whom Christ freed are now in a heavenly state or still in the bosom of 
Abraham/paradise, we might categorize as ‘conditionally essential’ rules.40 That is to 
say, each of these interpretations is a possible option within traditional orthodox 
Christianity, and the particular view one holds will depend on one’s theological 
convictions, reading of Scripture, denominational confessions, or some combination 
of these and other factors. We should also recognize that from an ecumenical 
perspective we need to include in this category the teaching of John the Baptist’s 
descent into hades, as the Eastern Orthodox tradition continues to uphold this 
teaching.41 For example, a hymn (troparion) sung each year by Orthodox Christians 
to commemorate John’s martyrdom states: “The glorious beheading of the Forerunner 
was a certain divine dispensation, that the coming of the Savior might also be 
preached to those in Hades.”42 Also, to the extent that D’Costa uses the notion of the 
apostles’ descent to argue for the instrumental causality of the church in the salvation 
of the unevangelized, this teaching is shown to be a ‘conditionally essential’ rule as 
well.43 
                                               
39 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 637. 
40 For Lindbeck’s ‘Taxonomy of Doctrines,’ see, Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 
70-74. 
41 Following Andrew Louth, the terms “Eastern Orthodox” and “Orthodox” are used 
in this chapter to refer to those groups within Eastern Christianity who are in 
communion with each other; e.g., Greek, Russian, Romanian, and Bulgarian 
Orthodox churches. See, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology (Downers Grove: 
IVP Academic, 2013), xiii-xx. 
42 Apolytikia and Kontakia (St. Anthony’s Greek Orthodox Monastery, 2009), 1215; 
accessed December 5, 2016, 
http://www.stanthonysmonastery.org/music/Apolytikia.pdf. 
43 He links it to the Roman Catholic teaching on Eucharistic mediation. See, 
Christianity and World Religions, 170-171, 180-186. 
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Taken altogether, this basic doctrinal typology will guide our application of 
the descensus doctrine for developing a Reformation prospective solution to the 
question of the unevangelized. But before we proceed, we must also consider the 
theological grammar of the reformers. 
 
Reformed and Lutheran Interpretations of the Descent 
 
By the time of the Reformation the general position of the Western church was 
that upon death a person’s soul separates from their body whereby they immediately 
obtain either eternal life in heaven, eternal life in hell, or “temporal punishment” in 
purgatory.44 Moreover, Scharlemann notes that by the time of the Middle Ages “the 
descent into hell came to be interpreted in terms of the limbus patrum, where Jesus 
offered the departed souls of patriarchs and prophets the benefit of His sacrifice.”45 
Thus, when the Reformation began the Western church held that Christ descended 
only to the just in limbo and not to the wicked in hell proper, and that Christ emptied 
the limbo of the just and opened the doors of heaven to the righteous and the doors of 
purgatory to those in need of further cleansing after death.46 So in regard to the 
conditionally essential rules of the descensus, this interpretation shaped the 
theological context of the issue during the time of the Reformation, and therefore 




 Zwingli affirms the descensus article in the Apostles’ Creed, stating: 
If He had not “died and been buried,” who would believe that He was a real 
man? Therefore the apostolic Fathers added in the creed, “descendit ad 
inferos,” i.e., He descended to those below, using the expression as a 
circumlocution to signify real death. For to be reckoned with those below is to 
have gone from the land of the living, and shows that the efficacy of His 
                                               
44 Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 482. Also see, ibid., 473-485 and DS 40, 
321, 410, 429, 456-457, 464, 530, 570s, 693. 
45 Scharlemann, “‘He Descended into Hell,’” 312. 
46 For example, see, DS 456-457; 464. 
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redemption extended even to those below. And this St. Peter hints at when he 
says [I Pet. 3: 19 f.] that the Gospel was preached also to them that are dead, 
that is, to those below who following the example of Noah from the 
foundation of the world, believed the warnings of God, when the wicked were 
scornful.47 
 
To be sure, this particular statement by Zwingli appears to limit the benefits of 
Christ’s descent to those who, like Noah, had ‘believed the warnings of God.’ But 
elsewhere he also mentions figures such as “Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, 
Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, the Catos and Scipios” as being among those who 
received Christ’s salvation.48 As we discussed in previous parts of this thesis, the sole 
basis of salvation for Zwingli is divine election; hence, “the elect are ever elect, even 
before they believe.”49 Timothy George explains that in this way, “the presumed 
salvation of such ‘heathen’ was not based on the universal revelation of God in 
nature, much less on their own meritorious deeds. It depended instead on the free 
decision of God to choose whom he will.”50 Or as G. W. Bromiley states: 
The decree of election upon which all salvation depends was a decree from all 
eternity, enclosing men of all generations within its embrace. Chronologically 
the patriarchs and pious Israelites preceded the coming of the Saviour, but this 
did not prevent their salvation by anticipatory faith. Similarly the pious 
heathen might well be the recipients of divine grace and redemption even 
though they remained outside the temporal reach of the Gospel. They were not 
saved because of their piety, but because of the eternal activity of God in 
election and atonement.51 
 
As regards the intermediate state, Zwingli interprets the ‘bosom of Abraham’ less as a 
particular place and more as a phrase indicating that the righteous were safeguarded 
                                               
47 Ulrich Zwingli, The Latin Works of Huldreich Zwingli, trans. Samuel Macauley 
Jackson, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: The Heidelberg Press, 1922), 245. 
48 Ibid., 272. 
49 Ulrich Zwingli, Selected Works of Huldreich Zwingli, trans. Samuel Macauley 
Jackson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1901), 242. Also see, 239-247. 
50 Timothy George, Theology of the Reformers (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2013), 
129. 
51 Huldrych Zwingli and Johann Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli and Bullinger, ed. G. W. 
Bromiley (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979), 242-243. 
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until Christ: “For it [the bosom of Abraham] can be nothing else than the sodality of 
the early believers to be everywhere preserved for the coming of Christ.”52 
For this reason, Gergely Juhász suggests that Zwingli may have held a view 
similar to his protégé Heinrich Bullinger, who argued for a figurative interpretation of 
Christ’s descent into hell.53 Regarding Bullinger’s position, Juhász states: 
Based on the quotation Peter uses in Acts 2:27 where he cites Ps. 16:10—“you 
will not leave my soul in inferno”—and based on Gen. 42:38 and 44:29, 
Bullinger identified the word infer(n)um with sepultus (grave). Consequently, 
Bullinger rejected both the bodily and the spiritual interpretation of this article 
of faith. Rather, he argued that the virtue of Christ’s death and salvation had 
its beneficial effect on the faithful of the OT, just as baptism, through the 
virtue of Christ’s resurrection, washes away the sins of the baptized.54 
 
Nevertheless, Zwingli does maintain “that through His precious death the captives 
were redeemed, and Christ, the victor, led them upwards, as is professed in the Creed: 
‘he descended into Hell.’”55 And based on his reading of the Creed Zwingli dispenses 
with the intermediate state after Christ’s descent, stating, “I believe, then, that the 
souls of the faithful fly to heaven as soon as they leave the body, come into the 
presence of God, and rejoice forever.”56 And for Zwingli ‘the faithful’ comprise all 
the elect both before and after Christ, which includes individuals who die before 
hearing the gospel.57 As W. P. Stephens explains: 
For him there is no contradiction between God’s sovereignty in election and 
Christ’s role as mediator in the salvation of the Gentiles. All people are saved 
through Christ, by which he means the mercy of God shown in Christ. They 
can be saved, however, whether or not the gospel is preached to them.58 
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54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 202. 
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In short, Zwingli holds that the doctrine of the descent teaches that by his death upon 
the cross Christ freed all the elect from the bonds of death and opened to them the 
doors of heaven. This did not, perhaps, include an actual journey to a specific 
location, but these souls received the benefit of Christ’s atoning work nonetheless. 
Thus, all elect individuals after the time of Christ experience the beatific vision 




 Paul Althaus says that Luther holds a two-fold view of the descensus doctrine. 
On one hand he says that Luther understands the article in the Creed as referring to 
“part of Christ’s death agony,” and is therefore meant to convey Christ’s humiliation 
on the cross as he “suffers hell and the wrath of God.”59 But on the other hand, says 
Althaus: 
On the basis of Scripture passages such as Psalm 16:10 and Acts 2:24-27 and 
in view of the sequence of the Articles in the Apostles’ Creed (where the 
descent into hell follows his death) Luther also teaches a descent of Christ into 
hell after his death.60 
 
Yet when considering Luther’s overall position, Althaus argues that his emphasis of 
the descent is chiefly on “the passion, Gethsemane, and Golgotha,” and that in 
contrast to his fellow reformer Philip Melanchthon and to later Lutheran orthodoxy he 
does not affirm “the descent into hell as Christ’s triumphal victory march into hell.”61 
Yet Bernhard Lohse cautions that “the importance of the victory motif [in Luther’s 
theology] should not be ignored. Not only in the context of atonement doctrine but 
also in ethics and in general observation of the world, the idea of victory has 
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considerable significance.”62 Emerson also tempers Althaus’ assertion by arguing that 
Luther does indeed envision a triumphal descent, but that “the Patristic perspective on 
Christ’s victorious descent is decoupled from their liberating motif, at least in the 
sense that it universally liberates humanity from Adam’s bonds.”63 
To be sure, Emerson’s observation appears to be closer to the mark. In a 
sermon at Torgau in 1533, Luther affirms the victory motif of the descent, but 
indicates that it was not universal: 
Before Christ arose and ascended into heaven, and while yet lying in the 
grave, He also descended into hell in order to deliver also us from it, who were 
to be held in it as prisoners. . . . However I shall not discuss this article in a 
profound and subtle manner, as to how it was done or what it means to 
“descend into hell,” but adhere to the simplest meaning conveyed by these 
words, as we must represent it to children and uneducated people.64 
 
What is the simplest meaning conveyed? He continues: 
Accordingly, it is customary to represent Christ in paintings on walls, as He 
descends, appears before hell, clad in a priestly robe and with a banner in His 
hand, with which He beats the devil and puts him to flight, takes hell by storm, 
and rescues those that are His. Thus it was also acted the night before Easter 
as a play for children. And I am well pleased with the fact that it is painted, 
played, sung and said in this manner for the benefit of simple people. . . . 
 Since we cannot but conceive thoughts and images of what is 
presented to us in words, and unable to think of or understand anything 
without such images, it is appropriate and right that we view it literally, just as 
it is painted, that He descends with the banner, shattering and destroying the 
gates of hell.65 
 
Here Luther preaches a victorious descent whereby Christ defeats sin, hell, and the 
devil but rescues only ‘those that are his.’ Furthermore, while Luther asserts that it is 
good to ‘view it literally,’ he means only in the sense of how the doctrine is 
traditionally represented through paintings, plays, and songs; “for it certainly did not 
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take place in a bodily and tangible manner although we can only paint and conceive it 
in a coarse and bodily way and speak of it in pictures.”66 
 That said, when Luther speaks elsewhere about Christ’s descent in a ‘profound 
and subtle manner,’ we discover why he thought it best to keep his sermon simple. In 
his commentary on Genesis he does not hesitate to dismiss the theological concept of 
the limbo of the just: 
They say [the Roman Catholic Church] that Christ descended to this place, 
broke it open, and set free—not from hell but from the limbo—the fathers who 
were troubled by the longing and waiting for Christ but were not enduring 
punishment or torments.67 
 
In response to this teaching, Luther writes: 
Their talk about a limbo of the fathers is inappropriate. It would have been 
better if they had called it the bosom of Abraham; for those who died before 
Christ were saved in the promise of the Word in which they lived in this life, 
and when they died, they entered into life and were truly alive.68 
 
From this perspective, Luther’s extended point is that the effects of Christ’s descent – 
i.e., freedom from the torments of hell – were actualized even before the occurrence 
of the historical event. And it is here that we must seek to grasp Luther’s ‘subtle and 
profound’ explanation. In the quote above we see that he does not envision the Old 
Testament saints as having had to wait for their salvation in Christ, as they were 
already saved based on their faith ‘in the promise of the Word.’ Althaus explains that 
for Luther: 
Christ’s work was done at a particular time in history. But in God’s sight it has 
existed from all eternity. . . . For the gospel and the promise are there from the 
beginning and these include Christ and his work. Thus all men of all times 
who believe the promise, and thereby are blessed, live from the work of 
Christ—even though this actually first took place on Golgotha. The work of 
salvation is, however, based on God’s eternal will to save; and its significance 
therefore transcends time.69 
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We might say, then, that the axiomatic issue for Luther is not the location of souls 
before and after Christ, but rather the spiritual condition of souls before and after 
faith. Outside of faith in Christ (or in the promise of Christ) a person is held captive 
by sin, death, and the devil. But the descent means that Christ defeats the power of 
hell – even before the actual event occurs – so that all who trust in his promise never 
need to fear death’s embrace. Althaus states, “The Christian holds fast to the word 
when he dies, and it gives him the certainty that he will be awakened out of death.”70 
Yet how does Luther envision the state of souls after death? 
Based on the words of Christ to the thief on the cross, “Today you will be with 
me in paradise” (Luke 23:43), Luther says that believers now rest in paradise which is 
the same as “the bosom of Christ.”71 He also calls this paradisal state ‘heaven,’ but 
not in the eschatological sense: 
There heaven and Paradise are the same thing, except that as yet there is rest 
and peace among the saints, but not the kingdom. Christ is in heaven or 
Paradise to direct, judge, and rule His church, to send angels to minister to His 
church, to distribute gifts to men, to exalt the humble, etc. For He is always 
working and does not rest as do the saints who sleep.72 
 
Thus, this state is not yet the beatific vision because Christ is still at work in the world 
while the saints sleep. Moreover, by ‘rest’ or ‘sleep’ Luther often seems to mean a 
literal connotation, which is a theological position known as ‘soul sleep.’73 For 
instance, Luther asserts, “There is a great difference between the sleeping saints and 
the ruling Christ. The former sleep and do not know what is going on.”74 However, he 
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does not insist that this view be held as dogma, and after expressing this opinion in a 
letter to his friend Nicholas von Amsdorf he concludes, “Who knows how God deals 
with the departed souls?”75 It is also for this reason that Luther is not always 
consistent in his statements on the matter. For example, in one place he seems to 
imply that souls maintain a certain level of consciousness: 
There is a difference between the sleep or rest of this life and that of the future 
life. For toward night a person who has become exhausted by his daily labor in 
this life enters into his chamber in peace, as it were, to sleep there; and during 
this night he enjoys rest and has no knowledge whatever of any evil caused 
either by fire or by murder. But the soul does not sleep in the same manner. It 
is awake. It experiences visions and the discourses of the angels and of God.76 
 
Nevertheless, despite his inconsistent statements on the matter, Philip Secker insists: 
There can be no denying that Luther frequently and throughout the course of 
his life as a Reformer referred to death as sleep. Indeed this may well have 
been the characteristic way in which he referred to death.77 
 
It is also because of Luther’s frequent use of this description of death that leads 
Althaus to conclude that the notion of soul sleep “is Luther’s definitive statement 
about the condition of the departed.”78 
 That said, returning to the issue at hand we discover that for Luther the 
“simplest meaning” of Christ’s descent into hell is that Christ “rescues those that are 
His.”79 But when he speaks in a profound and subtle manner Luther means that 
through his death and resurrection Christ defeated sin, death, and the devil and that 
through faith a person is freed “from hell’s jaws” as Christ brings “us again into the 
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Father’s favor and grace.”80 Thus the doctrine of Christ’s descent means that not one 
person of faith, including Old Testament figures, ever spend one moment in the 
torments of hell. Yet neither do they go immediately into the beatific vision as he 
appears to hold that, in some sense, all souls remain asleep between the time of death 
and the general resurrection at which time “all will have to stand before the judgment 
seat.”81 So in his own way, Luther teaches the continuation of the intermediate state 
as the faithful ‘rest’ in the bosom of Christ. 
 
John Calvin 
While Calvin upholds the descensus article in the Apostles’ Creed he also 
clearly opposes the idea of an actual journey into hell. In particular, he calls the 
medieval scholastic conception of the afterlife “childish” and a “fable,” as these 
theologians “imagined” the place “of the Patriarchs who died under the law . . . to be 
a subterraneous cavern, to which they gave the name of Limbus.”82 On the contrary, 
Calvin says the biblical notion of ‘the bosom of Abraham’ is a more appropriate 
concept, but that one should not inquire about the nature of this state since “the 
dimension of the soul is not the same as that of the body.”83 Yet he is certain that 
unlike the medieval notion of the limbus patrum, the bosom of Abraham was not a 
place in which the fathers were held ‘captive’ or from which they needed to be 
freed.84 As François Wendel says: 
For Calvin, the affirmation that the Christ had really gone down into hell after 
his death belonged to the domain of fables; the descent into hell ought to be 
regarded simply as an image for the sufferings endured by Christ on the cross 
and of his death in the flesh.85 
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Calvin asserts that there is no reason to think that Christ freed souls who are under 
condemnation,86 or that Christ suffered after death when death for a righteous person 
means the end of bodily suffering and rest for the soul.87 “In his view,” says Emerson, 
“the descent happens on the cross as Jesus experiences the full separation from the 
Father due to bearing the weight of sin, expressed in the cry of dereliction.”88 
Therefore, Calvin holds that it is the ‘hellish’ events of the crucifixion – endured by 
Christ in both body and soul – to which the article in the Apostles’ Creed refers.89 For 
Calvin, says Keith Johnson, “the descent thus signifies the moment on the cross when 
Christ willingly bears the full burden of human sin and its consequences.”90 So 
similar to Bullinger, Calvin argues that the descensus article describes Christ’s 
suffering on the cross rather than an actual visitation to the place of the dead. 
Having said this, Calvin does affirm the notion that the gospel was made 
known among the dead, saying that “Christ illumined them by the power of his 
Spirit.”91 And his support for this affirmation is 1 Peter 3:19, about which he writes: 
The purport of the context is, that believers who had died before that time 
were partakers of the same grace with ourselves: for he celebrates the power 
of Christ’s death, in that he penetrated even to the dead, pious souls obtaining 
an immediate view of that visitation for which they had anxiously waited; 
while, on the other hand, the reprobate were more clearly convinced that they 
were completely excluded from salvation. Although the passage in Peter is not 
perfectly definite, we must not interpret as if he made no distinction between 
the righteous and the wicked: he only means to intimate, that the death of 
Christ was made known to both.92 
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Of course, by ‘visitation’ Calvin means only that they received the good news of 
Christ ‘by the power of the Spirit,’ and he argues that while Scripture teaches that 
Christ is now present with the righteous in paradise, paradise is not yet heaven. For 
while the atonement makes the soul “capable of beatific glory,” Scripture suspends 
this event until the consummation.93 In this way, the bosom of Abraham is 
transformed into paradise but even this “abode of blessed spirits” constitutes an 
intermediate state:94 
Since Scripture uniformly enjoins us to look with expectation to the advent of 
Christ, and delays the crown of glory till that period, let us be contented with 
the limits divinely prescribed to us—viz. that the souls of the righteous, after 
their warfare is ended, obtain blessed rest where in joy they wait for the 
fruition of promised glory, and that thus the final result is suspended till Christ 
the Redeemer appear.95 
 
In like manner, “There can be no doubt that the reprobate have the same doom as that 
which Jude assigns to the devils, they are ‘reserved in everlasting chains under 
darkness unto the judgment of the great day’ (Jude 6).”96 
 Thus, similar to Luther, the crux for Calvin is not so much whether Christ 
descended into the place of torment or only to the bosom of Abraham, but that Jesus 
overcame sin, death, and hell. And even though Calvin interprets the descensus article 
as referring only to Christ’s sufferings on the cross, he does affirm that the gospel was 
made known among the dead through the illumination of the Spirit whereby the 
righteous rejoiced and the wicked were further convinced of their damnation. 
Nevertheless, both the righteous and the unrighteous alike must wait for the second 
coming of Christ before experiencing either the beatific vision or eternal 
condemnation. In the end, Calvin still interprets Christ’s descent as a victorious defeat 
of sin and death, affirming that “by engaging with the power of the devil, the fear of 
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death, and the pains of hell, he gained the victory, and achieved a triumph, so that we 




From this brief assessment of Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin we find that while 
they diverge from the patristic views in some ways, they nonetheless maintain the 
‘unconditionally essential’ rules that Christ died an actual death upon the cross and 
that the descensus signifies his completed and proclaimed victory over sin, death, and 
the devil. With regard to the ‘conditionally essential’ rules, all three use the usual 
theological grammar – e.g., “He descended to those below” (Zwingli);98 Christ 
“appears before hell, . . . He beats the devil and puts him to flight” (Luther);99 and “he 
penetrated even to the dead” (Calvin).100 Nevertheless, even though they understand 
the descent as an ontological reality they do not view it in terms of Christ actually 
traveling in soul or body to the abode of the dead. Instead, the distinction for them 
appears to be less about location and more about one’s relation towards God – e.g., 
Christ “rescues those that are His” (Luther);101 distinguished as “the souls of the 
faithful” and those who “were scornful” (Zwingli);102 or between the “pious souls” 
and “the reprobate” (Calvin).103 Hence, for these reformers the phrase ‘bosom of 
Abraham’ seems to function more as a metaphor indicating those who await their 
salvation in Christ. 
What we can say for sure, however, is that Zwingli teaches that the faithful 
experience the beatific vision in heaven immediately after death and “shall one day 
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enjoy everlasting bliss there also in the body,”104 while Luther says that the saints are 
in heaven with Christ but remain ‘asleep’ until the Day of Judgment. Of the three, 
only Calvin perpetuates the bosom of Abraham saying that all ‘pious souls’ must 
await Christ’s return. 
Considering our survey of the early church treatments and of Zwingli, Luther, 
and Calvin it should be evident that the doctrine of Christ’s descent into hell is a rich 
theological resource for our discussion of the unevangelized. For the point is not that 
Christ descended to save a few people from a certain place at a certain time, but that 
through his descent Jesus secured salvation for many people from all places and all 
times. In other words, the prospective salvation of those who die after Christ depends 
just as much on the descent into hell as did the prospective salvation of those who 
died before Christ. As Emerson concludes: 
The common thread here, for those who affirm and for those who deny the 
descent [i.e., denial of an actual visitation, not denial of the doctrine itself], is 
that in Jesus’ burial, he defeats the last enemy, which is death (1 Cor 15:26), 
and crushes Satan’s head. Death is swallowed up in death. Jesus thus 
accomplishes what will happen on the Day of the Lord: the defeat of Satan, 
sin, death, hell, and the grave. Indeed, his Passion is the Day of the Lord. The 
burial of Christ is an eschatological act in its defeat of Hades, both 
accomplishing that victory and anticipating its culmination at Jesus’ return. . . 
. His burial can thus be affirmed by all traditions as eschatologically salvific 
because it gains the victory over God’s enemies.105 
 
So with the doctrinal rules and theological grammar of the descensus now in hand, we 
will attempt to apply this doctrine to our prospective fides ex auditu approach to the 
problem of the unevangelized. 
 
The Limbo of the Just: Conceptual Dilemmas 
 
 Let us recall D’Costa’s application of the descensus doctrine and our initial 
concerns. First, D’Costa holds to the teaching which says that Christ descended in his 
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soul to the place of the righteous (conceived of as ‘the limbo of the just’) and not to 
the place of torment.106 From this position he notes the long tradition which includes 
righteous Gentiles as being among those who received salvation when Christ 
descended, and he suggests that perhaps there were some who, at that time, still 
required purification in purgatory – for instance, “the good thief in Luke 23:43.”107 If 
so, then in a similar way and for similar reasons perhaps good non-Christians might 
also receive the benefits of the descent (fides ex auditu) and, if requiring further 
purification, entrance into purgatory. D’Costa states: 
Conceptually, it is very likely that some of the just, after their encounter with 
Christ and his church in the analogical space of the limbo of the just, will 
require purification, and then they, like their Christian brothers and sisters, 
may enter the Christological fires of purgatory.108 
 
But there is a problem with the notion of an analogical space of the limbo of the just. 
As we have seen, D’Costa relies on the theological concept limbus patrum for 
his application of the descensus doctrine. Yet this concept poses an immediate 
problem for his theory as the tradition teaches that Christ emptied the limbo of the just 
in his descent. So even if the limbo of the just once included good Gentiles who died 
with no knowledge of the promise of Christ, this particular objective state is no longer 
populated after Christ’s descent thereby removing any possibility that a good non-
Christian might now benefit from this particular realm. Moreover, because purgatory 
has replaced the limbo of the just as an intermediate state, and because purgatory is 
only for those who die in faith, D’Costa’s theological frame seems to provide no 
equivalent objective state for unevangelized persons after Christ. 
To be sure, D’Costa acknowledges these difficulties, and to push through this 
impasse he proposes an analogical application of the limbo of the just.109 He writes: 
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Clearly, the limbo of the just will not persist and is temporary, but it will 
continue to analogically operate in teaching that the just are never lost and 
await the Lord’s coming after their death, just as do Christians.110 
 
In short, while the limbo of the just may not itself be a perduring reality this 
conceptual element of Christ’s descent indicates that the salvation of the just, perhaps 
even from among the unevangelized, will continue to obtain until the return of Christ. 
D’Costa concludes: 
If we understand this solution to operate between the objective reality that the 
limbo of the just is empty now and the subjective reality that there are many 
who subjectively still exist in the state of those who entered the limbo of the 
just, this doctrine [descensus] provides a sound solution to the problem we 
have been investigating.111 
 
Nevertheless, while it may be the case that certain individuals today subjectively exist 
in the same state as those who entered the limbo of the just before Christ’s descent, 
the fact remains that there is now no objective reality in which this event can actually 
occur. Based on the logic of the limbo of the just we can perhaps suggest that certain 
non-Christians might hear and receive the gospel after death, but if the limbo of the 
just is empty and purgatory is only for those who already have explicit faith in Christ 
then where does this encounter occur? There is now no objective fides ex auditu 
solution (i.e., theological concept) which corresponds to Christ’s descent to the limbo 
of the just. After the descent limbo is empty and purgatory is exclusive to Christians – 
there is nothing between. 
Responding to D’Costa’s proposal, Catholic theologian Edward Oakes also 
notes this issue with the limbo of the just, and states, “I hold that one cannot claim, 
with D’Costa, that the traditional limbus patrum . . . has any meaning after Christ’s 
descent.”112 One reason, says Oakes, is because “whatever its internal merits, 
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D’Costa’s solution certainly represents a rupture with the tradition, as he himself 
admits.”113 Although we ought to point out that in this same article Oakes says he 
agrees with D’Costa and DiNoia that, “contrary to all standard concepts of purgatory, 
. . . this realm of the dead also applies to non-Christians.”114 So perhaps faithfulness to 
tradition is not his real concern. Indeed, we might recall D’Costa’s objection to 
Oakes’ assertion that Christ descended all the way into hell so that he might suffer the 
torments of hell on our behalf (following Hans Urs von Balthasar).115 D’Costa argues 
that this position represents not only a rupture with tradition, “but corrupts a true 
doctrine,” contradicts “previous magisterial teachings,” and “teaches novel 
doctrines.”116 That said, if we bracket out Oakes’ questionable reliance on tradition 
and his ‘novel’ interpretation of the atonement, then his argument that Christ’s 
descent was not limited to the limbo of the just bears some interesting points to 
consider. 
 For instance, he states, “I see the underworld as less differentiated at the 
moment of Christ’s descent, and as only taking on its more settled ‘departments’ 
(purgatory and hell) after Christ’s departure from that underworld.”117 From this 
position he argues that because Christ overcame the torments of hell in his descent 
(‘hell’ viewed in more general terms), “purgatory can now be seen as applying to non-
Christians.”118 His point is that because “the eternal and irrevocable place of divine 
reprobation” came to exist only after Christ’s descent, all who now live in the state of 
                                               
113 Ibid., 20.; citing, Gavin D’Costa, “The Descent into Hell as a Solution for the 
Problem of the Fate of Unevangelized Non-Christians: Balthasar’s Hell, the Limbo of 
the Fathers and Purgatory,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 2 
(April 2009): 162. 
114 Oakes, “Descensus and Development,” 21. 
115 See, D’Costa, Christianity and World Religions, 201-210. 
116 Ibid., 206. 
117 Oakes, “Descensus and Development,” 20. Oakes credits this view to Joseph 
Ratzinger, see, 20-21. 
118 Ibid., 21. 
 
 249 
those who were saved in the descent may also receive the benefits of Christ’s saving 
work.119 Except that in the case of non-Christians, they will not go straight to heaven 
but will spend time in purgatory, which “is essentially a transitional stage on the way 
to heaven.”120 Nonetheless, in the end Oakes’ proposal suffers from the same internal 
dilemma as D’Costa’s and DiNoia’s theories. That is, purgatory, the process of 
purification, can only occur through Christ and is therefore only for those who are 
already in Christ – i.e., those who are part of the communion of saints.121 
 Having said this, and notwithstanding the concerns mentioned above, perhaps 
Oakes’ recommendation for a ‘less differentiated’ understanding of the ‘underworld’ 
before Christ’s descent is a helpful cue for how we might begin working towards a 
resolution. For this construal of the place of the dead moves the conversation back to 
a view of hades that comes closer to the early church treatments of the descensus. 
And, for similar reasons, his claim that the “more settled ‘departments’ (purgatory 
and hell)” came “after Christ’s departure from the underworld” may be a step in the 
right direction as well.122 Yet as I will explain in a moment, a Reformation approach 
will interpret the timing and nature of these ‘departments’ differently. So, keeping all 
these things in mind, we will now seek to identify an alternative theological 
framework for our application of the descensus doctrine. 
 
Reframing the Discussion 
 
The word ‘hades’ is a transliteration of the Greek term ᾅδης. As such, the 
teaching of Christ’s descent refers not to the eternal place of condemnation but to the 
intermediate place of all the dead.123 Thus, as Biesbrouck points out, the early church 
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fathers held that “even those who were members of the covenant were believed to be 
detained in Hades, as this was the realm of the dead, where all the deceased ‘lived’ 
their shadowy ‘existence.’”124 It is important to keep this understanding in mind, 
because in the descensus article in the Apostles’ Creed the word ‘hades’ is often 
eclipsed by the English word ‘hell.’ The reason for this change is because the English 
version of the phrase, ‘He descended into hell,’ derives from the Western tradition 
and is a translation of one of three Latin versions of the Creed. As Alyssa Pitstick 
explains: 
Some say, descendit ad inferna, others, ad infernos or ad inferos. . . . 
 All three words, inferna, infernos, and inferos, refer in their stems to 
something lower or below. . . . These root meanings give rise to derivative 
connotations of the dead, the underworld, or hell, the three words variously 
used in English translations of this creedal article.125 
 
Hence, within the context of the descensus article the word ‘hell’ is still meant as a 
general reference to the place of all the dead.126 
 That said, the term ‘hell’ can still sometimes cause confusion in the discussion 
as it is also used to translate the biblical Greek terms gehenna (γέεννα), the place of 
eternal condemnation,127 and tartarus (ταρταρώσας), the intermediate place of fallen 
angels.128 And yet these distinctions are significant because Christ did not descend 
into the hell of eternal condemnation; “otherwise,” as Oakes rightly states, “the 
resurrection would make no sense.”129 Nor did he descend into the hell of fallen 
angels, for “God did not spare angels when they sinned, but cast them into hell 
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[tartarus] and committed them to chains of gloomy darkness to be kept until the 
judgment” (2 Pet 2:4). 
Therefore, we can agree with Oakes when he asserts that Christ did not 
descend into “the eternal and irrevocable place of divine reprobation,” (gehenna) 
which did not exist during the time of the descent.130 But when he concludes that the 
hell of eternal condemnation “came into existence after Christ’s departure from the 
underworld at his resurrection,”131 we might argue instead that the scriptural evidence 
indicates that this hell will not come into existence, or will not be populated, until the 
time of the general resurrection. For example, Reformed theologian Geerhardus Vos 
points out: 
In the New Testament . . . Gehenna occurs in Matthew 5:22,29,30; 10:28; 
18:9; 23:15,33; Mark 9:43,15,47; Luke 12:5; James 3:6. In all of these it 
designates the place of eternal punishment of the wicked, generally in 
connection with the final judgment. It is associated with fire as the source of 
torment. Both body and soul are cast into it. This is not to be explained on the 
principle that the New Testament speaks metaphorically of the state after 
death in terms of the body; it presupposes the resurrection.132 
 
With this in mind, I would suggest that rather than speak primarily in conceptual or 
analogous terms, we might instead seek to situate the theoretical into the concrete; or 
rather, allow the conceptual to flow naturally out of the concrete. The hope here is 
that if we allow chronological order and temporal space to delimit the conversation, 
then perhaps an application of the doctrine of descent within this mode of thought will 
give rise to an objective space in time that is conducive to the salvation of 
unevangelized individuals who are subjectively in the same state as those who 
benefited from Christ’s descent. And the first step in working out this alternative 
approach is to substitute the theological concept of ‘the limbo of the just’ with the 
                                               
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid.; original italisized. 
132 Walter A. Elwell, “Baker’s Evangelical Dictionary of Biblical Theology,” Bible 




biblical notion of ‘the bosom of Abraham’ – a suggestion that is consistent with 
Reformation theology.133 For while the limbo of the just teaches that this intermediate 
space is empty after Christ’s descent, the same does not apply to the bosom of 
Abraham. 
Le Goff explains that for the early church fathers in the Western tradition, 
such as “Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory,” there “is an earthly paradise as well as a 
celestial paradise, and the latter . . . is the same thing as the bosom of Abraham.”134 In 
other words, unlike the medieval concept of the limbo of the just, many of the early 
fathers do not envision the bosom of Abraham as a place emptied by Christ but as a 
place which Christ transformed into paradise. As Ludwig Ott writes: 
Many of the older Fathers (St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. Hilary, St. 
Ambrose) assume a state of waiting between death and resurrection, in which 
the just indeed receive reward and the evil punishment, but do not yet achieve 
the final blessedness of Heaven or the final condemnation of hell.135 
 
To this extent, our survey of early church treatments of the descensus doctrine 
confirm that this is indeed a common position of the fathers. But perhaps more 
substantial support for our Reformation approach is with the discussion of the 
intermediate state by Calvin. We may recall that, based on Scripture, he insists that 
both the “souls of the righteous” and of “the reprobate” must wait for the day of 
judgment; the former in the bosom of Abraham and the latter in “chains under 
darkness.”136 
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Protestant treatment of the descent into hell.” See, Dictionary of Latin and Greek 
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand 
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Thus, from an eschatological perspective, if both gehenna and heaven are not 
yet populated with people, then we might tentatively suggest that hades, the 
intermediate and universal place of the dead, in some sense still exists after the 
descent and will remain the one objective realm of all the dead until the time of the 
consummation. In this way, and in light of the early church and Reformation material, 
we might also suggest that what changed for the souls in hades after Christ’s descent 
was not their location per se, but the reality of Christ. That is to say, for the wicked 
and rebellious hades became like hell (e.g., the rich man in Luke 16) while for those 
who received Christ it became like heaven (i.e., paradise; Luke 23:43); and yet, all 
souls are still in hades. Hence, Christ’s descent brought about a fundamental rather 
than comprehensive change to the place of the dead so that the objective space and 
subjective purpose of hades continue to exist and operate even after his descent. This 
means that even though the bosom of Abraham was transformed into paradise, this 
state is not yet the beatific vision. For while Christ makes souls “capable of beatific 
glory,” says Calvin, “Scripture uniformly enjoins us to . . . wait for the fruition of 
promised glory.”137 At most, we might agree with Tertullian that martyrs go 
immediately into the heavenly throne room (based on Rev 6:9-11). But even this state, 
located “under the altar,” is a temporary abode in which these souls await God’s final 
justice (v. 9-11). 
Our second step in reframing the discussion concerns the doctrine of 
purgatory. It is good that DiNoia and D’Costa speak of purgatory as meeting the need 
for further purification and transformation because of sin, rather than as meeting the 
need for further punishment and satisfaction for sin.138 In the eyes of the reformers, 
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the idea that punishment for sins was not fully satisfied in Christ is perhaps the most 
unacceptable element of the doctrine of purgatory. As Calvin declares: 
We are bound, therefore, to raise our voice to its highest pitch, and cry aloud 
that purgatory is a deadly device of Satan; that it makes void the cross of 
Christ; that it offers intolerable insult to the divine mercy; that it undermines 
and overthrows our faith. For what is this purgatory but the satisfaction for sin 
paid after death by the souls of the dead? . . . But if it is perfectly clear . . . that 
the blood of Christ is the only satisfaction, expiation, and cleansing for the 
sins of believers, what remains but to hold that purgatory is mere blasphemy, 
horrid blasphemy against Christ?139 
 
In contrast, the Lutheran position is not against the theological concept of purgatory 
per se – i.e., the need for further purification after faith in Christ – but rather against 
the idea that further punishment or satisfaction for sins is necessary. For instance, 
using the fathers and early church councils as support, the Augsburg Confession 
states, “If some of them mention purgatory, they interpret it neither as payment for 
eternal punishment nor as satisfaction, but as purification of imperfect souls.”140 
To this extent, D’Costa’s proposal depends upon a revised understanding of 
the doctrine of purgatory which appears to favor a purification emphasis rather than 
focus on the notion of satisfaction. Specifically, he follows the interpretation proposed 
by Joseph Ratzinger (later as Pope Benedict XVI), who speaks of the purgatorial fires 
in a Christological rather than punitive way – it is the “gaze” of Christ which 
purges.141 Ratzinger suggests: 
The purification involved does not happen through some thing, but through 
the transforming power of the Lord himself, whose burning flame cuts free our 
closed-off heart, melting it, and pouring it into a new mold to make it fit for 
the living organism of his body.142 
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Moreover, Ratzinger seems to move away from a satisfaction model of purgatory to 
something more akin to a sanctification model: 
Purgatory is not, as Tertullian thought, some kind of supra-worldly 
concentration camp where man is forced to undergo punishment in a more or 
less arbitrary fashion. Rather is it the inwardly necessary process of 
transformation in which a person becomes capable of Christ, capable of God 
and thus capable of unity with the whole communion of saints. . . . It does not 
replace grace by work, but allows the former to achieve its full victory 
precisely as grace. What actually saves is the full assent of faith.143 
 
This reinterpretation of purgatory is intriguing to several Protestants scholars. For 
instance, Justin Barnard claims that when it is viewed as the opportunity for 
“lapsable” Christians to continue the process of purification after death, then “a 
doctrine of purgatory is useful for Protestant Christians who take seriously 
sanctification as a process.”144 
Jerry Walls agrees, and he uses a similar version of purgatory to argue for the 
possibility of repentance after death (not as a second chance), and he asserts that 
sanctification models like Barnard’s are indeed beneficial to Protestant theology: 
Protestants can affirm sanctification models of the doctrine without in any way 
contradicting their theology, and may find that it makes better sense of how 
the remains of sin are purged than the typical Protestant account that it 
happens instantly and immediately at or after death.145 
 
Walls therefore suggests that a Protestant version of purgatory might be feasible after 
all, as it helps explain how Christians continue moving towards full sanctification 
after death through the work of the Spirit in communion with the church. 
Nevertheless, as regards our proposal here, this solution only works in reference to 
those who die within the process of sanctification; i.e., those who are already 
epistemologically related to Christ. This means that when it comes to the question of 
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the unevangelized there still remains a theological chasm between here and there that 
cannot be crossed. 
In other words, we must recall that purgatory is fundamentally Christological, 
and this process of purification necessitates not only the already existing indwelling 
work of the Spirit (bestowed only after repentance; Acts 2:38), but also a face-to-face 
encounter with Christ as Judge. As Ratzinger explains, “Purgatory is understood in a 
properly Christian way when it is grasped christologically, in terms of the Lord 
himself as the judging fire which transforms us and conforms us to his own glorified 
body.”146 Hence, as stated earlier, purgatory, the process which brings about full 
purification, can only occur through Christ and is therefore only for those who are 
already in Christ. So even though Walls argues “for a significant modification of the 
traditional view of purgatory, namely, that it should allow for postmortem 
conversion,”147 the only way to do this is to de-Christologize purgatory which then 
renders the doctrine meaningless. 
I recommend that instead of trying to transpose the concept of purgatory as a 
whole onto our proposal, we need only seek to draw from the doctrine those aspects 
which speak of it as an intermediate state in which souls are prepared for Christ in 
anticipation of the beatific vision. As Donald Bloesch asserts, “I believe that the 
restoration of hades as an intermediate state in which we wait and hope for Christ’s 
salvation may speak to some of the concerns of those who embrace purgatory.”148 
Hence, while the intermediate state is not yet the purifying encounter with Christ, it 
nonetheless allows the preparation for this encounter to continue after death. As, 
Ratzinger writes: 
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In this doctrine, the Church held fast to one aspect of the idea of the 
intermediate state, insisting that, even if one’s fundamental life-decision is 
finally decided and fixed in death, one’s definitive destiny need not 
necessarily be reached straight away. It may be that the basic decision of a 
human being is covered over by layers of secondary decisions and needs to be 
dug free.149 
 
From this perspective, the suggestion here is to view the bosom of Abraham (the 
subjective state of paradise-in-hades) as the intermediate space in which the Holy 
Spirit either begins or continues the work of sanctification for certain unevangelized 
individuals and Christians through the ministry of the church. Yet this intermediate 
state is not itself purgatory proper. On the contrary, purgatory, or rather purgation, is 
what will happen on the day when Christ comes to judge the living and the dead, 
when “the fire will test what sort of work each one has done” (1 Cor 3:13b, 10-15). In 
this way purgatory retains its Christological and Christian nature, and because the 
suggestion is that this event occurs in the time of the general resurrection purgation is 
of the whole person, body and soul, and not of a disembodied soul.150 
Moreover, if the bosom of Abraham/paradise is still in hades, then perhaps the 
unevangelized who are in the same subjective state as those who were saved in the 
descent will benefit from the church’s continued ministry of the word, for it is 
reasonable to assume that the saving and sanctifying work begun by Christ in his 
descent will carry on until the day of judgment. For instance, Bloesch (an evangelical) 
writes: 
I believe there is a firm basis in both sacred Scripture and sacred tradition for 
affirming sheol-hades or the nether world of spirits as the interim state for the 
great majority of people who remain outside the circle of faith at the time of 
their death. The souls in hades await the final judgment, the great assize, and 
some may even look forward to possible deliverance. A number of residents of 
hades will take part in the judging of others. We are told in Matthew 12:38-42 
that the people of Nineveh and the Queen of Sheba will rise at the judgment to 
judge Israel. Sheol-hades is a temporary abode, for it will be cast into the lake 
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of fire after giving up its dead (Rev 20:13-14). The final and irrevocable 
separation of the just and the unjust has not yet occurred. Heaven and hell are 
still in the future—not only for us but also for the souls in hades. 
 Salvation is fixed at death for those who are in Christ, but the 
condemnation of those who have never known Christ is not yet decided at 
death. They are not necessarily eternally condemned, but they are not yet 
saved. I am teaching not a doctrine of a second chance but the universality of 
opportunity for salvation.151 
 
Furthermore, we might also consider the suggestion by Biesbrouck, whose delineation 
of the issue offers a theological framework that provides further support for our 
proposal. 
After noting the problem in D’Costa’s theory regarding “the concept of the 
ongoing reality of the limbus patrum as a ‘logical space’ after Christ’s descent,” 
Biesbrouck (also an evangelical) writes: 
Our own suggestion . . . is that between the resurrection of Christ and the 
general resurrection at the Last Judgment, there is only one objective 
intermediate state, distinguished in two subjective states: the righteous and 
baptized in one, the unrighteous in another. The first, which includes non-
Christians who during their lifetime were ontologically related to Christ, 
experience their state as ‘Paradise’, even if they are still awaiting the 
resurrection of their bodies. In that intermediate state, the souls of the faithful 
departed are in a dynamic relation with Christ and each other. If the souls of 
the Christian faithful in that intermediate state, proclaim Jesus some way or 
another, those who during their lives on earth never heard of Jesus, are now 
given the opportunity to recognize him whom they met in the least (Mt 25), as 
Jesus, their Christ and Saviour.152 
 
To be sure, his suggestion appears to fit our current need quite well as it provides the 
necessary categories for working out our own proposal. Nevertheless, we need to 
make a few minor adjustments to his framework so that it better reflects the nature of 
this thesis.153 
 First, rather than categorize the two subjective states as ‘the righteous and 
baptized in one, the unrighteous in another,’ we will describe this distinction as ‘the 
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elect’ and ‘the unpardonable.’ This description allows for the possibility that ‘the 
elect’ state includes not only certain unevangelized and baptized people, but also 
unbaptized individuals who nevertheless die with faith in Christ – e.g., the penitent 
thief (Luke 23:39-43). Similarly, ‘the unpardonable’ state includes not only recusant 
evangelized and unevangelized people, but also baptized individuals who nevertheless 
die without faith in Christ. In this way, I simply mean to distinguish between those 
who receive the Holy Spirit’s work of grace during their lifetime from those who 
reject it. 
 Second, Biesbrouck indicates that he would explain a non-Christian’s 
ontological relation to Christ before death in reference to Matthew 25 – presumably 
following Stephen Bullivant’s use of Matthew 25:31-46 to argue for the possible 
salvation of atheists.154 While not discounting the potential merits of this approach, 
we will assume that this ontological relation obtains based on the proposal developed 
in the previous chapter – i.e., by the Holy Spirit’s work of actual grace through the 
convicting use of the natural law. Also, for the sake of clarity, we will refer to this 
particular group of people as ‘unevangelized’ rather than as ‘non-Christians.’155 
 Now with this new theological framework in place we are ready to move 
towards the completion of our Reformation approach, and we will do this by working 
through Augustine’s prohibition against the possibility of posthumous salvation. 
 
Augustine on Christ’s Descent into Hell 
 
 In his work The Literal Meaning of Genesis (c. 393-394), Augustine considers 
the location of souls after death in reference to the parable of the rich man and 
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Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), and the phrase from Peter’s sermon in Acts 2:24, “God 
raised him [Christ] up from the dead, having loosed the pangs of hell.”156 This latter 
verse leads Augustine to assert that because he has “not yet found the term ‘lower 
world’ [or ‘hell’] applied to the place where the souls of the just are at rest,” the term 
“hell” must refer only to the place of torment and not the abode of the blessed.157 
Therefore he reasons that because Scripture says that Christ ‘loosed the pangs of hell,’ 
we must conclude that he descended into the place of torment and not only to those in 
the “restful abode.”158 He states: 
It is believed, and not without reason, that the soul of Christ went to that very 
region where sinners are tormented in order to release from their suffering 
those who He decreed should be released according to the inscrutable ways of 
His justice.159 
 
To be sure, Augustine affirms that all those in the torments of hell deserved this fate 
because they “have sinned through love of the flesh.”160 But God overcame this fate 
for some of them according to his sovereign will; for Christ 
did not disdain to visit this part of the world. He could not have been ignorant 
of the fact that some were to be delivered from there in accordance with the 
mysteries of God’s justice, and there He went to deliver them.161 
 
So in this early discussion of Christ’s descent, Augustine supports the possibility of 
salvation after death for certain people based on ‘the mysteries of God’s justice.’ 
 One thing we should note at this point, however, is that his reasoning is based 
on a lose translation of Acts 2:24. Augustine’s quotation is from the Vetus Latina,162 
which reads “solutis doloribus inferorum [hell],” whereas the original Greek reads 
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that God “loosed the pangs of death” (λύσας τὰς ὠδῖνας τοῦ θανάτου).163 As we 
will see, this interpretation effects the trajectory of his statements on the descent. 
 Some years later (414), in a letter to his fellow bishop Evodius of Uzalis, 
Augustine reiterates his position and delineates it further, writing: 
The words that “the pains of hell were loosed” may be understood as referring 
not to the case of all, but only of some whom He judged worthy of that 
deliverance; so that neither is He supposed to have descended there in vain, 
without the purpose of bringing benefit to any of those who were there held in 
prison, nor is it a necessary inference that what divine mercy and justice 
granted to some must be supposed to have been granted to all.164 
 
Once again, based on his reading of Acts 2:24, Augustine argues that Christ saved 
certain people from the torments of hell in his descent, but he dismisses any notion 
that this view leads necessarily to a universalist position. Indeed, the tone of the letter 
is such that if not for his reading of Acts 2:24, he seems ready to deny that Christ 
saved anyone at all from the place of torment during his descent. As Jeffrey 
Trumbower explains: 
For Augustine, it would be fine to speak of a liberation from the bosom of 
Abraham, because that is where the righteous dead like Lazarus go, but hell is 
another matter. Unfortunately, scripture does not always say what Augustine 
would like. He admits that Christ at his descent rescued some in hell from 
their sorrows, those deemed worthy by his mysterious justice.165 
 
Nevertheless, Scripture says nothing about the unevangelized since the time of Christ, 
and on this point Augustine states definitively that no one can now be saved after 
death. He argues that if it were possible for one who has never heard the gospel in this 
life to have the opportunity to hear and believe in hell, this would lead to the “absurd 
consequence” that “the gospel ought not to be preached on earth.”166 Hence, in 
accordance with his divine mercy and mysterious justice Christ saved some from the 
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torments of hell during his descent, but he does not now save anyone from this fate, 
not even those who die before hearing the gospel. 
 Returning again to the subject only a few years later (417), Augustine 
modifies his understanding of the nature of hell so that he is able to reinterpret his 
view of Christ’s descent. Previously, he distinguished between hell, the place of 
torment, and Abraham’s bosom, the place of rest. But now he references Jesus’ words 
to the thief on the cross, “This day you will be with me in paradise” (Luke 23:43), and 
states: 
It is not easy to find anywhere in the Scriptures the word hell used in a good 
sense. Thus, the question is often asked how we can reverently believe that the 
soul of the Lord Christ was in hell, if the word is not used in any sense but the 
penal one. A good response to this is that he descended there to rescue those 
who were to be rescued. Therefore, Blessed Peter says that he loosed the 
sorrows of hell in which it was “impossible that he should be held” (Acts 
2:24).167 
 
So far, his response is consistent with his previous statements. But then he asserts: 
Moreover, if we are to believe that there are two regions in hell, one for the 
suffering and one for the souls in repose, that is, both a place where the rich 
man was tormented and one where the poor man was comforted, who would 
dare to say that the Lord Jesus came to the penal parts of hell rather than only 
among those who rest in Abraham’s bosom?168 
 
With this new delineation he now adopts a general view of hell as the place of all the 
dead dividing it between “the penal parts” and the “state of living in happiness,” and 
from this perspective he dismisses the notion that Christ saved anyone from the place 
of torment in his descent, saying that he only visited the righteous dead.169 Alfeyev 
writes: 
Augustine offers the quite novel idea that after Christ’s ascension from hell, 
any recollection of his sojourn there was eradicated. Therefore, the descent in 
Hades was a “one-time” event relevant only to those who were in hell at that 
time.170 
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One curious feature of this new position is that while he uses the same Latin 
translation of Acts 2:24, he makes no attempt to explain how Christ is said to have 
‘loosed the sorrows of hell’ if he did not rescue anyone from the place of torment. 
Thus, for whatever reason, Augustine leaves this element of his argument wholly 
unaccounted for. In the end, this formulation stands as Augustine’s definitive 
statement on the issue. 
If Augustine’s position on the fate of the unevangelized were merely 
Augustine’s view on the matter, then perhaps there would be no pressing need for us 
to deal with his prohibition against posthumous repentance. This, however, is not the 
case: 
As Gregory the Great repeated Augustine’s formulations about the 
impossibility of post-humous salvation for the unbaptized (Dial. 4.46, 59), and 
as subsequent Western theologians took their cues from these two, death truly 
became a firm and universally recognized boundary of salvation in the 
West.171 
 
Thus, as the apparent source of this ‘universally recognized’ position in Western 
theology, it is imperative that we seek to provide a satisfying response to Augustine’s 
objection. 
 
A Closer Reading of Augustine’s Argument 
 
As noted above, it is in his second major treatment of the doctrine that 
Augustine makes his definitive statement against the possibility of posthumous 
salvation after Christ’s descent. His line of reasoning on the issue centers on his 
objection to a popular notion at the time which said that Christ emptied “that place of 
punishment or imprisonment” when he descended.172 The idea was that Christ did this 
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“because the gospel was not published to the whole world in their lifetime, and they 
had sufficient excuse for not believing that which had never been proclaimed to them; 
but that thenceforth, men despising the gospel when it was in all nations fully 
published and spread abroad would be inexcusable, and therefore after the 
prison was then emptied there still remains a just judgment, in which those 
who are contumacious and unbelieving shall be punished even with eternal 
fire.173 
 
Augustine responds by pointing out that what this position fails to recognize is the 
fact that the gospel is still not yet fully known in the world, which means that all those 
who die after the time of Christ without hearing the gospel also have this same 
excuse. Yet if one then attempts to resolve this dilemma by extending the possibility 
to those who die after Christ, “who can bear the contradictions both of reason and 
faith which must follow?”174 He states: 
If, again, it be alleged that in hell those only believe to no purpose and in vain 
who refused to accept here on earth the gospel preached to them, but that 
believing will profit those who never despised a gospel which they never had 
it in their power to hear another still more absurd consequence is involved, 
namely, that forasmuch as all men shall certainly die, and ought to come to 
hell wholly free from the guilt of having despised the gospel; since otherwise 
it can be of no use to them to believe it when they come there, the gospel 
ought not to be preached on earth, a sentiment not less foolish than profane.175 
 
Recalling his interpretation of ‘hell’ in the descensus as the place of torment, his 
reasoning here is rather straightforward. Augustine has no doubt that any person who 
finds themselves in hell after death will immediately accept the opportunity to escape 
this terrible fate. If then this opportunity is extended to those who die before hearing, 
dying is practically a guarantee of salvation for unevangelized people. And if this is 
so, then why should the church take the chance that an unevangelized person might 
refuse the gospel in this life and thus enter into eternal damnation, when they could 
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instead die in ignorance, experience torment for a short time, and then enter into 
eternal life? 
From this perspective, if those who do not hear the gospel preached in life 
have the opportunity to hear and believe in hell, then the church on earth is at best 
irrelevant and at worst a potential hazard to unevangelized souls. As Ralph Turner 
states, Augustine held “the belief that if Christ had preached to all the souls in hell, it 
would have given sinners an unjust advantage over the faithful.”176 Moreover, 
Augustine refuses “to entertain the thought that the gospel was once preached, or is 
even to this hour being preached in hell in order to make men believe and be 
delivered from its pains, as if a Church had been established there as well as on 
earth.”177 He thinks it is absurd to believe that the church somehow also exists in the 
place of torment, and he concludes that the salvation that was once bestowed upon 
souls in hell during Christ’s descent is no longer possible. 
 One thing to notice about Augustine’s argument here is that the objection is 
not against posthumous salvation per se, for at this point he still states, “I do not 
doubt” that Christ “was . . . in hell, and that He conferred this benefit [salvation] on 
persons subjected to these pains.”178 Rather, his main concern at this point is with the 
idea that God grants salvation to people in hell for the sole reason that they did not 
have the opportunity to believe during their lifetime. As noted earlier, for Augustine 
Christ’s salvific purpose in the descent was not due to people’s inculpable ignorance, 
but to God’s mysterious justice. It is also important to recognize that at the time of the 
writing of this letter much of Augustine’s reasoning is done with the Pelagian 
controversy in mind. As Trumbower explains: 
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Many aspects of the Pelagian controversy played a decisive role in 
Augustine’s rejection of posthumous salvation. For instance, Pelagius and his 
followers had a firm belief in human potential and human freedom to obey or 
reject God’s demands and the teachings of Christ. Augustine feared that their 
interpretation of the Christian message might obviate the absolute necessity of 
Christ’s salvific death in the economy of salvation.179 
 
Indeed, Augustine seeks to deny the premise that Christ descended because of the 
unevangelized since the logical implication would be that he still does this for the 
unevangelized today. Yet he argues that this cannot be the case today because Christ 
is no longer in hell nor is the church there now. 
What is interesting, however, is that Augustine does not then seek to 
demonstrate the superiority of his position by applying this same logical deduction to 
his own premise. For instance, his premise is: 
Seeing that plain scriptural testimonies make mention of hell and its pains, no 
reason can be alleged for believing that He who is the Saviour went there, 
except that He might save from its pains.180 
 
In other words, the sole reason for the salvation of souls in hell during Christ’s 
descent was “the inscrutable ways of His justice.”181 And yet, if we follow the logic 
through we might further reason that if some were saved during the descent in 
accordance with God’s ‘inscrutable ways,’ then perhaps he will save individuals after 
the descent who are in the same subjective state as those who were saved during the 
descent. To be sure, Augustine’s interpretation of hell along with his disdain for the 
notion that the church is now proclaiming the gospel there would make it difficult for 
him to draw this conclusion. It is also the case that he solves this problem eventually 
by claiming that the just were also in ‘hell,’ and that Christ went only to those who 
were at Abraham’s side.182 But doing so causes him to contradict his reading of Acts 
2:24 since he no longer has any recourse for explaining how Christ is said to have 
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‘loosed the pangs of hell.’ He also neglects his theological premise that Christ “could 
not have been ignorant of the fact that some were to be delivered from there [the pains 
of hell] in accordance with the mysteries of God’s justice, and there He went to 
deliver them.”183 That said, perhaps there is still a way to affirm Augustine’s premise 
and the possibility of posthumous salvation while maintaining an Augustinian 
trajectory. 
 
Retaining an Augustinian Trajectory 
 
 Augustine develops his view of Christ’s descent with at least two concerns in 
mind: 1) guarding against universalist-type notions of salvation, and 2) upholding the 
necessary role of Christ and the church in salvation. For even when he concedes in his 
initial treatments that Christ must have saved at least some souls from hell, he also 
asserts that it is not “a necessary inference that what divine mercy and justice granted 
to some must be supposed to have been granted to all.”184 And when others promote a 
universalistic view of salvation, Augustine argues that just as the ark was the only 
means of salvation in the days of Noah, so today God saves only through the 
church.185 It is important to recall, then, that our Reformation approach also denies 
universalist options by maintaining an ecclesiocentric approach – i.e., the doctrinal 
rules that salvation is through Christ alone by faith alone and that faith comes from 
hearing the church’s proclamation of the gospel. Thus, these two concerns are not at 
risk in our development of a posthumous solution to the problem of the 
unevangelized. What we will do, however, is reconsider Augustine’s reading and 
subsequent logic of Acts 2:24. 
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As noted above, Augustine’s reading of Acts 2:24 is based on a Latin 
translation which states that with Christ’s resurrection God ‘loosed the pangs of hell,’ 
whereas the original Greek reads that God ‘loosed the pangs of death.’ In itself, and 
as a kind of commentary, the Latin version is not a problem. But only if one views 
‘death’ and ‘hades’ synonymously and does not confuse the term ‘hell’ as a reference 
to ‘gehenna.’ To this extent, even though Peter’s sermon associates the phrase ‘loosed 
the pangs of death’ with the prophetic Psalm “For you will not abandon my soul to 
Hades” (Acts 2:27; Ps 16:10), Augustine appears to associate the Latin term in verse 
24 with the Greek term ‘gehenna.’ That is to say, he cannot understand how it is 
possible that “the souls of the just” are in hell when, in light of the parable of the rich 
man and Lazarus, we know that they are in “peaceful retreat” at Abraham’s side.186 
Thus, if hell “is not used in any sense but the penal one,” and if the just where not 
actually in that place, then, according to Augustine’s final statement, Christ went only 
to rescue those in the restful abode.187 
The problem, however, is that it is indeed significant that Acts 2:24 does not 
say that Christ loosed the pangs of ‘hell,’ but rather that he loosed the pangs of 
‘death.’ It is significant because the former, according to Augustine’s interpretation, 
can only apply to certain individuals inhabiting a certain location (an interpretation 
that he ignores in his final statement), whereas the latter denotes an action which 
overcomes a circumstance that is common to all people. For as Paul says, “All have 
sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23) and “the wages of sin is death” 
(Rom 6:23) – i.e., every person sins thus every person dies. So in Acts 2, when Peter 
declares that God, through Christ’s death and resurrection, ‘loosed the pangs of 
death,’ this entails an act that was performed for the benefit of all people – even the 
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Gentiles. Indeed, concerning Peter’s sermon as a whole, Craig Blomberg points out 
that “here appears the first hint in Acts that the disciples understand that the gospel 
will eventually go to Gentiles as well.”188 A ‘hint’ which is most evident in Peter’s 
conclusion as he states, “For the promise is for you and for your children and for all 
who are far off, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to himself” (v. 39). 
Yet Peter also specifies that Christ’s liberating work requires a response: 
“Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the 
forgiveness of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit” (v. 38). Hence, 
perhaps a more appropriate gloss, as it relates to the descensus, is that Christ 
descended into the realm of all the dead (hades), and not only to the hell of torment 
(e.g., Augustine’s first two statements) or only to the place of the just (e.g., 
Augustine’s last statement), so that he might grant freedom from the penalty of sin to 
all those who were his, both Jew and Gentile. This then brings us to a contingent 
point. If salvation is through Christ alone by faith alone and faith comes from hearing 
– where ‘hearing’ is characterized by an act of repentance – then like those upon the 
earth so likewise those ‘under the earth,’ all had to turn in faith to the person of Christ 
to be saved. 
In other words, the descent represents more than just the fulfillment of 
salvation for the Old Testament faithful who died before Christ, but like the day of 
Pentecost in Jerusalem the descent signifies a time of mass conversion. For instance, 
as we noted earlier Clement speculates that Christ preached to the Jews in hades while 
the apostles later preached to the Gentiles, and the reason he gives is “so that He 
should bring to repentance those belonging to the Hebrews, and they the Gentiles.”189 
Similarly, Origen says that Christ, “when he became a soul, without the covering of 
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the body, he dwelt among those souls which were without bodily covering, converting 
such of them as were willing unto himself, or those whom he saw, for reasons known 
to him alone, to be better adapted to such a course.”190 Trumbower explains, “Like 
Clement, Origen imagines Christ’s sojourn in Hades to be quite similar to his sojourn 
on earth. Sinners are able to repent even after they are dead.”191 In short, just as the 
Jews and everyone else during the time of Jesus’ ministry on the earth, so also the 
Jews and everyone else in hades during his descent – upon hearing the proclamation 
of the gospel souls had to place their faith in the name of Christ for the forgiveness of 
sins. And because this is the way of salvation for all, it follows that conversion in 
hades – i.e., turning to the person of Jesus – was not only possible but necessary. 
Yet in light of this alternative reading and application of Acts 2:24, how do we 
maintain an Augustinian trajectory in a way that still fits within our suggested 
theological framework for understanding the descent? The key for accomplishing this 
task lies with Augustine’s initial assertion that Christ’s salvation of those who, from a 
human perspective, were outside the promise of salvation, was done “in accordance 
with the mysteries of God’s justice”192 That is, the salvation of a person who dies 
before hearing the gospel does not rest on the fact that they are ‘unevangelized,’ but 
on the fact that they are among “those who [God] decreed should be released 
according to the inscrutable ways of His justice,”193; those “whom He judged worthy 
of that deliverance” according to his “divine mercy and justice.”194 
As it relates to our proposal for how God might prepare an unevangelized 
person through the Spirit’s use of the natural law; those who died in a state of 
preparation for the gospel turned to Christ when he descended (i.e., the elect), while 
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those who died unprepared rejected him (i.e., the unpardonable). We might even 
imagine that the Gentiles who died outside knowledge of the God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob yet who were prepared by the Spirit for receiving the gospel promise would 
have been drawn to and received by those at Abraham’s side in hades. As Jesus 
declared after marveling at the faith of the Gentile centurion: “I tell you, many will 
come from east and west and recline at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the 
kingdom of heaven” (Matt 8:11).195 Likewise, perhaps those who rejected the Spirit’s 
preparatory work in life would have despised or been denied the comfort afforded by 
this promise of redemption. In other words, just as on the earth so likewise under the 
earth, the proclamation of the gospel in hades became “a fragrance from death to 
death” to the “perishing,” but to those who were “being saved” it was “a fragrance 
from life to life” (2 Cor 2:15-16). As John Damascene states: 
The soul [of Christ] when it was deified descended into Hades, in order that, 
just as the Sun of Righteousness rose for those upon the earth, so likewise He 
might bring light to those who sit under the earth in darkness and shadow of 
death: in order that just as He brought the message of peace to those upon the 
earth, and of release to the prisoners, and of sight to the blind, and became to 
those who believed the Author of everlasting salvation and to those who did 
not believe a reproach of their unbelief, so He might become the same to those 
in Hades.196 
 
The suggestion here is that before Christ’s descent ‘the pangs’ of death in 
hades were mutual, experienced by the elect and unpardonable alike. Yet these pangs 
imply not the torments of hell but the fact that atonement for sin had yet to be made 
and thus sin and death still reigned. That is, the bonds of death held fast to all who 
died until the time of Christ, for death could not overcome Christ “because it was not 
possible for him to be held by it” (v. 24b). Furthermore, recalling our suggestion that 
Christ’s descent into hades caused a fundamental rather than comprehensive change 
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so that there is still only one objective intermediate state with two subjective states, 
we might then say that in this sense the church is indeed in ‘hell’ and that just as on 
earth so also in hades Christians witness to the hope of resurrection in Christ. 
Moreover, if the church is in hades then the Holy Spirit is present there too, for if the 
beatific vision and glorification are delayed until the day of the Lord, then until that 
day the Spirit remains “the guarantee of our inheritance until we acquire possession of 
it” (Eph 1:14). So even though Christ is now seated at the right hand of the Father in 
heaven, all who abide in the Spirit rest in the bosom of Christ (1 John 4:13), and while 
this state is not yet heaven it is still paradise because when viewed in this way, 
“paradise,” says Augustine, refers to “any spiritual region, as it were, where the soul 
is in a happy state.”197 
In short, if hades remains the one objective intermediate state of the dead after 
the descent, and if a major characteristic of hades is that it provides certain individuals 
who die outside knowledge of Christ the opportunity to hear and respond to the 
proclamation of the gospel, then just as in hades before Christ so likewise in hades 
after Christ – those who die outside knowledge of Christ but who are nonetheless 
prepared by the Spirit for receiving the gospel will be drawn to and received by the 
church in paradise. As Biesbrouck suggests, “If the souls of the Christian faithful in 
that intermediate state, proclaim Jesus some way or another, those who during their 
lives on earth never heard of Jesus, are now given the opportunity to recognize 
him.”198 Or as Bloesch states: 
I believe it is more in keeping with the tradition of the church catholic to view 
the descent as opening the door to the salvation of those who are not yet in the 
family of God. Not all will believe when they hear the gospel for the first time, 
but it is not impermissible to surmise that many will come to faith in Christ.199 
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To be sure, this possibility requires posthumous repentance, but maybe worries can be 
mitigated when we consider that the proposal here is that: 1) souls do not go 
immediately to heaven proper or hell proper after death, but to the one objective space 
called hades where they await the consummation; 2) unlike heaven and hell, or even 
‘the limbo of the just,’ the opportunity to hear and receive the gospel with faith is not 
only permissible in hades but necessary (i.e., all had to turn to the person of Christ in 
his descent to be saved); 3) the church’s proclamation of the gospel in hades is not 
efficacious for those who rejected Christ in life nor for all the unevangelized in 
general (the unpardonable), but only for those individuals who receive the Spirit’s 
work of preparing grace during their lifetime (the elect). 
It is especially with this last point that the proposal is able to maintain an 
Augustinian trajectory. For as stated earlier, this salvation is not based on the fact that 
they are unevangelized, but on the fact that it is “in accordance with the mysteries of 
God’s justice.”200 Or as it relates to our Reformation approach, we might simply 
connect this trajectory to Zwingli, who states, “Nothing prevents God from choosing 
from among the heathen men to revere Him, to honor Him, and after death to be 
united to Him. For His election is free.”201 And as regards Augustine’s concern that 
the notion of posthumous salvation leads to the logical conclusion that “the gospel 
ought not to be preached on earth,” we might simply agree with him that such a 
conclusion is “absurd” and no “less foolish than profane.”202 Of course Augustine 
expresses this opinion in response to the idea that all unevangelized people are saved 
in hell, but we have already demonstrated in the previous chapter that, in itself, a 
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theological hope for the unevangelized does not lead necessarily to the derogation of 
Christian missions or to some form of universalism. As Bloesch asserts: 
Our hope is based not simply on Christ’s descent into hell but also on his 
ascent into heaven and the outpouring of the Spirit on earth. The nether world 
of spirits is not outside the reach of God’s grace, and this is why the 
intermediate state of the spiritually deprived and forsaken can be preached as 
part of the gospel—the good news that Christ has come to save the lost and 
that his grace is irresistible and invincible. Not even the gates of hell can 
impede its advance (Mt 16:18).203 
 
Assuming, then, that our answer remains in the spirit of the Augustinian prohibition 
against posthumous salvation and also upholds the traditional teaching that one’s fate 
is sealed at death, our development of a Reformation prospective fides ex auditu 




 The goal of Part 3 of this thesis has been to fill two gaps in Lindbeck’s 
prospective fides ex auditu theory in an effort to offer a Reformation solution to the 
question regarding the fate of the unevangelized. The first gap concerned his assertion 
that a strict cultural-linguistic point of view means that “adherents of different 
religions do not diversely thematize the same experience; rather they have different 
experiences.”204 The problem with this position in relation to a prospective theory is 
that it implies that unevangelized individuals will have little capacity for actually 
being able to receive or reject Christ upon hearing the gospel in death. And if despite 
their different cultural-linguistic experiences unevangelized persons were suddenly 
made able to understand and receive the gospel in the moment of death, then this 
brings into question continuity of personal identity. 
To work out this problem we noted that when Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic 
approach “draws on specifically biblical considerations,” he asserts that there are 
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“God-willed and God-approved anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom” in 
other religions.205 From this perspective, and in light of D’Costa’s use of the 
preparatio evangelica, we used a creative extrapolation of Luther to suggest that God 
prepares unevangelized persons for the gospel through the convicting use of the 
natural law by the Holy Spirit, and we called this an act of “actual grace” whereby the 
soul “is directed to the attaining . . . of sanctifying grace.”206 This grace is not itself 
saving, but it does direct the individual towards salvation. Furthermore, although it is 
described as an internal grace, the proposal is not just another version of the 
“experiential-expressive” approach which Lindbeck argues against.207 Rather, it 
suggests that the Spirit uses the particular cultural-linguistic environment to bring 
about this effect. Hence, our approach is in keeping with Lindbeck’s insistence that 
“the humanly real . . . is not constructed from below upward or from the inner to the 
outer, but from the outer to the inner, and from above downward.”208 
The next gap in his theory, which we have covered in this chapter, concerns 
the need for a cultural-linguistic space and time after death in which certain 
unevangelized people can come to faith. In other words, even if they are prepared for 
the gospel they still need to gain “some familiarity with the determinate settings in 
which religious utterances acquire propositional force.”209 As regards the fides ex 
auditu solution, the determinate setting is the church and the church’s proclamation of 
the gospel. The proposal then is that unevangelized individuals who are in the same 
subjective state as those who were saved in the descent will likewise have an 
opportunity to hear and receive the gospel after death. And what makes this possible 
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is the suggestion that hades still functions as the one objective intermediate place of 
all the dead (based on early church and Reformation material). 
This proposal is worthy of consideration for the following reasons. First, it 
upholds the doctrinal principles of solus Christus, sola fide, and fides ex auditu. The 
possibility of salvation for an unevangelized person is founded on the assertion that, if 
this happens, it will only be through hearing the church’s proclamation of the gospel. 
Therefore, this solution satisfies the Christological and ecclesiological requirements 
of salvation. Second, it explains how other religions can lead adherents towards ends 
that are different to Christianity, while at the same time allowing for the possibility 
that there is among them “God-willed and God-approved anticipations of aspects of 
the coming kingdom.”210 For by defining ‘preparation for the gospel’ as an act by the 
Holy Spirit rather than as certain things in a religion, the religion itself need not be 
judged according to the level of truth, beauty, and goodness it contains as viewed 
from a Christian perspective. In this way, Christians can appreciate the teachings of 
other religions on their own terms and yet still expect that God is working among 
adherents for the sake of salvation. 
Third, it mitigates the Augustinian prohibition against posthumous salvation 
by affirming that the possibility is not due to the fact that they are unevangelized, but 
to the fact that, just as in the descent, some may yet be saved according to God’s 
‘mysterious justice’ (or what Luther calls ‘irregular grace’). Fourth, it overcomes the 
difficulties related to the analogical use of the doctrine of Christ’s descent into hell. 
That is, in order for this analogy to work the historical event and location of the 
descent must connect to something that is also objectively available after Christ. The 
theological concept of the limbo of the just cannot meet this need because this space 
is empty after the descent. Yet my proposal overcomes this problem by suggesting 
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that hades, the general place of all the dead, still objectively exists and that the church 
will continue to proclaim the message of Christ in this place until the full number of 
the elect is reached. 
Fifth, it keeps purgatory Christological and Christian by placing it during the 
time of the general resurrection, when “the dead in Christ will rise first” (1 Thess 
4:16). It therefore suggests that until this day the Spirit will continue to preserve and 
sanctify the elect through the church’s ministry of the word, and also “hold the 
unrighteous for punishment on the day of judgment” (2 Pet 2:9). Sixth, it upholds the 
urgency of the missionary task for reaching the unreached by pointing out that the 
prime motive of missions is rooted not in communal or personal views of the 
unevangelized, but in the active immutable presence of the Holy Spirit. Outside of 
faith a person is truly lost in sin and under the power of death and condemnation 
(Rom 6:20-23); thus, until the consummation the church must strive to proclaim the 
gospel in all the world so that “those who have never been told of him will see, and 
those who have never heard will understand” (Rom 15:21; Isa 52:15). Seventh, it 
makes the prospective fides ex auditu option theologically accessible as a 
Reformation approach by upholding the evangel and placing the possibility squarely 
in the sovereign will of God. For it is not related to a person’s response to elements of 
truth outside the church, but to the Spirit’s work of grace in the world to lead people 
to Christ through the church. 
 However, notwithstanding these strengths, I also recognize that the lack of 
critical engagement with the biblical text in support of the overall argument means 
that the proposal is not yet as theologically robust as it could be. For instance, with 
little question I accepted Luther’s reading of Romans 2:14 in order to establish the 
concept of the ‘people in the middle’ as a kind of cornerstone for the discussion on 
natural law and grace. And although I mentioned that some Protestant scholars today 
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interpret Romans 2:14 as referring to Gentile Christians and then further suggested 
that the argument still works with this alternative reading, I did not also seek to prove 
this assertion. 
In a similar way, in this last chapter, I have depended more upon the 
traditional teachings on the interim state between death and the consummation and 
less upon the biblical exegesis involved in working out these teachings. Indeed, a 
good example of this kind of biblical scholarship on the subject is found in Paul 
Williamson’s book, Death and the Afterlife, in which he provides a careful study of 
the numerous Old and New Testament passages that support the notion that after 
death all souls must wait in an intermediate state until the resurrection.211 Had I 
incorporated his study into my own, it would have substantially increased the biblical 
integrity of the current proposal. 
Nevertheless, this weakness also indicates an appropriate direction for further 
study. As Lindbeck writes: 
It is there [the Bible] that the final court of appeal is to be found and external 
standards of distinguishing between good and evil and truth and falsity give 
way to internal ones. . . . Changes in landscape and worldview occur within 
believers’ Scripture-dependent outlook, which, precisely because it is textually 
inscribed, remains basically unchanged.212 
 
Although simple appeal to Scripture cannot provide definitive support for the 
possibility of salvation for unevangelized people, a deeper study of the relevant 
biblical passages could strengthen the case by showing ways in which the proposal is 
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